UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN PRIOR TO 1848

A Study in Anglo-French Relations

JAMES EDGAR SWAIN

A THESIS

IN HISTORY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA

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PREFACE

THE prolonged struggle between Great Britain and France for world supremacy was temporarily abandoned with the signing of the *entente cordiale* in 1904. The numerous episodes in this age-long encounter vary in intensity and scope, but far removed from each other as they sometimes were, their causes were strikingly similar. The Mediterranean stands out conspicuously as one of the many focal points in the rivalry between these two great powers.

The importance of the Mediterranean area in recent international relations has received adequate historical emphasis but its importance during the earlier period has been somewhat neglected. There were many factors in the earlier period which were forerunners of important events that culminated in the recent epoch. The *raison d'être* for this work is to trace the beginnings of the well recognized present-day Mediterranean problems insofar as they affected Anglo-French relations.

The first two chapters contain little that is new or original. They are intended as the background for the main subject. The Mediterranean actually became a center of Anglo-French friction with Napoleon's ill-fated Egyptian expedition.

This work is an outgrowth of a study of "The Opposition to the French Control of Algiers, 1830-1848," which was submitted as part requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in history at the University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to Professor William E. Lingelbach, under whose direction this study was begun, and to the other members of the History Department at the University of Pennsylvania for their help and encouragement in this work.

Professor Herbert C. Bell of Wesleyan University, Professor F. S. Rodkey of the University of Illinois, Professor F. R. Flournoy of Saint Stephen's College, Professor W. T. Morgan of Indiana University, and my colleague, Professor Henry R. Mueller, were kind enough to read the entire manuscript and offered many valuable suggestions. Mrs. Alice Mary D. Leach of Germantown, Philadelphia, read and made many corrections in the proof. The errors which remain are to be ascribed entirely to the author.

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JAMES EDGAR SWAIN.

Muhlenberg College
Allentown, Pennsylvania
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CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL TREND OF ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS

The sixteenth century witnessed an expansion of the activities of civilized peoples from an inland sea to the greater expanse of the Atlantic. The growth in power and the mounting ambitions of England and France, which accompanied this change, led them into controversies in spite of the extent of the field of possible activity. Their interests conflicted almost from the beginning of their national existence, and the struggle for commercial and colonial supremacy assumed a leading rôle in the long story of their international complications.

The Hundred Years' War was the culmination of a long series of commercial and nationalistic disputes in which France was able to free herself from the dangers of the direct control of England. The latter, failing in the attempt to dominate France, withdrew from the continent and sought satisfaction in more distant lands. The sea became the realm of her greatest adventure and the scene of her greatest triumphs. While France struggled to control continental Europe England laid the foundations for her far-flung empire.

Even with this parting of the ways the two nations found themselves rivals and competitors. England, although not actually seeking territorial possessions on the mainland, was anxious to prevent any continental state from becoming too powerful and thereby threatening the prospects of her own commercial and colonial supremacy. This attitude, manifestly evident as early as the sixteenth century, became a

cardinal principle in English foreign policy. France, on the other hand, sought to augment her influence both on the continent and abroad. England, in order to restrain a rival, whether it was France or some other power, was instrumental in establishing a principle commonly referred to as "the balance of power." The purpose, as far as England was concerned, was to maintain a *status quo* in continental affairs. England and France became the leaders of two opposing groups, while the other powers generally aligned themselves with one or the other of these two states. The two resulting organizations were by no means constant. States often shifted from one to the other and at times the specified alignments ceased to exist altogether; but during a crisis England and France nearly always led opposing groups. Diplomacy, therefore, played a very important part, since the outcome of a struggle was often decided by the number and strength of the allies which each state was able to win. The English seemed to excel in this respect. With but few exceptions France, when at war with England, was forced to face a formidable alliance which her rival had been able to muster.

The first real test of the balance of power was the attempt of France to extend her territorial limits to what Richelieu called the natural frontiers.[1] England opposed the French occupation of the Rhine provinces as a serious threat against her security; Louis XIV added still another cause for her concern by seeking control of Spain. When through his efforts his grandson was elected King of Spain he bade the new king godspeed with the significant words, *"Adieu, mon fils, il n'y a plus de Pyrénées."*[2]

England, opposed to the application of the doctrine of natural frontiers, was very much incensed at this threat

[1] Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 321.
[2] *Oeuvres de Louis XIV*, II, 466.

against Spain. William III, the first King of England really to test the principle of balance of power, organized the Grand Alliance in order to curb the ambitions of Louis XIV. Article five of the agreement purposed "To recover the Provinces of the Spanish Low Countries, that there may be a fence and rampart, commonly called a Barrier, separating and distancing France from the United Provinces; . . . as likewise the Duchy of Milan, with its dependencies, as a Fief of the Empire, and contributing to the security of His Imperial Majesty's hereditary Countries; besides the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily and lands and islands upon the Coasts of Tuscany in the Mediterranean, that belongs to the Spanish Dominions and may serve to the same purpose; and will also be to the advantage of the navigation and commerce of the subjects of the Kingdom of Great Britain and the United Provinces."[3] The Treaty of Utrecht, which brought to a close the War of the Spanish Succession, substantiated the ideas which William III had in organizing the Grand Alliance. The union of France and Spain was prohibited; Great Britain, by a separate treaty with Spain, obtained Gibraltar; a balance of power was established for Europe; and the Mediterranean was secure from the domination of any one power.[4]

This principle was applied many times in the treaties and negotiations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The English came to the aid of Prussia in 1756 in order to uphold the principle of balance of power. In explaining the British point of view Newcastle declared that unless England had intervened she would have had to "abandon Europe to France and sustain alone, during many years, an unequal struggle against that power."[5] England's skill both in military and diplomatic pursuits against her rival is

[3] Mowat, *European States System*, 29.
[4] Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique Politique Étrangère*, I, 229.
[5] Hill, *History of European Diplomacy*, III, 547.

shown in the Seven Years' War. England joined Prussia against Austria and France not for love of Prussia nor for any animosity against Austria, but because of her rivalry with France. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 demonstrated the success of the British policy. The frontiers in Europe remained virtually unchanged, but Great Britain enriched herself at the expense of France in Canada and India. The period of the French Revolution and Napoleon marked another intense struggle in which England was primarily responsible for the ultimate defeat of France. The Treaties of Paris and the Congress of Vienna had as their prime motives the curbing of France. Great Britain did not fail to watch France even after this and was one of the first European powers to protest against the French occupation of Algiers in 1830.

Anglo-French relations in regard to the Mediterranean, with special reference to Algiers, prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, are the subject matter of the following chapters. At this point it is sufficient to say that the British policy in general altered but little from an attempt to prevent any one power from becoming too strong on the continent. Changes were made in Europe with the consent of the British government (the independence of Belgium and Greece for example), but in each case the British policy aimed at the prevention of any one power from becoming supreme in these important territories. France was a persistent obstacle in the realization of these aims.

CHAPTER II

THE CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BECOMES AN ISSUE

The Mediterranean region holds a unique place in world history. It served as a cradle for civilization and nursed it in its infancy. Then as nations developed, it became the center of competition and rivalry. Persia, Greece, Carthage, Rome, and Venice, each in turn, attained great heights of achievement. To most of the early powers the Mediterranean area was the limit of the known world; but gradually the more venturesome extended their activities beyond the limits of that great inland sea to the vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean. Mediterranean cities no longer held a monopoly on world trade. They were gradually superseded by the great *entrepôts* on the Atlantic. Civilization passed from an inland sea stage to an oceanic one. Sailors turned their ships towards the Americas and the Far East.[1]

The successful rounding of the Cape of Good Hope and the circumnavigation of the earth eventually broke the prestige of Venice, the last of the early Mediterranean powers. That, along with the discovery of the vast territorial expanse of the western hemisphere, shifted the commercial routes to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Venice, realizing the inevitable loss of her prestige, contemplated as early as the sixteenth century the construction of a canal connecting the Mediterranean with the Red Sea in order to maintain her commercial supremacy.[2] The canal was not started, but the fact that it was even discussed at this early date indi-

[1] Herre, *Weltgeschichte am Mittelmeer, passim.*
[2] Hill, *op. cit.*, II, 268.

cated that its possibilities were realized. The futile dream of Venice was destined to become a reality in a later period.[3]

Both England and France were conscious of the possibilities that could be derived from the ultimate control of the Mediterranean, and they contested each other's rights for points of vantage such as Gibraltar, Italy, northern Africa, and Turkey. All these places figure conspicuously in the struggle for the control of the Mediterranean, but Turkey, by virtue of her control of the Dardanelles, was the most outstanding bone of contention. The strategic importance of her geographical position, her different type of civilization combined with an inherent political weakness, gave rise to an issue commonly referred to as the "Near Eastern Question." The powers of Europe had a variety of interests in Turkey, but the most significant of all was the desire to acquire a lion's share of the spoils in case the Porte should succumb. This caused some curious international alignments with sudden changes of policy on the part of some of the states but at the same time it insured Turkey against complete destruction. Even in the darkest moments of her existence there was always a power to lend the Porte a supporting hand, not for love of the Sultan or his people, but to check the aggressions of some rival power. From the battle of Lepanto in 1571 to the World War in 1914 this condition reappears with monotonous regularity in the drama of European politics.

The powers most vitally interested in Turkey were Great Britain, France, and Russia. Great Britain considered the control of this highway to her Far Eastern possessions necessary for her security and prosperity. British statesmen recognized this fact and unhesitatingly attempted to retain that control, regardless of the dynasty that occupied the throne or the party that governed the state. There were a

[3]Newbigen, *Mediterranean Lands, passim.*

number of Englishmen who had at the same time a sentimental and cultural interest in the Mediterranean. Dr. Johnson spoke in behalf of an influential group when he declared that "a man who has not been to Italy is always conscious of an inferiority, from his not having seen what it is expected a man should see. The grand object of traveling is to see the shores of the Mediterranean. On these shores were the four great Empires of the world: Assyrian, Persian, Grecian, and Roman. All our religion, almost all our law, almost all our arts, almost all that sets us above savages has come to us from the shores of the Mediterranean."[4] The inspiration that Gibbon obtained from the ruins of Rome led him to write his masterly *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. The same spirit prompted Lord Byron to make the supreme sacrifice for the cause of the Greeks.

The policy of France was neither as consistent nor as logical as that of Great Britain, but it was none the less vital. The Mediterranean region was to her a realm of adventure, a stepping-stone towards her greater achievements. This point of view is strikingly illustrated in the Mediterranean policy of Napoleon. In the words of Louis Blanc, the Near East was to the French "that great battlefield where sooner or later, must be fought the great fight of our intellectual and moral supremacy."[5] France often shifted her plans completely in order to conform to some passing fancy. Realizing this, the British sometimes appealed to France to offset Russia, and then, as the occasion arose, turned the tables and used Russia to curtail the ambitions of France.[6] Russia desired the Dardanelles and was willing to sacrifice more to obtain it than was France or Great Britain. The control of this outlet to the sea she considered as a *sine qua non* to her progress. Great Britain

[4] Boswell, *Life of Johnson.*
[5] Louis Blanc, *History of Ten Years*, II, 191.
[6] *Malmesbury Diaries*, I, 256.

was just as opposed to Russian as to French control of the Dardanelles and she endeavored to prevent both by preserving the territorial integrity of Turkey.

Italy was still another center which held the interest of the powers. Internal dissension kept this unfortunate country in constant turmoil. The Papacy endeavored to make a reality out of the unrealistic Holy Roman Empire and struggled for the mastery of the peninsula.[7] Naples, Milan, and Venice, all powerful, independent states, contested this effort, but instead of banding themselves together to oppose their common enemy they sought aid individually from other powers. This lack of unity afforded an excellent opportunity for the powers to intervene. Austria, Spain, and France had for some time been looking for such a chance. Great Britain once again was opposed to one power dominating Italy, just as she was opposed to one power controlling Turkey. She was less insistent about Italy than about Turkey, and was thus more compromising, but her motives were primarily the same.[8]

Charles VIII inaugurated an active campaign to obtain Italy for France. He attempted to hide his more materialistic aims by posing as a crusader for the establishment of peace and as a protector of the Roman Catholic religion. In reality, however, it was the lure of the East which prompted his active intervention in Italy, the occupation of which he considered as a necessary preliminary step. Charles VIII was wise enough to realize that the neutrality of England must be assured before he could undertake the hazards of the expedition. This he purchased in the Treaty of Etaples by the payment of 745,000 crowns of gold. The English negotiators probably did not realize the extent of Charles's ambitions. His initial attempts in Italy were quite

[7] Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire.*

[8] Hill, *op. cit.*, II, 171. Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 261.

successful. Fortune soon failed him, however, and he was forced to retreat.[9] Louis XII, the successor to Charles VIII, became a party in the famous League of Cambray which aimed at the destruction of Venice and the augmentation of the powers of the signers. Venice in desperation appealed to England. The Venetian ambassador declared that "France would become monarch of the universe by the occupation of the Empire, which would certainly follow." This appeal found response in England where opposition to France was already keen.[10] England did not intervene with an army, but her diplomats were busy. The Pope signed a treaty of peace with Venice in 1510, and negotiations were put under way for the formation of a league to be composed of Venice, England, Spain, and the Emperor against France. France could not meet any such opposition so her activity in Italy gradually waned, until in 1559, in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis she gave up her claims and turned her attention in another direction.

Both France and England were busily engaged in Turkey endeavoring to win concessions from the Sultan. Francis I, King of France, negotiated a treaty of friendship and commerce with Sultán Suleiman in 1528, which gave the French special privileges in Turkey, and inaugurated the practice of capitulations and extra-territorial jurisdiction. Queen Elizabeth, due to pressure which the Levant Company brought to bear, appointed a regularly accredited ambassador to the Sultan's court. Trade between England and Turkey was steadily growing, and some protection was demanded by the English merchants from their government. English ships had for some time been carrying commodities between Southampton and Crete, Cyprus, and Syria, and with the formation of the Levant Company a request was

[9] Hill, *op. cit.*, II, 206.

[10] Brewer and Gardiner, *Reign of Henry VIII from Accession to Death of Wolsey.* Hill, *op. cit.*, II, 282.

made for the establishment of diplomatic contacts. Harbone was sent as Ambassador to Constantinople in 1582, and he in turn sent consuls to Cairo, Alexandria, Aleppo, Damascus, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Trade increased rapidly. In 1584, the estimated value of the Mediterranean trade was £45,000, and from 1591 to 1599, seven thousand tons of currants, to mention only one item, entered the port of London from Corinth.[11] Turkey, although inhabited by infidels and barbarians, was given diplomatic recognition by two of the greatest of the European powers before the close of the sixteenth century.

English seamen were very active in the Mediterranean during the latter part of Queen Elizabeth's reign and the beginning of the Stuart period. Some affiliated themselves with pirate bands, particularly with the Algerians, taught them improved methods in ship-building and even practised piracy themselves.[12] Sir Walter Raleigh contemplated an expedition into the Mediterranean before he finally decided to go to America; and Frobisher was trained in Mediterranean service before he went in search of the Northwest passage.[13]

The Barbary pirates were a source of great annoyance to English merchants. James I, due to pressure from the Levant and the East India Companies, appointed a Royal Commission in 1617, to investigate and recommend the best means of protecting the Mediterranean commerce.[14] The Commission recommended the immediate despatch of a squadron which should be permanently located in the Mediterranean.[15] The ostensible purpose of this act was to coerce the pirates, but it is evident that they also had in mind the

[11] Jonquière, *Histoire de l'Europe Ottoman*, I, 163. Cheyney, *History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth*, I, 375.
[12] Lane-Poole, *History of Barbary Corsairs*, 226. Corbett, *England and the Mediterranean, 1603-1713*, I, 11.
[13] Cheyney, *op. cit.*, I, 375.
[14] Corbett, *op. cit.*, I, 31 ff.
[15] *Ibid.*, 47.

establishment of an effective barrier against any power that might become too aggressive in the Mediterranean.[16] The recommendation was carried out, however, and in 1620, an English fleet set sail for the Mediterranean. The British government became an active participant in Mediterranean affairs. In 1661, a special expedition was sent against the pirates at Algiers, and Tangier was occupied the following year.[17]

France was by no means inactive while Great Britain was establishing herself in the Mediterranean. Richelieu took up the challenge for France. He inaugurated an aggressive policy in the Mediterranean as a part of his general plan to promote the interests of his King and country. The French navy was reörganized and modeled after the English; a survey was made with the idea of building a canal connecting Marseille with the Atlantic Ocean, and a naval base was begun at Toulon.[18] Louis XIV took a particular interest in Italy. His dreams of expanding the territorial limits of France naturally led him in the direction of Italy. Savoy became almost the same as a French province; Tuscany welcomed the French King and Pope Clement X seemed willing to allow him to have his way if he would promise to join in a crusade against the Turks.[19] Louis made considerable headway because at this time the English were inactive in the Mediterranean. Dissension between the Crown and Parliament resulted in the evacuation of Tangier, the one English stronghold in the Mediterranean. Louis XIV took advantage of this and for a time threatened to dominate not only the Mediterranean but the whole of Europe.

The accession of William III as king of England marked

[16] *Ibid.*, 81.
[17] Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, 323.
[18] *Ibid.*, I, 145.
[19] Hill, *op. cit.*, III, 129.

a turn in the tide. He was convinced of the importance of the Mediterranean in combating Louis XIV[20] and insisted on the complete control of a base in that region. Louis XIV, in the meantime, proceeded to occupy Cadiz, Port Mahon, and Gibraltar with the hope of controlling the western part of the Mediterranean and to further his cause in Spain. The War of the Spanish Succession, which had been going on for some time, became at this point "a war to prevent the dangerous preponderance of an ambitious and powerful state; it was also a war for the freedom of commerce. . . ."[21]

The death of William III and the accession of Queen Anne did not alter the English policy towards the Mediterranean. Marlborough, whose prominence in military activities and diplomacy was assured by this time, recognized the importance of the Mediterranean.[22] Before the end of the War of the Spanish Succession the allies were in possession of Gibraltar and their fleets had swept the Mediterranean clean of the French forces. The Treaty of Utrecht sealed the victory, degraded France, and advanced Great Britain to the rank of a first-rate power. Great Britain was triumphant in her policy even towards her allies because she succeeded in restricting not only her enemy but her friends as well. She controlled Gibraltar and Minorca; and the power of her merchants was enhanced by the "Asiento" or the right to furnish slaves to the Spanish colonies.[23] The British Mediterranean policy at the time of the peace of Utrecht was the culmination of a long period of wavering interest. A graph would show an uneven line slowly rising from a point of indifference during Elizabethan days to a high point of ardor in the time of Queen Anne.[24]

[20] Gimblot, *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and their Ministers, 1679-1700.*
[21] Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, 470.
[22] *Marlborough Despatches, passim.*
[23] Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, chapter 29.
[24] Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, 567.

Louis XIV, as mentioned previously, strove to dominate the eastern part of the Mediterranean as well as the western.[25] He used Turkey as an ally and as an enemy, depending on which capacity was best suited to his interests.[26] Great Britain was in no position to interfere with force of arms, but her diplomats aided in the prevention of the partition of Turkey in the Treaties of Carlowitz in 1699, and Passarowitz in 1718.[27] France was curbed in the East as well as in the West by the War of the Spanish Succession.

Walpole for Great Britain and Cardinal Fleury for France, both men of peace, greatly improved the relations between the two countries.[28] This good will, however, was not experienced by the nations as a whole. The old spirit of rivalry still manifested itself on the slightest provocation.[29] Cardinal Fleury, although passively submissive to the desires of Great Britain, did manifest some activity in the Mediterranean area. He was interested in the affairs of Italy, and he opposed the advances of Austria and Russia into Turkey.[30] The Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, which saved Turkey from the clutches of Russia, was largely his work.[31] Turkey, as a token of appreciation for what France had done, renewed and enlarged French capitulations. The cautious and wise policy of France during this period retrieved some of the influence which she had lost in the Mediterranean, while British prestige suffered because of the inactivity of Walpole.

Pitt and Choiseul, successors to Walpole and Cardinal Fleury respectively, followed policies which were in striking contrast to those of their predecessors. Both were aggressive and chauvinistic; and both with their aggressiveness and

[25] Hill, *op. cit.*, III, 137.
[26] Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy, 1451-1789*, 202.
[27] Roe, *Negotiations in his Embassy to the Porte, 1621-1628.*
[28] Abbott, *op. cit.*, II, 178.
[29] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, 83 ff.
[30] Hill, *op. cit.*, III, 444.
[31] Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique Politique Étrangère*, I, 405.

chauvinism received the enthusiastic support of the people of both countries. Determined on regaining some of the lost prestige of his country, Choiseul organized expeditions against the pirates in North Africa, made approaches to the Sultan of Turkey for a closer understanding,[32] and annexed Corsica outright in 1769.[33]

The Mediterranean problem was more than a two-sided affair between Great Britain and France. These two powers were as a general rule at odds, but in several instances they saw fit to coöperate in order to check the aggressions of a third power. For some time Russia had been gradually pushing southward towards the Dardanelles. Turkey was forced to sign the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774, which gave Russia control over the Crimea, influence in Moldavia and Wallachia, free navigation for Russian ships on all waters controlled by Turkey, and a substantial indemnity.[34] This caused consternation in both Great Britain and France and led to preliminary negotiations for an alliance to oppose this common enemy.[35] No action was necessary, however, in this particular instance, for dissension between Catherine of Russia and Joseph of Austria and the unexpected intervention of Sweden removed the immediate dangers of Russian expansion.[36]

France and Great Britain also contested each other's rights in Egypt. Both powers considered this country as a likely stepping-stone to the East. This idea found expression in France as early as 1763.[37] The British watched very closely what was taking place and sent a consul to Cairo with instructions to "watch the motions of the French and their

[32] Abbott, *op. cit.*, II, 289.
[33] Jacobi, *Histoire de la Corse*, II, chapter 8.
[34] Hill, *op. cit.*, III, 677.
[35] *Auckland Correspondence*, see especially I, 217. Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au dix-huitème Siècle*, 263. Marriott, *The Near Eastern Question*, 155.
[36] Sorel, *op. cit.*, chapter 2.
[37] Charles-Roux, "La Politique française en Egypte à la fin du XVIIIe Siècle," *Revue Historique*, 1926.

particular designs."[38] Egypt was destined to become the focal point of Anglo-French rivalry in the Mediterranean.

The first few years preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution was a period of the gradual ascendency of France over Great Britain. France made temporary gains as a result of the American Revolution. A family compact existed between France and Spain, the French King shared his throne with an Austrian princess, and Russia showed signs of friendship which were reciprocated in the French court.[39] All of these things seemed to bid fair for the future of France. Both Catherine and Joseph in 1787, were pressing Louis XVI for his support in the partitioning of Turkey and offered him Egypt in compensation.[40] Several things prevented the fruition of the plans. Joseph died in 1790, the partition of Poland temporarily satisfied Catherine, and France, passively opposed to the destruction of Turkey from the beginning, was soon involved in a revolution that ultimately affected the whole of Europe.[41]

The French Revolution completely changed the foreign policy of France. Everything pertaining to the *Ancien Régime,* foreign or domestic, was considered taboo by the new element which the Revolution brought into power. At first they were too busy with internal problems to give any particular attention to foreign affairs. They were forced to wage a defensive war, but once the invaders were repulsed, they were carried on by their enthusiasm for democracy and territorial aggrandizement to begin an offensive war. Even before the appearance of Napoleon the revolutionary government in France was active in Turkey. Accredited agents were sent there and propaganda societies were established. There was very little opposition from

[38] Hoskins, *British Routes to India,* 35.
[39] Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française,* I, 522.
[40] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* I, 146.
[41] Driault, *La Question d'Orient, passim.*

Great Britain but Russia was on her guard. Not until the Egyptian campaign of Napoleon did Great Britain open her eyes.[42] The aggressiveness of the revolutionary government in France soon led them onto forbidden ground, a fact which ultimately involved them in a war with Great Britain.[43]

Great Britain broke with France, not because of any general opposition to the theories of the Revolution, but because of the threat which France made against the territorial *status quo* in Europe. There was in fact a strong sentiment in both countries in favor of peace. Mirabeau advocated an alliance with Great Britain and was supported by Talleyrand, who for a short time represented his country at the court of St. James. Talleyrand worked hard for British neutrality and at first seemed to make some headway.[44] He warned the French government against spreading propaganda in Great Britain and discouraged any attempt at intervention in the Low Countries.[45] The situation gradually got beyond his control,[46] as the British became more and more suspicious of the French and the French more aggressive and less considerate of the British. French troops entered the Low Countries. The Scheldt River was opened and three days later a decree declaring war against all kings passed the French Assembly. All hope for peace was destroyed by these acts, despite the efforts of Talleyrand.[47]

The Mediterranean question played an important part in the long war which followed. The British succeeded in winning the support of Sardinia and Naples against France. Admiral Hood was sent with a fleet to the Mediterranean where he occupied Toulon in August, 1793, and made plans

[42] Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique Politique Étrangère*, II, 37 ff.
[43] Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, III, 233.
[44] A. E. C. P., Angleterre, supplement 29. Talleyrand to Delessait, January 27, 1792.
[45] *Ibid.*, Talleyrand's reports of February 17, 21, and March 2, 1792.
[46] *Ibid.*, Angleterre 581.
[47] *Ibid.*, 585.

to occupy Corsica. The break-up of the First Coalition handicapped the operations of the British.[48] By the close of 1796 they had evacuated Crosica, Elba, and practically all points of vantage which they had held in the Mediterranean.[49]

The establishment of the Directory improved the relations between France and Great Britain. Peace negotiations were started[50] but they were premature. The French were still in hope of greater victories, and the British, although desirous for peace, were not willing to make the sacrifices which their adversaries demanded.[51] The appearance of Napoleon destroyed any immediate prospects for peace.

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[48] *Dropmore Papers*, III, *passim*.
[49] Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, IV, 447.
[50] A. E. C. P., Ang. 591. Talleyrand to the Directory, August 21, 1797. Guyot, *Le Directoire et la Paix de l'Europe*, 303 ff.
[51] *Dropmore Papers*, III, 272 ff.

CHAPTER III

NAPOLEON'S ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE MEDITERRANEAN

The auspicious revival of French activity in the Mediterranean was augmented by the appearance of Napoleon, who possessed the dynamic initiative so much needed to bolster the idealism of the French Revolution. The breadth of his ambitions was unlimited and to him the control of the Mediterranean was a logical step in the fulfillment of his plans. He believed that Great Britain was his chief opponent. Her command of the sea necessitated an indirect attack, and India, he was convinced, was one of her most vulnerable points. The approach to India was through the Mediterranean.

Even before Napoleon came on the scene of action, France had displayed more than usual interest in Italy. Napoleon was appointed by the French government in 1794 to go to Genoa to examine the fortifications and make a general military survey.[1] He was recalled before his task was completed, and in disgust sought permission to go to Turkey to enter the services of the Sultan.[2] Permission was not granted. Changes in the French government led to his appointment first as second-in-command of the Army of the Interior and finally to the position of commander of the Army of Italy.[3]

Both Napoleon and the Directory regarded the invasion of Italy as a means to an end. It would serve as a military outpost for an attack against Austria, and eventually as a

[1] Bourrienne, *Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte*, I, 22.
[2] *Ibid.*, 31.
[3] Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique Politique Étrangère*, II, 145.

base for operations against Turkey. It was a necessary preliminary step towards complete control of the Mediterranean.

The British were quite conscious of these plans. Pitt encouraged Catherine of Russia to occupy Corsica in order to hold France in check. Catherine did not respond immediately, and her death in December, 1796, ended the immediate possibilities of aid from that direction.[4] The same suggestion, when made to Paul, the new ruler of Russia, fell flat. He was not inclined to warlike activities, and although he did not like Napoleon, tolerated him as the most powerful foe of the hated Jacobins.[5]

Napoleon was successful in Italy both on the field of battle and at the conference table. He took command of the Army of Italy in March, 1796; in April Piedmont signed a treaty of peace; in February, 1797, the Pope sued for terms; and in April the Austrians signed the preliminary peace of Leoben.[6] The crowning achievement of the Italian campaign was the Treaty of Campo Formio which was signed October 17, 1797.[7]

Italy was looked upon by the French as a favorable field for activity, but the conquest was intended also to cripple British prestige in the Mediterranean. The armistice to which the Cardinals agreed at Bologna stipulated that the British be expelled from the Papal States and that French troops occupy Ancona. "Ancona," wrote Napoleon in explaining to the Directory the reasons for his actions, "will give a great influence over the Ottoman Porte and make us masters of the Adriatic."[8] The consideration which was shown Austria in the Treaty of Campo Formio was

[4] Guyot, *Le Directoire et la Paix d'Europe*, 293.

[5] *Malmesbury Diaries*, III, 340 ff.

[6] De Clercq, *Recueil de Traités de la France*, I, 319.

[7] *Ibid.*, I, 335. Negotiations for the treaty are to be found in Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1675. A. E. C. P., Autriche 370.

[8] *Correspondance de Napoléon I*, II, no. 1510. Bonaparte to the Directory, February 19, 1797.

prompted by a desire to win her favor and alienate her from Great Britain.[9] Talleyrand in the meantime expedited the Austrian transactions by separate negotiations with the British at Lille. He mistrusted the British and urged that peace negotiations be used merely to further the prospects of an understanding with Austria. The idea worked perfectly.[10] Napoleon was pleased with his treaty with Austria, especially the provision which gave France the Ionian Islands. He believed that the possession of these islands would enable him to become master of the Mediterranean.[11]

Napoleon's successes were proclaimed at Paris. Barras, one of the Directors, greeted him on his return as a conquering hero with the timely words, "Go there and capture the giant corsair that infests the seas: go punish in London outrages that too long have been unpunished."[12] This was not a new idea to Napoleon. Such encouragement only strengthened notions which his fertile imagination already harbored. The title of Commander of the Army of England was bestowed upon him, and he visited Dunkirk, presumably to make plans for an invasion of the British Isles. His interests, however, were in another direction. "If the success of a descent upon England appears doubtful," he declared, "as I suspect it will, the Army of England shall become the Army of the East, and I go to Egypt."[13]

The idea of an expedition to the East in order to weaken Great Britain was not new, nor was it Napoleon who first conceived it. It was rather the outgrowth of a long development of French policy towards the Levant. Louis XIV had been urged to substitute Egypt for the Rhine Provinces. Choiseul called it to the attention of Louis XV after the Seven Years' War. Louis XVI was offered Egypt

[9] A. E. C. P., Autriche 364.
[10] A. E. C. P., Ang. 591-2. Reports of Talleyrand to the Directory. *Dropmore Papers*, III, 380 ff. *Malmesbury Diaries*, III, 366 ff.
[11] *Nap. Corresp.*, III, no. 2195. Bonaparte to Talleyrand, September 13, 1797.
[12] Quoted in Rose, *Life of Napoleon I*, I, 158.
[13] *Ibid.*, I, 160.

by Catherine of Russia and Joseph of Austria for his support in a proposed partitioning of Turkey. D'Argenson suggested as early as 1738 that a canal should be cut through the Isthmus of Suez; and in 1780 French officers were in Egypt to investigate the possibilities for a conquest. The Foreign Office in 1795, received a plan which outlined in detail a proposed attack against Great Britain. Magallon, the author of the document, declared that "Departing from Toulon on the 20th of June, French troops could be at Alexandria on the 10th of July, at Cairo about the 20th, at Suez about the 25th, forty-five days later in India, before the English would have had time to take any defensive measure. Ten thousand French newly arrived from Europe, in a single campaign, would chase them out entirely from Bengal, where they have their principal military establishment."[14] Three years later *Le Moniteur* contained a report from an official commission which recommended expansion in order to attain prominence in European affairs, and Egypt was mentioned as a desirable place to begin.[15] More significant still, when considered in the light of later developments, was Talleyrand's address delivered before the Institute entitled: "An essay upon the advantages to be derived from new colonies in the existing circumstances."[16] He recommended expansion to the East rather than towards the Rhine, which was favored by the majority of leading Frenchmen. His appointment a short time later as Minister of Foreign Affairs gave him the opportunity officially to carry out his views. He encouraged Napoleon to undertake a campaign to Egypt; he emphasized the value of Egypt as a colony and suggested that the possession of Egypt would compensate for the loss to Great Britain of

[14] Quoted in Hoskins, *op. cit.*, 53.
[15] *Le Moniteur*, April 20, 1798.
[16] *Mémoires de l'Institut National des Sciences et Arts*, II, 288.

their colonies in North America.[17] Napoleon readily responded to these suggestions because they appealed to his imagination and conformed with his ideas as to the value of the Orient. His schemes soared after the treaty with Austria and the *coup d'état* of 18th Fructidor. He outlined to Talleyrand his plans to occupy the Ionian Islands, Malta, and Corfu as preliminary steps and he requested Talleyrand to find out what effect the proposed expedition might have on the Porte.[18] The idea of using Egypt as a stepping-stone to India was old in theory but not practically applied until the time of Napoleon.

The Directory favored the Egyptian expedition, not only for reasons just mentioned but also to remove Napoleon from Paris, where his influence and prestige was feared by some of the members.[19] They encouraged his departure and furnished him with elaborate instructions which conformed very closely with the ideas of the adventurer for whom they were intended. "The Army of the East shall take possession of Egypt. The Commander-in-Chief shall chase the English from all their possessions in the East which he can reach, and in particular he shall destroy all their comptoires in the Red Sea. He shall have the Isthmus of Suez cut through; and shall take all the necessary steps to assure the free exclusive possession of the Red Sea to the French Republic. He shall ameliorate by all the means in his power the lot of the natives of Egypt. He shall maintain, as far as it depends on him, a good understanding with the Grand Signior and his immediate subjects."[20] Armed with these far-reaching instructions and his indomitable will Napoleon started out

[17] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1687. Talleyrand to Directory, February, 1798. A. E. C. P., Autriche 366. Talleyrand to Napoleon, August 23, 1797. *Ibid.*, 367. September 27, 1797. Cans, "Les Idées de Talleyrand sur la politique coloniale de la France au Lendemain de la Révolution," *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 1900-1.

[18] *Nap. Corresp.*, III, no. 2195. Bonaparte to Talleyrand, September 13, 1797.

[19] Jonquière, *L'Expédition d'Egypte*, I, 44.

[20] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1687.

on his hazardous adventure. "My sword is at my side, and I shall go far," proclaimed the conqueror.

The British watched closely and indeed were concerned over the various manifestations of French activity in the Near East. Up to the time of Napoleon they had regarded French efforts as more or less idle threats. The instructions which were drawn up by the Directory and Napoleon's boasts were at first considered in the same light. The British diplomatic corps in Egypt was woefully weak, and Nelson, who was in command of the British Mediterranean fleet, was without instructions or knowledge of the actions of the French. The suddenness of Napoleon's decisions and the rapidity of his movements took them by surprise.

Napoleon delayed his voyage to Egypt long enough to occupy Malta. He expected to use this island as a base for further operations in the Mediterranean. The well-filled treasury of the Knights was also a welcome acquisition, as the lack of funds was a serious handicap which had caused him considerable worry.[21] Successful in this initial attempt, he turned his ships towards Egypt.

He successfully evaded Nelson and landed his troops at Alexandria. There in behalf of the revolutionary government of France, he issued a proclamation to the people of Egypt assuring them that he was their friend and that he had come to release them from the tyranny of the Mamelukes. He also informed them that the French were interested in their welfare while the British were determined to make slaves of them.[22] At the same time he tried to avoid an open break with the Sultan. "*Par quelle fatalité la Porte et la France, amies de tous les temps et des lors par habite, amies par l'éloignement de leurs frontières, la France ennemie de la Russie et de l'Empereur, la Porte ennemie de la Russie et de l'Empereur, sont-elles cependant en*

[21] *Nap. Corresp.*, no. 2676.
[22] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1687.

guerre?"[23] The Sultan was both confused and flattered by Napoleon, so much so that the British agent in Constantinople had difficulty in inducing him to regard Napoleon as an enemy.[24] A treaty ultimately was made between Turkey and Great Britain which provided that the Sultan should declare war against France and that the British should send a fleet to aid him.[25]

Nelson, in the meantime, upon finding Napoleon's fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay completely destroyed it on August 1, 1798. This was a severe blow, but whatever might have been his inward thoughts Napoleon did not betray them by his outward expression. "Well," he declared, "we must remain in these lands and then come out great like the Ancients." He set to work on plans to reform the government of Egypt and to establish himself as ruler.[26] He spoke to his associates of plans to lead an army into Asia Minor and ultimately strike England in India. He invaded Syria and laid siege to Acre. He defeated the natives, but the British navy made his brilliant land victories hollow and useless. He saw the futility of further action in face of disease and the stubborn resistance of Acre, so retraced his steps to Egypt. Apparent failure, however, only spurred on his energy and imagination. He decided as a last resort to return to France. General Kléber was put in command of the remnants of the army with instructions to hold on to the territory until he could under more favorable conditions be relieved.[27]

The Egyptian expedition had caused great concern in England. The news of Nelson's victory over the French fleet was received with great rejoicing.[28] He was proclaimed a national hero. The East India Company gave him £10,000

[23] *Ibid. Nap. Corresp.*, V, no. 4364. Bonaparte to Grand Vizar, August 17, 1799.
[24] F. O., Turkey 78/19. Report of Smith, July 23, 1798. *Ibid.*, September 3, 1798.
[25] *Ibid.*, 78/20. Grenville to Smith, October 1, 1798.
[26] Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, I, 160.
[27] *Nap. Corresp.*, V, no. 4374. Bonaparte to General Kléber, August 23, 1799.
[28] Hansard, *Parliamentary History*, XXXIII, 1527.

as a material recognition of his services. Many felt that this blow would permanently end Napoleon's career, and sufficient precautions were not taken against his further actions.[29]

Napoleon skilfully utilized the failure of the Egyptian expedition for the promotion of his own interests in France. He charged the Directory with inefficiency and failure to support him as they should have done.[30] "The soldiers are asking with loud cries whether they are to be rewarded by assassination on their return home, as it appears all patriots are to be dealt with."[31] He was accorded an enthusiastic reception in Paris in spite of his military reverses in Egypt.

The Egyptian expedition renewed interest on the part of both Great Britain and France in the Mediterranean and especially in Turkey. The British felt that they had had a narrow escape from the destruction of their interests in the Near East, and as a result took more precautionary measures. Egypt remained a problem. Russia and Great Britain seemed agreed that the best solution was to make Egypt a semi-independent state to be ruled by the Beys, whose authority was to be restricted by the Porte. This paved the way for the rise of Mehemet Ali, who later became the cause for further Anglo-French friction in the Mediterranean.[32]

While Napoleon was in Egypt new developments rapidly took form in Italy. The first Italian campaign was intended largely to promote Napoleon's interests in another direction, and as a result he neglected to organize properly the newly conquered territory. The Army of Italy experienced difficulties almost as soon as Napoleon gave up its personal direction. Ferdinand VII, King of the Two Sicilies, anxious

[29] *Dropmore Papers*, V, 397.
[30] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1687.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Driault, *Mohamed Ali et Napoléon* (Introduction). F. O., Turkey, 78/23. Smith to Kléber, October 26, 1799.

to gain distinction for himself and his country, signed an offensive and defensive alliance with Austria on May 20, 1798, the very day that Napoleon left Toulon for Egypt. Supported by the British Mediterranean squadron, Ferdinand undertook to restore the Pope in Rome and drive the French out of all Italy. His rashness together with the incompetence of the Neapolitan troops caused most of his plans to fail.[33] He was driven out of Naples and forced to take refuge in Palermo under the protection of the British squadron.[34] The French occupied Naples in January, 1799, and established the high-sounding Parthenopæan Republic. This was an unfortunate move as it incurred more obligations at a time when their strength was already taxed to the limit. The Second Coalition was also beginning to take definite form. Pitt, undaunted by the failures in Naples, pushed the Second Coalition to completion. This agreement was so well worked out that in substance it served as a basis for the settlements of 1814-1815. It included a loosely constructed agreement between Great Britain and Russia, Austria, Naples, and Turkey.[35] Russian and Austrian troops entered Italy and defeated the French, whose cause was saved only by the timely return of Napoleon.

Napoleon's rise to power after his return from Egypt was aided by the weakness of the Directory in France[36] and by the gradual break-up of the Second Coalition.[37] He lost no time in taking advantage of both conditions.

Napoleon's first move after his return was to wave a flag of truce to the powers. He wrote polite letters to the King of Great Britain, the Emperor of Austria, and the Czar of Russia. His letter to George III found some favorable response in England, but Pitt's objections prevented his

[33] Nicolas, *Despatches of Nelson*, II, *passim*. Nelson's letters are very pessimistic.
[34] Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, V, 105 ff.
[35] Marten, *Recueil des Principaux Traites de l'Europe*, VI, 557.
[36] Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, I, chapter 25.
[37] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, 296.

country from taking seriously Napoleon's supposed friendship.[38] The Emperor of Austria's reply was non-committal, while the Czar of Russia ignored his letter altogether. These refusals gave Napoleon the opportunity to appeal to the French people for support on the grounds of a defensive war. "Soldiers! it is not only your frontiers that it is necessary to defend: it is the enemy states that it is necessary to invade."[39]

Napoleon was still convinced that the path of glory was through Italy. He was planning a second campaign when Austria refused to renew the provisions of the Treaty of Campo Formio, which she had violated. A whirlwind campaign humiliated Austria and reëstablished the supremacy of Napoleon in Italy. Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte negotiated the Treaty of Luneville,[40] which was expedited by Napoleon's continued victories on the field of battle. This Treaty, signed February 9, 1801, shows the extent of Napoleon's designs not only in the Mediterranean countries but in Europe as a whole. It bore some similarity to the one signed at Campo Formio but was more far-reaching. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was forced to abdicate. The republics of Cisalpine, Batavia, Liguria, and Helvetia were recognized by Austria.[41] The Neapolitans were forced to withdraw from the Papal States, close their ports to the British, and give the French special privileges in their country. Marshal Soult with a French army occupied certain strategic places in order to insure the enforcement of the Treaty and to protect French interests.[42] The Treaty of Luneville made Napoleon supreme in Italy. It is evident from the terms of the Treaty and subsequent developments

[38] Hansard, *op. cit.*, XXXIV, 1349.

[39] *Nap. Corresp.*, VI, no. 4449. Bonaparte to the Soldiers of France, December 25, 1799.

[40] A. E. Mém. et Doc., France, 658. Talleyrand to Napoleon, September 8, 1800.

[41] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, I, 124 ff. A. E. C. P., Autriche 371. Talleyrand to Joseph Bonaparte.

[42] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, I, 424 ff. Lavisse, *Histoire de France Contemporaine*, III, 53.

that he had designs to reach the Orient and ultimately to destroy Great Britain.

Napoleon saw in Czar Paul of Russia a prospective ally for the realization of his plans. Backed by Russia's unlimited resources he could undertake almost any military adventure, and Paul was at least interested in his designs. Malta was offered as an encouragement to the Czar, but the British occupied the island before any transaction could be carried out. The Czar in the meantime turned his attention towards building up a league to control the Baltic.[43] Napoleon encouraged this but in addition urged a combined French and Russian expedition to the East, including Asia Minor, even after the failure of his Egyptian expedition.[44] These plans were well under way when the assassination of Paul and the British victory at Copenhagen prematurely exploded the whole scheme.

While this was taking place the British had gradually strengthened their position in the Mediterranean. They occupied Valette, which gave them control of one of the most strategic positions in the whole area, and they successfully besieged the French in Egypt. Although successful on the continent, Napoleon made little headway against the mistress of the seas.

The failure of the Egyptian campaign and the death of Czar Paul were disastrous to Napoleon's Mediterranean policy. He continued negotiations with Russia but Alexander, the new Czar, was not inclined to follow him.[45] Napoleon realized the full significance of these developments. He blamed the English with having a hand in the assassination of Paul. "Paul I died on the night of the 24th of March and the English squadron passed the Sound on the

[43] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, 300.

[44] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1706. Talleyrand to Napoleon, May 12, 1800. Lecestre, *Lettres Inédite de Napoléon*, I, 32. Napoleon to Lucien Bonaparte, January 14, 1800. Driault, *Question d'Orient*, 78.

[45] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1706 a.

30th. History will reveal the connection which probably exists between the two events," he declared. A further comment reveals his real intentions. "In concert with the Czar, I was sure of striking a mortal blow at English power in India. A palace revolution has overthrown all my projects."[46]

Having failed in this attempt to destroy Great Britain, and with the destruction of every means by which he had hoped to accomplish this end, Napoleon decided to make peace. He realized the impossibility of a conquest for the time being. He needed a breathing spell to prepare for the next undertaking.[47] "I have two great enemies to cope with," he declared. "I will conclude peace with the one I find most easy to deal with. I frankly confess that I should like best to be at peace with England. Nothing would then be more easy than to crush Austria. She has no money except what she gets through England."[48] The Addington Ministry was very willing to listen to peace overtures.[49] Napoleon sent Otto to London to sound out the English; after several conferences the latter reported that he believed the time was ripe for action.[50]

Preliminaries to the Treaty of Amiens were signed by Lord Hawkesbury for Great Britain and by Otto for France on October 1, 1801. The weakness of the British Ministry and the determination and skill of Napoleon are revealed even in the preliminary negotiations. Napoleon brought pressure to bear by threatening to invade Portugal, and in order to appear generous he offered to evacuate Egypt. This was an empty although alluring promise, because the French army surrendered before the negotiations were completed. Otto was instructed to hold out for British evacuation of Malta.[51] He succeeded in obtaining a promise of evacuation

[46] Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, II, 66.
[47] *Nap. Corresp.*, VII, no. 5468. Bonaparte to Talleyrand, March 18, 1801.
[48] Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, I, 301.
[49] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 594. Hawkesbury to French Government, March 21, 1801.
[50] *Ibid.*, April 21, 1801. *Ibid.*, 595. Hawkesbury to Otto, June 25, 1801.
[51] *Ibid.*, 596. Talleyrand to Otto, September 25, 1801.

in favor of the Knights who were to be put under the protection of a third power other than Russia. All territories occupied by Great Britain during the war were to be returned except Trinidad and Ceylon; France agreed to evacuate Naples, the Roman States, Egypt, and the Ionian Islands. Finally plans were made for a conference to be held at Amiens in order to discuss the final terms for a treaty.[52]

The political situation in London affords a partial explanation for the many concessions made by the British. The Ministry was anxious for peace and its desire was taken advantage of by the French negotiators. Pitt, at that time the leader of the opposition, favored the acceptance of the terms. He felt that it was better to accept the agreement as it stood rather than run the risk of something worse. He believed, too, that British supremacy in the Mediterranean was of secondary importance compared with supremacy in the East and West Indies.[53]

The negotiations at Amiens were carried on by Lord Cornwallis for Great Britain and Joseph Bonaparte for France. Talleyrand was in close touch with Joseph, and Napoleon directed the maneuvers from the side-lines.[54] Cornwallis fell an easy victim. He was flattered by his reception in France[55] but soon grew weary and perplexed. Volume III of the published correspondence with his government reveals the extent of his disillusionment. He was sincere and honest but ill and in no position to hold his own against the French negotiators.[56] The final treaty was signed on March 27, 1802. The first and second articles provided for perpetual peace and the exchange of prisoners. Articles three and four provided for Great Britain to return

[52] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, I, 464.
[53] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, 306.
[54] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Bonaparte, 1772 and 1773.
[55] *Correspondence of Cornwallis*, III, 377 ff.
[56] *Malmesbury Diaries*, IV, 1 ff. Bowman, *Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens.* Du Casse, *Négociations relatives aux Traités de Montfontaine, de Luneville et d'Amiens.*

all the colonies taken from France, Spain, and Batavia in the recent war. Articles eight to eleven inclusive dealt with Mediterranean affairs. Napoleon rather grudgingly agreed to the preservation of Turkey and the Republic of Seven Islands (Ionian Islands). Malta was to be returned to the Order of St. John; and the British promised to withdraw from all ports occupied in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Napoleon took care not to make promises that would handicap his operations in Italy. He did promise to withdraw his troops from Taranto and the Papal States, but he figured doing this would not seriously handicap him.[57] Without any hesitation he bid for the support of the Italians by appealing to their nationalistic instincts. He substituted the name Italian for Cisalpine and inaugurated a constitution modeled after the one that was being used at that time in France.[58]

The Treaty of Amiens contained too many unforeseen snares to insure permanent peace. The British were sadly disillusioned and as the weaknesses of the treaty became apparent the Addington Ministry was condemned.[59] Napoleon's promise to evacuate Egypt was considered at the time to have been a real victory,[60] but news of the surrender of the French army in Egypt destroyed even that. Napoleon was given the opportunity to carry out some needed reforms as a result of the temporary halt in hostilities. He began almost immediately to plan for greater undertakings. Later events seem to indicate that he underestimated the strength of the British because of the ease with which he had won his points at Amiens. His activities during the few months of peace show conclusively the purpose which he intended the peace to serve.

Napoleon focused his attention on the Mediterranean,

[57] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, I, 484. Negotiations are in A. E. C. P., Angleterre 596.
[58] A. E. Mém. et Doc., France 658. Talleyrand to Napoleon, January 3, 1802.
[59] *Ibid.*, November 3, 1802. *Malmesbury Diaries*, IV, 76.
[60] F. O., Turkey 78/33. Hawkesbury to Elgin, October 3, 1801.

which he hoped to make the starting place for his extended operations. "Egypt is the most important country in the world," he wrote.[61] He continued his negotiations with the Porte regardless of the promises he had made in the Treaty of Amiens.[62] A treaty was signed on June 25, 1802, which granted France numerous economic concessions.[63] Special agents were also busy in Tripoli and Egypt.[64] General Sébastiani was sent by Napoleon in September, 1802, on a special mission that took him into Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Turkey.[65] Napoleon insisted that it was purely a commercial enterprise, but the report which was made by Sébastiani on his return indicates that commerce was secondary in importance to military affairs. General Brune was appointed Ambassador to Constantinople in the same month. He was told that "the intention of the government is that the Ambassador at Constantinople should resume by every means, the supremacy which France had for two centuries in that capital. . . . He must constantly hold rank above ambassadors of other countries, be surrounded with a numerous suite and take no step without a great display. He should retake under his protection all the hospitals and all the Christians of Syria and Armenia, and especially all the caravans which visit the Holy Places."[66] In Italy Napoleon openly annexed Parma, Piedmont, and Elba in September and October, 1802.

The British government was conscious of at least part of Napoleon's activities in the Mediterranean. Reports of threats to partition Turkey came to London from both Paris and Constantinople early in 1802.[67] A special agent

[61] Quoted in Rose, *Life of Napoleon I*, I, 330.
[62] F. O., Turkey 78/33. Elgin to Hawkesbury, December 10, 1801.
[63] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, I, 588. Arch Nat., A F. IV, 1688.
[64] *Ibid.*, 1687.
[65] *Nap. Corresp.*, VIII, no. 6308. Bonaparte to Sébastiani, September 5, 1802.
[66] *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 6378. Instructions particulières pour l'Ambassadeur à Constantinople, October 18, 1802.
[67] F. O., France 27/62. Merry to Foreign Office, May, 1802. F. O., Turkey 78/35. Report of Elgin, January, 1802.

was despatched from London in July, 1802, to confer with the Sultan on the affairs in Egypt in order to curb the very evident progress which the French were making there.[68] The principal point at issue was Malta. This island was not entirely the cause for the friction that gradually developed between Great Britain and France, but it proved a convenient subject over which to air their animosity. The British felt that they were being outdone in the Mediterranean and refused to evacuate Malta as they had agreed to do at Amiens. In the words of Lord Hawkesbury, "His Majesty would certainly be justified in claiming possession of Malta, as some counterpoise to the acquisitions of France, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty."[69] Complaints were made to Napoleon for his violations of the Treaty of Amiens and he was warned that it must be adhered to in its entirety.[70] There was even some talk of seeking the support of Russia to help hold France in check.[71]

Disagreements between the two countries did not take a serious turn until after the publication of Sébastiani's report in *Le Moniteur* on his observations in the Near East. He emphasized the weakness of Turkey and the utter inability of the Sultan to handle the problems of his state. He pointed out that the British had lost their influence and that a force of 6,000 French soldiers could conquer Egypt. The effect of this report on the British was sensational. Whitworth strongly urged that Malta must be kept in order that the British might hold their own in the Mediterranean.[72] One thing led to another until compromise was out of the ques-

[68] *Ibid.*, 78/36. Stuart to Elgin, October 15, 1802.

[69] Browning, *England and Napoleon in 1803*. Hawkesbury to Whitworth, November 14, 1802.

[70] A. E. Mém. et Doc., 658. Talleyrand to Bonaparte, November 3, 1802.

[71] F. O., Russia 65/52. Hawkesbury to Warren, February 1, 1803.

[72] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1687.

tion.[73] Napoleon seemed quite willing to go to war in spite of the protests of Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand.[74]

The major part of the military activities of the ensuing war were in the northern and central part of Europe, but the Mediterranean was not entirely neglected. Napoleon's plans were first to destroy all opposition on the mainland and then continue his adventures in the Mediterranean. He did, however, send a small expedition into Sicily shortly after war was declared. He proposed an alliance with the King with a view to drive the British from Malta, but in addition to that he hoped to obtain the use of the Sicilian navy for transporting troops to the most advantageous points. The British government anticipated Napoleon's plans and sent Nelson to Malta with instructions to watch the fleet of France and protect Malta, Naples, Sicily, and the Ionian Islands. Nelson was successful in preventing the capitulation of the government in Naples, which prevented Napoleon from using that country as a base for further operations in the Mediterranean.[75]

Political developments of great importance occurred in both Great Britain and France in 1804. Napoleon in May of that year had himself crowned Emperor of France and in the same month William Pitt returned to office. Both events indicated that the wavering policies of the past few months was to cease and that a real contest was about to begin.

Napoleon in the meantime continued his efforts to extend his influence in Turkey. He encouraged the Turks to revolt against the Sultan; he watched with interest the unrest in Egypt and lent support to it wherever possible;[76] and at

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[73] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 600. Despatch of March 15, and April 3, 1803.

[74] Philippson, "La Paix d'Amiens et la Politique général de Napoléon," *Revue Historique*, March and June, 1901. Ekedahl, "The Principal Causes for the Renewal of War between France and England in 1803," *Transactions of Royal Historical Society* (new series) VIII, 181 ff.

[75] Nicolas, *op. cit.*, V, 68 ff.

[76] A. E. Mém. et Doc., France 658. Talleyrand to Napoleon, August 3, November 4, and 17, 1803.

every opportunity he tried to make the British as unpopular as possible in all the Turkish possessions.[77] His hopes for success in the Near East were somewhat increased by his successes in Italy.[78] He declared himself King of Italy and annexed the Genoese Republic. Egypt was next on his program.

Since his rise to power in 1804, Pitt had been busy building up a coalition against Napoleon. His proposals met with the favor of the Czar of Russia.[79] Novosiltzov was sent to London with an elaborate plan to create a new map of Europe in accordance with the spirit of the times. He was instructed to present this to Pitt. Most of the items were high sounding generalities of which the one recommending the establishment of governments on "the sacred rights of humanity," is quite representative. He did have, however, some concrete suggestions about the disposal of Mediterranean territories. Sardinia was to go to Piedmont, the Italian Republics were to be taken from France and the partition of Turkey was intimated.[80] Although Novosiltzov did not present these propositions to Pitt in their entirety the latter was well aware of what Russia desired. His immediate problem for solution was to defeat France and he could not afford to antagonize the Czar. He met the difficulty by sending to Russia a counter proposal, the keynote of which was to block French expansion in the Mediterranean. He agreed with the Czar on the feasibility of strengthening Sardinia but wisely suggested that Austria should be allowed to expand into Italy. This, he secretly hoped, would block not only France but Russia as well.[81] The success of Pitt's endeavor is manifested in an article which was written into the final agreement stipulating that

[77] *Ibid.*, November 11, 12, 1803 and January 3, 1804.
[78] *Nap. Corresp.*, no. 8807.
[79] F. O., Russia 65/54. Warren to Hawkesbury, February 3, 1804.
[80] F. O. Turkey 78/43. Department instructions to Straton, October 19, 1804.
[81] Rose, *Pitt and Napoleon*, 525.

the parties were to guarantee the safety and independence of the "weak states and presenting a formidable barrier against the ambitions of the stronger."

The battle ground for the struggle between Napoleon and the Third Coalition was the central part of Europe where Napoleon's military genius asserted itself without the effective opposition of the "giant corsair of the sea." Victory followed victory with dazzling rapidity. Austerlitz humbled Austria and paved the way for peace with that nation. Talleyrand and Napoleon disagreed over the policy which they should follow in regard to Austria. Talleyrand urged a lenient policy because it would win Austria's support, afford an effective bulwark against Russian expansion, and protect their own interests in the Mediterranean and further East.[82] Napoleon at first was favorably inclined towards Talleyrand's idea but Austerlitz changed his mind.[83] The Treaty of Presburg signed December 26, 1805, bears witness to his convictions as opposed to Talleyrand's. Napoleon was by this agreement recognized as King of Italy; thereby obtaining control of Venetia, Istria, Piedmont, and Parma. With the exception of Sicily he was now supreme in Italy but that stronghold with Great Britain's support, defied his claims.[84] Early in 1806 he decided to take this last barrier by storm.[85] The King and Queen were driven out of Sicily, but they found ready protection by the British fleet which effectively guarded both Palermo and Malta. Again Napoleon was held in check by his failure to control the sea.

The return of Fox to power in Great Britain paved the way for renewed peace negotiations with France.[86] Napoleon was willing to listen provided he could be assured of

[82] A. E. Mém. et Doc., France 658. Talleyrand to Napoleon, October 17, 1805.
[83] *Nap. Corresp.*, XI, no. 9540. Napoleon to Talleyrand, December 3, 1805.
[84] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, II, 145.
[85] *Nap. Corresp.*, XII, no. 9788. Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, February 9, 1806.
[86] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 603. Fox to Talleyrand, April 8, 1806.

what he had set out to obtain by conquest. *Le Moniteur* on March 6, 1807, contained a statement from Napoleon which suggested a basis for peace negotiations. On April 8 Fox replied in a favorable tone, and Talleyrand used his influence to bring about peace.[87] A long series of negotiations followed,[88] but Napoleon's demands were far in excess of anything Fox could agree to, conciliatory as he was. Besides control of the Netherlands and the Rhinelands Napoleon demanded Genoa, and that Istria and Dalmatia be recognized as a part of his federative system. Great Britain was asked to evacuate Sicily and Malta because her possession of these islands prevented his direct communication with the Levant.[89]

These demands are interesting inasmuch as they show the extent of Napoleon's designs in the Mediterranean. Although he saw the advantages of a peace with Great Britain, he considered Malta still more important. British interests in the Mediterranean are also shown by the fact that Fox, though desiring peace, would not submit to giving up Malta or Sicily.

Napoleon continued his activities in the Near East in spite of the handicaps which the British control of the sea presented. General Sébastiani was appointed as ambassador to Turkey with instructions to work for an alliance with Persia and Turkey and to induce the Porte to disavow Russia.[90] Napoleon, however, was too busy with continental affairs to intervene with an army.

Russia, alone of the great powers, blocked the ambitions of Napoleon on the continent in 1807. The battle of Friedland in June of that year removed most of the opposition even in that direction. This victory for Napoleon broke

[87] *Ibid.*, Talleyrand to Fox, April 16, 1806.
[88] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1673.
[89] *Nap. Corresp.*, XII, nos. 10396, 10409, 10416, 10448, and 10499.
[90] F. O., Turkey 78/50. Abuthnot to Fox, April 25, 1806. A. E. Mém. et Doc., 1776. Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 9, 1806.

down the barrier and paved the way for an understanding between the two monarchs whom fate had gradually brought together.

Napoleon's first message to Alexander after the battle of Friedland was cordial. Instead of making demands he actually offered the Czar an extension of his territory along the Vistula. This of course was clearly a bribe for a much greater prize. The meeting of the two monarchs on a raft in the middle of the River Niemen resulted in an understanding. Napoleon was anxious for an agreement with Alexander in order to further his own cause against Great Britain. Alexander was somewhat submissive because of his recent defeat and was easily won over by the personal charm of Napoleon. The resulting Treaty of Tilsit provided that Westphalia and the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw should be given to Napoleon together with the recognition of his possession of Italy, the Adriatic, Holland, and Germany. An offensive alliance against Great Britain was discussed but no definite agreement was reached. Alexander was promised the Danubian provinces and Turkey with the exception of Roumelia and Constantinople.[91] Alexander held out for Constantinople but Napoleon wanted that for himself.[92]

The British government, although uncertain as to what had happened at Tilsit, wasted no time in trying to oppose the newly formed combination. A swift and decisive attack on Copenhagen kept Denmark from becoming a party to an alliance with Alexander and Napoleon. Napoleon, in retaliation, occupied Portugal and pressed further into Spain. He was not so successful in the Iberian peninsula. Madrid rebelled in May, 1808 and Great Britain inter-

[91] Arch. Nat., A F. IV, 1689. Negotiations at Tilsit as dictated to Talleyrand by Napoleon.

[92] *Nap. Corresp.*, XIV, no. 11918. Bonaparte to Talleyrand, March 3, 1807.

vened in her behalf. This territory proved to be one of the weakest places in Napoleon's whole European system.

Napoleon continued his activities in the East, even while busily engaged in other places. During the month of May, 1808, he wrote enthusiastically about the possibilities of partitioning Turkey.[93] On February 3 he outlined to Alexander a plan not only to attack Turkey but India as well. "An army of 50,000 men, Russian, French, and perhaps even a few Austrians, going by way of Constantinople into Asia could not arrive at the Euphrates without making England tremble and putting her on her knees before the continent. . . . The stroke would resound to the Indies, and England would be subjected. I will not refuse any preliminary stipulation necessary to arrive at so great an object. But the interests of our two States must be combined and balanced. . . . By May 1 our troops can be in Asia, and the troops of Your Majesty by the same date at Stockholm. Then the English, menaced in the Indies, chased from the Levant, will be crushed under the weight of events with which the atmosphere will be charged. . . ."[94]

Napoleon and Alexander planned to meet at Erfurt to make final plans for their future operations but the meeting was not as successful as Napoleon had hoped. The two monarchs demonstrated their friendship, at least outwardly, but they failed to reach any definite agreement on the points that concerned Napoleon most. Russia was allowed to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia but with the understanding that no further infringements were to be made against Turkey.[95] Napoleon was in favor of dividing Turkey but he insisted upon having Constantinople for himself.

Napoleon was too hard pressed in central Europe during

[93] *Nap. Corresp.* XVII, nos. 13877 and 13915. Napoleon to Decrès, May 13 and 17, 1808.

[94] Quoted in Mowat, *Diplomacy of Napoleon*, 216.

[95] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, II, 284 ff.

the remainder of his career as Emperor of France to give much direct attention to his designs in the Mediterranean. The British during this period never ceased their attempts to drive the French from the Mediterranean countries. Wellington's success in Spain and Portugal assured his control of the Iberian peninsula and Bentinck was instructed by the British government to carry on an attack against the French in Italy and Sicily. Bentinck was very active, much more so than was best for the interests of his country, and did succeed in undermining Napoleon's influence.[96] Stratford Canning, beginning in 1810, did great service for his country in Turkey. Acting without specific instructions but with sound and mature judgment he succeeded in protecting Turkey from both the French and the Russians.

Meanwhile, fortune had deserted Napoleon. The failure of the Moscow expedition, the defeat at Leipzig, and the allied occupation brought about his first abdication. Napoleon's abdication did not settle all the problems which Castlereagh had in mind. He hoped to prevent any other state from becoming as dominant in Europe as France had been.

The Mediterranean did not figure prominently in the discussions at Paris and London, preliminary to the Congress of Vienna. Castlereagh was very much concerned about it but thought that the best policy would be to keep the whole matter in the background as much as possible. Italy was mentioned and Castlereagh followed chiefly the course which Pitt had suggested to Russia in 1804. Castlereagh hoped to have all the major problems settled before the Congress of Vienna met. He did not succeed but at least he had worked out in his own mind the course he was going to follow in Vienna before the arrival of the delegates for that memorable Congress.

[96] R. M. Johnston, "Bentinck and Murat," *English Historical Review*, April, 1904.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERLUDE, 1815-1830

THE Congress of Vienna holds a unique place in the annals of international relations. It was not a congress called to draw up a treaty of peace; peace had already been signed with France. It was not called with the idea of making a new order out of an old one, but to supersede the new with the old; and while all the powers insisted that they hoped to restore the *status quo ante bellum,* they proceeded to violate that principle whenever opportunities to augment their own positions occurred. Russia occupied Finland, Bessarabia, and a part of Poland; Austria advanced her claims in Italy and along the Dalmatian coast; and Prussia practically doubled her area in central and western Germany. Even the doctrine of legitimacy, which was advanced in order to restore deposed dynasties, was carried out only when there was no real reason for disregarding it.

Great Britain had been the backbone of the opposition against France during the Napoleonic wars; just as she had been France's most consistent rival throughout the preceding centuries. France was more completely humbled in 1815 than she had been since the struggle with Great Britain first started, and was in almost every respect at her rival's mercy. Undoubtedly Castlereagh could have crushed this ancient rival if he had chosen to do so; but this was not his intention. A strong France was very necessary in order to build up a balance of power and to insure the stability of Europe. With this in mind he was more inclined to be lenient with France than were any of the other great powers. Castlereagh was met more than halfway by Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs in France, who favored an under-

standing with Great Britain in preference to any other power. Negotiations between the two were under way before the opening meeting of the Congress of Vienna and, although no definite agreement was reached, both felt that coöperation was not only possible but necessary.[1]

No definite Mediterranean policy of either France or Great Britain is discernible at the Congress of Vienna. North Europe was of the greatest interest as far as territory was concerned. The contest for the control of Poland and Saxony diminished all the other struggles, but even here Great Britain and France were able to agree in principle. Direct reference to the Mediterranean countries was seldom made by any of the powers but it must have been definitely in mind on several occasions. The Russians had their eye on the Straits region; the Austrians were beginning to look covetously at the Balkans, and the British were watching with jealousy the line of their future route to the East. That the French also had interests in the Mediterranean was shown by the detailed directions which Talleyrand carried with him to Vienna with regard to the kingdom of Naples.[2] Whether or not his opposition to the recognition of Murat as the legitimate king of Naples[3] was a part of a definitely formed Mediterranean policy is questionable, but at least it showed his interest in that direction.[4]

Unity of action was necessary on the part of both France and Great Britain for the attainment of their interests. Castlereagh, in return for Talleyrand's support on the Poland-Saxony problem, agreed to oppose Murat in Sicily. Opposition to Murat presented difficulties because Metternich, a third member of the group, was strongly in favor of him. The determined stand taken by the various parties con-

[1] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Traités et Conventions 673. Castlereagh to Talleyrand, May 10 and 18, 1814. *Ibid.*, France et Divers 677. Talleyrand to Jaucourt, July, 1814.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, Congrès de Vienne 678. Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, October 9, 1814.
[4] *Ibid.*, November 7, 1814.

cerned was broken only by the confusion which resulted from the escape of Napoleon from Elba. Murat, at that time, declared war on Austria but was ultimately completely defeated. Ferdinand, a Bourbon, was then recognized as the king of Naples, and Talleyrand's doctrine of legitimacy triumphed in Sicily.

Castlereagh, with the settlement of the principal questions before the congress, turned his attention to the erection of political machinery to insure permanent security in Europe. We are concerned with this enterprise only insofar as it affected the Mediterranean countries; but it is difficult, if not impossible, to segregate the affairs of the Mediterranean from those of the rest of Europe. Castlereagh followed in general the plans for international security which Pitt had suggested in 1804. A general guarantee should be signed by all the powers to prevent aggressions in any form. The powers agreed to include all of Europe except Turkey, but Russia insisted that the Sultan make all the amends which he had previously promised before she would consent to having him included in the pact. The Sultan was obstinate as usual, when no impending danger confronted him, and the congress was brought to a close without Turkey being included in the general pact.[5]

Great Britain emerged from the Congress of Vienna as the dominant power in the Mediterranean. In 1815 she held Gibraltar and Malta; and the Ionian Islands, though free and independent, were placed under her protection. Turkey was intact but there was no signed agreement for her future protection, which ultimately proved to be the chief weakness in the British Mediterranean policy. France had been left out almost completely. Talleyrand could claim some credit for the deposition of Murat, although his deposition gave France no particular prestige in the Mediterranean. Napo-

[5] Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815*, 430.

leon's dream of making the Mediterranean a French lake and his attempts to make this dream a reality were not soon to be forgotten. Many of the peoples living in the Mediterranean countries, who were struggling for their freedom, looked to France as a possible ally. They found responsive listeners in many parts of France. The struggles in the Balkans, in Egypt, and in Italy produced new issues in the Mediterranean in which France and Great Britain usually sponsored different factions. This turn of events introduced a new phase in Anglo-French rivalry.

The general effect of the Congress of Vienna on France was very depressing. The Bourbons, in returning to power, looked upon France not as it had been under Napoleon but as Louis XVI had left it. Their spirit of contentment and conservatism could not have been shared by a vast majority of the French people. General Lamarque expressed the prevailing feeling when he said that "the Treaty of 1815 is not a peace; it is a halt in the mud." Most Frenchmen felt that this humiliation could be removed, at least partly, by an aggressive foreign policy. The Mediterranean still held their attention just as it had in the days of Napoleon's greatest success. The spirit of expansion was not dead; it was only dormant for the time being and was bound to reappear.

Russia was the chief offender in threatening the *status quo* in the Mediterranean during the period immediately following the Congress of Vienna. She had emerged from the Napoleonic wars apparently the most powerful state in Europe, and although the Czar talked of peace, he had a large army in constant readiness on the Balkan frontier. Great Britain feared the consequences of a Russian attack on Turkey especially when the Czar approached Talleyrand's successor, Richelieu, with an offer of the Morea in return for his support. This was a lucrative offer to France,

humiliated and isolated as she was at that time. Castlereagh hoped to prevent an open break between Turkey and Russia by urging the Sultan to meet every reasonable demand which Russia made. He also sounded out the Austrian government on a possible course of action if Russia should attack Turkey. Russia did not make a move to carry out her threats for the time being.

Anglo-French Mediterranean interests were further complicated by revolutions in Spain and Italy. The French government took advantage of this opportunity to assume a more prominent rôle in continental affairs than it had maintained since the restoration of the Bourbons. The French king and his ministers offered to help subdue the outbreaks in order to gain the favor of the absolute powers and at the same time curb the liberal faction in France. Castlereagh objected to armed intervention not only because he opposed French participation in Mediterranean affairs but also because the proposed intervention was counter to what he believed the real functions of the alliance should be, and involved a "principle which struck at the roots of the British constitution." The Peninsular War had convinced both Castlereagh and Wellington of the importance of Spanish independence in continental affairs.[6] The failure of the Congress of Verona to decide on a definite course of action gave France the opportunity to intervene. Wellington offered to mediate but his offer was refused. Canning, the successor to Castlereagh as Minister of Foreign Affairs, did assist in preventing Russian intervention in Spain; but French troops crossed the Pyrenees in 1823, in spite of his protests,[7] and remained there until 1827. Canning did not see fit to declare war against France but sent four thousand troops into Portugal to protect British interests.

[6] Castlereagh's position is well stated in his memorandum of March 5, 1820, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 622, Appendix A.

[7] F. O., France 27/284. Canning to Stuart, February 18, 1823.

French intervention in Spanish affairs was indicative of what was to follow. It was undertaken primarily with a view to strengthen French prestige, a situation strikingly similar to that which led Charles X to send an expedition to Algiers seven years later. It adequately demonstrated to the British that France was looking for an opportunity to regain her influence in the Mediterranean. The British accepted the challenge and prepared to oppose any move which the French might make in that direction. However, rivalry of a much more acute nature had developed by this time in the Near East.

The interest of the western powers in the growth of nationalism in the Balkans forced the Near Eastern problem into the foreground. Numerous revolts occurred in the Balkans which at first attracted very little attention but in time grew in intensity. Ypsilanti in March, 1821 started a revolt in Rumania but the Congress of Laibach, then in session, frowned upon his efforts. No definite action was taken against him. The revolt which started in the Morea the following month reached such a stage that the powers were forced to take some notice. This disturbance turned out to be much more than a question as to whether these people, so long suppressed, should be allowed to acquire their freedom. It was a test case involving principles of the French Revolution and the security of the Turkish state.

The individual interests of some of the powers that became involved in the Greek Revolution merit special notice. Taken as a group they were opposed to revolts in any form. The horrors of the French Revolution and the disorders of the period immediately following were still very much of a reality. France was not vitally concerned in the Greek revolt, yet both the government and the people showed a great deal of interest. Charles X, in spite of his opposition to liberalism at home, favored the revolutionists in Greece.

He saw in the struggle a conflict between Christianity and Mohammedanism, with resulting prospects of himself becoming a hero in the eyes of the church; a crusader like his illustrious ancestor, Saint Louis. Canning characterized it as "romantic ranting." The French people saw in the same struggle a movement not unlike their own in 1789, an attempt of a suppressed people to cast off the yoke of tyranny. Both the government and the people were united in their desire for action although their motives varied greatly. The saner and more practical statesmen saw merely an opportunity to elevate France in the affairs of European politics. Great Britain hoped to maintain the *status quo* for the protection of her interests. This meant that she had to support the infidel Turk against his rebellious subjects, an act entirely counter to her political and intellectual philosophy. The British, however, were not prone to lose sight of a material advantage for a vague and indefinite idealism. Russia, more than any of the other powers, felt that her interests were most vital. Dismemberment of Turkey would give her an opportunity to obtain an outlet to the sea. The success of the Greeks might mean the furtherance of this cause, especially if the Czar could claim credit for their success. Autocratic Russia came to the aid of the spirit of democracy in Greece, not for freedom's sake but as a disguise for territorial aggression.

Meanwhile the Greeks continued their struggle for independence, and the Sultan made no headway in restoring order. This increased the uneasiness of the powers as they were anxiously watching the combat. The Sultan on July 19, 1824, promised the Pasha of Egypt the Morea and Candia if he would subdue the Greeks. The Greeks immediately called for help but Canning maintained a benevolent neutrality. Privately he did confess to Stratford Canning that he was favorable to Greek independence if won by the

Greeks with their own efforts and without the interference of an outside power.[8] A conference was called in the summer of 1825 at St. Petersburg to discuss a course of action which the powers should follow in regard to the Greek Revolution.

Stratford Canning, who was at that time in Russia, did not have instructions to participate in the discussions. This in reality doomed the possibilities of any progress at St. Petersburg. George Canning was still busy with separate negotiations with Constantinople and St. Petersburg but the Russian Czar intimated that he was determined to act independently against Turkey. In order to prevent this Canning sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg, supposedly to congratulate the new Czar but in reality to discuss the Near East with him.[9] Wellington was well received. An agreement was signed which stipulated that the two powers should coöperate in an attempt to mediate between the Turks and Greeks, with the understanding that Greece was to be autonomous but should pay the Sultan an annual indemnity.[10] This prevented Russia from taking independent action, the very thing Canning had hoped to curb.

The agreement between Russia and Great Britain found little favor in France. The French government seemed somewhat humiliated at being excluded from the original discussions but seemed willing to bide its time until an opportunity presented itself for recognition. The French did not have long to wait. Canning had no intention of excluding the French, in fact he anticipated utilizing them to assist in keeping the Russians from getting beyond his control. On August 20, 1826, he sent the protocol to the French government. On September 18, Canning himself went to Paris to discuss the Near East with the French government. Charles

[8] F. O., Russia 65/144. Instructions to S. Canning, December 8, 1824.

[9] *Wellington Despatches*, III, 85. F. O., Turkey 78/140. Canning to S. Canning, January 10, 1826.

[10] *Wellington Despatches*, III, 393.

X seemed flattered by this expression of friendship and agreed to participate in a general discussion which Canning had planned to take place in London.[11] Three drafts for an agreement were presented at London from the representatives of Great Britain, Russia, and France. On July 6, 1827, they agreed to unite in order to put an end to the war and announced that measures would be taken against the party that refused to lay down arms.[12] There were several details which were not decided and which, in due course of time, were to cause considerable uncertainty. Notes were sent by the three powers to their ambassadors and admirals located in Greece and Turkey. They were to favor the side that was most compromising but they must take "extreme care to prevent the measures which you shall adopt against the Ottoman marine from degenerating into hostilities. . . ." Also they were "not to make use of that force unless the Turks persist in forcing the passages which they [the admirals] had intercepted."[13]

The Treaty of London was the last public work of George Canning before his death in August. It was a fitting climax to his brilliant career as a statesman. For the first time since the Napoleonic wars Great Britain's interests were well safeguarded in the Near East. The cause of the Greeks had been recognized, Russia had pledged herself not to intervene independently, and the French adhesion had given the agreement greater stability.

The Greeks immediately complied with the provisions of the Treaty of London but the Turks refused to do so. This necessitated action against Turkey, and a detachment of the French, the Russian, and the British fleets proceeded to carry out the provisions of the agreement. Precautionary measures were taken to avoid a conflict but the prevailing

[11] F. O., France 27/352. Damas to Granville, December 8, 1826.
[12] Hertslett, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, I, 741 and 769. *Parliamentary Papers* (1830) XXXII.
[13] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIV, 632.

opinion of the allied commanding officers was that hostilities were inevitable.[14] Meanwhile the Turks, having been reinforced with Egyptian troops, continued their ravages in Greece. When protests failed the allied commanders held a conference on October 18, 1827, and decided on a naval demonstration in order to check the Sultan's army. On October 20 the fleet sailed into Navarino Bay and destroyed the entire fleet of the enemy.[15]

The effects of the battle of Navarino were far reaching. The Sultan was very indignant and demanded that the powers should drop their intervention in Greek affairs and acknowledge the battle at Navarino as a mistake. Wellington, recently advanced to the head of the ministry in Great Britain, was in a quandary. Non-intervention had been the foundation of the British policy. The King in a speech before Parliament lamented "deeply the conflict . . . with the naval force of an ancient ally."[16] The French and the Russians, in the face of Wellington's objections, planned further action in Greece. Lieven informed Wellington that the Czar intended to carry on the war against Turkey, with or without British coöperation. The French hailed the victory as a glorious feat of French arms and Charles X referred to it enthusiastically in his speech to the French Chambers. La Ferronays, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was quite pro-Russian and urged an alliance with the Czar. On May 13, 1828, the French Chambers voted a loan of 80,000,000 francs and sanctioned calling to the colors 60,000 men, presumably for use in the Near East. Wellington finally gave his consent for the French expedition to sail[17] but could not separate France from Russia. The French troops landed in Greece and pushed on towards Athens.[18]

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[14] Crawley, *Greek Independence, 1821-1833*, 84.
[15] Crawley, *op. cit.*, 91. Driault, *L'Expédition de Créte et Morée, 1823-28.*
[16] *Hansard* (new series) XVIII, 3.
[17] *Parliamentary Papers*, (1830) XXXII, 241.
[18] F. O., Turkey 78/167. S. Canning to Aberdeen, October 21, 1828.

The weakness and indecision shown by Wellington in his policy towards Greece was more than counteracted by the work of Stratford Canning. He was able to induce General Guilleminot, an ambitious French general, to follow a policy of moderation. Without instructions, without even the consent of his government, he met the representatives of the various powers at Poros where it was decided that Greece should have independence by paying the Sultan an annual tribute.[19]

The agreement reached at Poros on December 12, 1828, was not so important in itself, but it served as the basis for further discussion and reinstated British influence in the negotiations concerning Greece. It was one of the few examples of British constructive statesmanship in the Near East between the death of Canning and the advent of Palmerston.

Russia and France were by no means entirely restricted by the Congress of Poros. Wellington seemed to be more suspicious of the French than the Russians probably because of his pronounced anti-French bias.[20] There was some justification for this attitude because the Czar, for some reason, was beginning to favor a cessation of hostilities. The Treaty of Adrianople between Russia and Turkey which was signed on September 14, 1829, ended the hostilities. This Treaty was drawn up with great skill by the Russians. It did not provide for any excessive transfer of territory to Russia, but the provisions of the agreement left Russia in a position to continue a "peaceful political and economic penetration." Russia acquired the direct protectorship of Moldavia and Wallachia, indirect control over Serbia and Greece, and was promised the guardianship of all Christians in Turkey.[21]

[19] F. O., Turkey 78/166-168. S. Canning to British foreign office. *Ibid.*, 78/164. Aberdeen to S. Canning.

[20] Crawley, *op. cit.*, 157.

[21] Hertslet, *op. cit.*, II, 813 ff.

Russia had outmaneuvered both France and Great Britain in this epoch of the Near Eastern struggle. The influence of Great Britain was probably at its lowest ebb. Wellington himself realized the extent of his failure in this direction and his activities suffered by contrast with that of Castlereagh and Canning. The unfortunate results of his policy were among the contributing causes for the fall of his ministry in November, 1830.

Great Britain, France, and Russia did coöperate in the final settlement of the affairs of Greece. Palmerston, who succeeded Aberdeen in the foreign office, Lieven representing Russia, and Talleyrand representing France, continued the negotiations at London where they agreed on Greek independence, on her territorial boundary, and on a king for the newly created throne. Some of Canning's ideas were restored in the provisions of the treaty, which stipulated that troops from any power were not to enter Greece without the consent of the three powers.[22]

The Greek Revolution caused very little friction between Great Britain and France because the activities of Russia in Turkey completely overshadowed those of France. The participation of Charles X in the settlements convinced him that France was gradually overcoming the humiliations which she had suffered since 1815, and that she was again in a position to assume a dominant rôle in European politics. This decision finally led him to undertake measures which Great Britain saw fit strenuously to oppose. The setback which the British experienced in 1829 did not alter their belief or their determination that Turkey should be kept intact. The high value which they placed on the control of the route to India necessitated keeping both France and Russia at bay in the Mediterranean.

[22] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIX, 4.

CHAPTER V

NEW POLICIES AND ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Mediterranean was gradually becoming once again an important trade route to the East. The long voyage of from five to eight months around the Cape of Good Hope, with all the handicaps that accompanied it, created a demand for a shorter and better route to the East. In Great Britain the Industrial Revolution was causing a greater value to be placed upon imported raw materials and was inducing merchants to seek new markets for manufactured commodities. Trade routes between India and the mother country not only increased but changed somewhat in character. Instead of the payment of specie for goods, manufactured articles, such as cloth, were traded for raw cotton. This trade called for a more efficient means of transportation. British cloth exports to India in 1819, amounted to 7,127,661 yards; in 1824, it increased to 23,685,426 yards; and in 1832, it reached a grand total of 51,833,913 yards. The total evaluation of British cloth exported to India in 1814, amounted to £201,182, and in 1832, this increased to £3,238,248. This in turn was accompanied by an increase in raw cotton importations from India.[1]

These promising figures made their impression on alert British merchants, who not only took advantage of the existing opportunities, but also endeavored to expand them. The long voyage around Africa was the greatest handicap to the further extension of their trade. Steamships were at this

[1] *Parliamentary Papers* (1837), 97.

time just beginning to prove their worth, as they were speedier and more dependable, but still impracticable on long trips because of the necessity to carry so much fuel and water that little space was left for cargo. A shorter route such as the one through the Mediterranean would solve the problem.

Steam navigation soon became the topic of the day. As early as 1823, prizes were offered in England for the completion of a steamboat voyage transporting goods from England to India by way of the Mediterranean. A society was organized in Calcutta in the same year to encourage this new development.[2] Considerable headway was made; vessels were constructed especially for use on the Mediterranean, and plans were made to establish a regular schedule.[3] The *Hugh Lindsay* on April 22, 1830, completed a successful voyage from Bombay to Suez, an event which henceforth made possible the transfer of mail from India to London in fifty-nine days. This was a great feat in transportation and heralded a new age.

The Mediterranean, besides being a convenient route for commerce to the East, was beginning to develop centers for trade. British merchants, for example, found ready markets for their commodities in the newly established Greek state.[4] This was another cause, and a very effective one, for the increased interest of the British in a region that had been so long neglected. Diplomacy, often a vehicle for commercial interests, followed the British trader in the Mediterranean and attempted to promote his interests by insisting on a territorial *status quo*. France was one of the powers which Great Britain feared might disturb the established order. A new issue was at stake in the Mediterranean.

French activity in the Mediterranean lacked the materi-

[2] *Ibid.*, (1831-32), 735.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Driault, *La Question d'Orient*, 104 ff.

alistic motive which was so characteristic of the British. In some respects French intervention was spontaneous and inconsistent, yet they considered it as fundamental and realistic. Both the government and the people were interested in the Mediterranean.

Louis XVIII had realized that his position as king of France depended upon the supporting hand of outside powers. Charles X, however, felt more secure in his position than his predecessor and was determined to be more assertive. His chief concern was to erase the effects of the French Revolution and Napoleon in order that the *Ancien Régime* might be reëstablished. Villèle and Chateaubriand shared with him the belief that, in 1830, they were on the verge of realizing this hope. Chateaubriand had declared three years earlier at the conclusion of the French expedition into Spain: "we are now liberated from the tutelage of misfortunes and they [the nations of Europe] have recognized our military rank in Europe." France still had to crush some evident signs of democracy before the glorious state of Louis XIV could again be attained.

The French people, although never enthusiastic about the restored Bourbons, passively submitted to fate. The revival of French prestige, successful military campaigns, and the desire for new territories still had their appeal to the French people, but the Bourbons' endeavors towards the realization of these aims lacked the glamour of Napoleon's brilliant achievements. The people shared with their king the feeling of humiliation which had been imposed upon them in 1815, but to them the Bourbon dynasty was a part of that humiliation. Participation in the government, a heritage from the French Revolution, was especially dear to the French people, who resented any infringement on this coveted right.[5] Charles X was determined to crush the re-

[5] *Archives Parlementaires*, LVII, 578 ff. Guizot, *Mémoires*, I, 335 ff.

bellious opposition in the French Chambers. "There is no way of treating these peoples and it is time we stopped," declared the King. He recalled Polignac from London, where he had been serving as Ambassador, and made him Minister. This was the first step in the proposed destruction of the opposition in the Chambers. Polignac was especially unpopular because he replaced Martignac who represented a constitutional majority in the Chambers.

Charles X and Polignac believed that the time was ripe when they could with safety show some assertiveness in their foreign policy. The harsh restrictions of 1815, had been lessened until in 1829, France was again in good standing with the other powers. A military victory or a successful diplomatic move, which would add territory and prestige to France, would gain for Charles X, so he believed, the support of the French people, and enable him to reëstablish absolution. The first move in this direction was an attempt to win the Rhine provinces.

Charles X knew that he could not acquire the control of the Rhine territory without incurring the opposition of some of the powers. He must have some help in order to be on the safe side. He regarded the Czar of Russia as his best friend and the man who would be most willing to aid him. He knew that the Czar was experiencing difficulties in getting an outlet to the sea through the Dardanelles, and that the support of France in this undertaking would probably be most welcome. With these things in mind he drew up an elaborate plan for the complete reörganization of the political map of Europe to be submitted to the Czar for approval. France was to have Belgium and the extension of her territory to the Rhine River; Russia was to have Constantinople; Bosnia and Serbia were to go to Austria; Holland and Saxony to Prussia; and Great Britain was to

be offered the Dutch colonial possessions.[6] Charles X thought that this would satisfy all the powers, in spite of the fact that a number of wars had been fought to keep France out of the Rhine provinces and Russia out of Constantinople. Great Britain was no more inclined to agree to these changes in 1829, than she had been previously. Even the possibilities of winning the support of Russia were doubtful, as the Treaty of Adrianople had brought to a close her warlike activities in Turkey.[7] Charles X, upon learning that the Treaty of Adrianople had been signed, decided not to approach Russia.

The failure of the Rhine project did not daunt the French King. He was still convinced of the necessity for a military victory in order to crush the opposition in his own country. In reality he was steadily losing ground to the Liberals. A brilliant victory for his army had to be arranged.

The possibility of territorial expansion on the mainland of Europe had disappeared, so another place must be chosen. In 1827, Charles X had been advised that an expedition against Algiers would avert a calamity similar to the one which the French monarchy had experienced in 1789. All parties, he was told, were more interested in the extension of frontiers than in anything else.[8] Charles X was in a position to consider Algiers and he definitely decided to choose it as the scene for action. He believed that here France would not be faced with the international complications which had characterized the Rhine undertaking, and that a victory, even in Africa, would serve the same purpose. This decision marked the beginning of an aggressive French policy in the Mediterranean.

French interests in the Mediterranean had grown very gradually. Adventurous merchants and ardent expansionists

[6] A. E. C. P., Russie 178.
[7] Alfred Stern, "Der Grosse Plan des Herzog von Polignac Jahr 1829," *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, (1900) 49 ff.
[8] Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique Politique Étrangère*, II, 760.

had referred to the great commercial possibilities and of the necessity for immediate intervention.[9] French statesmen had noted the growing weakness of Turkey, as demonstrated in the Greek Revolution, and anticipated the day when that nation would succumb. France, they claimed, must be ready to claim her share of the spoils. The designs on Algiers were encouraged by this anticipation.

Algiers, nominally a possession of the Sultan of Turkey, under the government of the Dey was practically free. The Dey claimed control not only over the city of Algiers but also over Oran, Constantine, and Medea, the most important posts in Algeria. Algiers had been a rendezvous for pirates for centuries. They were violators of every law of Christian decency. Christian powers not only tolerated the barbarous activities of these people, but even submitted to the humiliation of purchasing immunities from them. There had been a few half-hearted unsuccessful attempts to crush the pirates but most of the powers refused to destroy them.[10] Why the Algerians were not subdued is hard to explain, for any one power alone could have crushed them. Perhaps some of the hesitation was due to a fear that an attack on Algiers would be a bad precedent for further aggressions against Turkey.

Charles X had no difficulty in finding an excuse for war against the Dey.[11] What amounted to a state of war had existed since 1827, when diplomatic relations were broken by the Dey who in a fit of anger struck the French Consul in the face with a fan.[12] The city of Algiers was blockaded in an attempt to bring the Dey to terms. Admiral la Bretonnière, after almost two years of an ineffective blockade, was sent to reöpen diplomatic negotiations but the Dey was

[9] Serres, *La Politique turque en Afrique du Nord sous la Monarchie de Juillet*, chapter 2.

[10] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 994.

[11] Zimmerman, *Kolonialpolitik, passim.*

[12] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Algéria IV. Report of the French Consul in 1827.

in no mood to arbitrate. La Bretonnière's ship, although it carried a flag of truce, was fired upon.[13] Charles X and Polignac considered that this incident gave them a just cause for war at a very opportune moment.

France had not abandoned her interest in Egypt, another province of the Sultan of Turkey. Since the disastrous but brilliant Napoleonic expedition into Egypt, there had been no active intervention because of the restrictions which the Congress of Vienna had placed upon France; but there had developed a close contact with Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. This remarkable man had shown his energy and ability in the Greek Revolution, and was destined to test not only the strength of the Turkish government but also the wits of the statesmen of Europe for a decade and a half. Mehemet Ali was friendly to the French; he gave them preference over other peoples in privileges of various kinds which he had at his disposal. French merchants developed a profitable trade in cotton, sugar, and olives with the Egyptians. French military and naval experts were called in to help organize the army and the navy. Colonel Sèves entirely reconstructed the Egyptian army. He increased the size of the army from 20,000 to over 100,000 men, established military schools, and supplied them with arms and ammunition. The Egyptian fleet was similarly improved by prominent French naval experts including M. de Cérisy and M. Bresson.[14] France was also instrumental in helping to improve the economic conditions in Egypt which she was able to use to her own advantage. As a result Mehemet Ali and the French were bound by mutual ties of friendship while Englishmen were conspicuously slighted.

Charles X and Polignac decided to take advantage of the existing friendship with Mehemet Ali, and invited him to

[13] *Ibid.*, V. La Bretonnière to Polignac, December 10, 1829. U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports, Algiers. Lee to Secretary of State, December 20, 1829.

[14] Marriott, *The Near Eastern Question*, 229.

participate in the proposed expedition against Algiers. Whether this move was prompted by a desire to further French interests in Egypt or merely to insure the success of the expedition is hard to determine. Polignac insisted that he had no designs against Egypt, and there is no evidence in the official correspondence to prove that he did. Regardless of the motives involved, however, it proved to be a most unfortunate move for the French. The British were averse to a French attack against Algiers, and the possibility of involving Egypt was more than they could tolerate. Wellington insisted that it was a scheme to destroy completely the Turkish state and that Great Britain would not permit this, even at the risk of war.

Mehemet Ali was anxious to participate in the conquest. In order to satisfy Wellington he wrote to the Sultan asking permission to attack the Dey of Algiers. At the same time, however, he informed Guilleminot, the French Ambassador in Constantinople, that "unless assent is readily given I will go without his consent."[15] Polignac was pleased with the prospects of having the support of Mehemet Ali, because it lessened the immediate military responsibilities of the French which had caused him considerable concern.[16] Polignac expected opposition from Great Britain but took consolation in the hope that Russia and Prussia would not object.[17]

Wellington, as early as May 1829, indicated that any change in the *status quo* in the Mediterranean would meet with his strenuous objection.[18] He suspected that the French were planning intervention of one kind or another, and although he was a close friend of both Charles X and

[15] A. E. C. P., Turquie 260. Guilleminot to Polignac, January 6, 1830, and January 16, 1830. Douin, *Mohamed Aly et l'Expedition d'Alger*, 1829-1830.

[16] A. E. C. P., Turquie 260. Polignac to Guilleminot, February 9, 1830.

[17] *Ibid.*, February 11, 1830. Darcy, *France et Angleterre: Cent Années de Rivalité Coloniale. L'Afrique*, 76.

[18] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 627. Roth to Portalis, May 11, 1829.

Polignac, he could not allow them to undertake an aggressive policy in the Mediterranean, as it would menace the integrity of Turkey. The continued blockade of Algiers and the hostile actions of the Dey caused great uneasiness in London. The British Consul stationed at Algiers saw the dangers of a French attack and offered to mediate. His offer was spurned by both sides, but he continued to press for a settlement. In his eagerness to be of service to his country, he overstepped the limits of a neutral agent and incurred the animosity of la Bretionnière. A protest was sent to London against the actions of the British Consul.[19]

Charles X and Polignac did not undertake the expedition without first attempting to appease the British. They were aware that Great Britain must be kept neutral; open hostilities with that state would be disastrous. Polignac attempted to satisfy Wellington with promises and explanations. He pointed out that the expedition was intended merely to rid the Mediterranean of the troublesome pirates. "France," he declared, "owes to Europe the removal of these pests from Africa." He further explained that Mehemet Ali was to aid in the undertaking merely to make success more certain. He referred to the relationship between the North African provinces and Turkey, and dismissed the matter by stating that "Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria are all practically independent of the Sultan and that no infringement on his general political status would be made." His further instruction to Laval, the French minister in London, is conclusive evidence that the expedition had been decided upon regardless of British opinion. "If objection is shown point out that the interests of France are at stake and that for humanity's sake the expedition must succeed."[20] From every

[19] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Algérie IV. St. John to La Bretonnière, December 10, 1829. *Ibid.*, December 18, 1829. *Ibid.*, La Bretonnière to St. John, December 22, 1829. U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports, Algiers. Lee to Secretary of State, March 14, 1830.

[20] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 629. Polignac to Laval, January 15, 1830.

point of view this letter was a colossal blunder. It did much more to antagonize Wellington and Aberdeen than it did to relieve the existing tension.

When Laval approached Wellington on the subject of the instructions which he had just received, he met with a violent protest. Laval wrote Polignac of what had taken place. Polignac answered that Aberdeen and Wellington must be assured that the consent of the Sultan had been obtained and that France had no intention of destroying the political integrity of Turkey.[21] The damage, however, was irreparable. Wellington was determined to prevent the co-operation of Mehemet Ali, and also the French expedition if possible.

Wellington's first move was to act through the Porte to prevent the attack on Algiers. Gordon, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed to induce the Sultan to bring pressure to bear on the Dey of Algiers for an understanding with France.[22] Gordon, a very capable diplomat, applied all his talents in an endeavor to settle the difficulty. He checked Polignac's statements to Aberdeen with those which the French sent to Constantinople. He found that the Sultan had not given Mehemet Ali permission to send troops against Algiers, and furthermore had promised under no conditions would he give his consent.[23] Wellington protested to Laval by declaring that the British could in no way tolerate a combined Franco-Egyptian attack on Algiers. "France has no right to appeal to Mehemet Ali because he is a subject of Turkey. I cannot but view this scheme as one tending to establish in the regency a French system instead of a Turkish one. It is folly for a nation as strong as France to seek aid in attacking a place no stronger than Algiers."[24]

[21] *Ibid.*, February 3, 1830.
[22] F. O., Turkey 78/188. Aberdeen to Gordon, January 20, 1830.
[23] *Ibid.*, 78/189. Gordon to Aberdeen, March 2, 1830.
[24] F. O., France 27/405. Memorandum of Wellington's conversation of February 2.

Wellington's protest carried weight. He indicated clearly that if Mehemet Ali was made a party to the conquest Great Britain would intervene. Laval was convinced that Wellington meant business. He wrote Polignac: "I attempted to persuade His Majesty that the alliance had no ulterior motives but was unable to do so."[25]

Polignac and Charles X dared not risk open hostilities with Great Britain, which would only further weaken their position at home. Defeat would be just as disastrous as victory would be advantageous to their plans. Opposition to an alliance with Mehemet Ali also developed in France. D'Haussez, Minister of Marine, and Bourmont, Minister of War, both objected,[26] and even Polignac at times seemed doubtful.[27] Charles X was finally won over; on April 14, he announced that France would make the attack against Algiers unaided. This decision was communicated to Aberdeen a few days later.[28]

British opposition to the French expedition against Algiers did not cease when they learned that Mehemet Ali was not to participate; instead their suspicions seemed to increase. No one knew what Charles X would do next but they hoped that a compromise between the French and the Dey would be possible. Gordon interviewed both the Sultan and Guilleminot and proposed that a commission be appointed, composed of members of both parties, to settle the impending disputes. The members were to sit in Algiers, weigh all the evidence and propose plans for settlement. The Sultan naturally took kindly to such a proposal and appointed Tahir Pacha to represent him on the commission. The French, just as naturally, did not agree. Guilleminot delayed action. He denied, after being pressed, that he had

[25] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 629. Laval to Polignac, March 3, 1830.
[26] D'Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 157.
[27] F. O., France 27/407. Stuart to Aberdeen, February 12, 1830.
[28] *Ibid.*, 408. Stuart to Aberdeen, April 19, 1830. A. E. C. P., Angleterre 630. Polignac to Laval, April 14, 1830.

agreed to appoint a man to serve on the commission; but Gordon reminded him that he had in his possession the promise in writing.[29] Guilleminot was not entirely responsible for the misrepresentation which he made to Gordon. Polignac had not kept him fully informed and his instructions were vague and indefinite.[30] Guilleminot, as a result did not know what to do. He had to take action without the slightest idea of what policy Polignac was pursuing. He was also expected to keep Mehemet Ali instructed as to the course to follow, but here also he was at a loss as to what to say.[31]

Meanwhile the Sultan, because of the influence of Gordon, urged Guilleminot to allow Tahir Pacha to go alone to Algiers to attempt to mediate.[32] Gordon urged this because he was convinced that the French Ambassador had no intention of appointing a representative to serve on the commission. Aberdeen asked the British Ambassador in Paris to secure for Tahir Pacha a promise of a safe passage to Algiers. Polignac answered that he "had had too much experience with the Porte's utter inability to influence the authorities at Algiers, to induce him to advise his Sovereign to delay measures for obtaining the object by force."[33] On March 27, the British Ambassador at Paris, was informed that any offer of mediation from the Porte would not be welcomed by the French government. Furthermore, Polignac declared: "The attainment of the ostensible object of the expedition by means of negotiations will not produce the effects in France that were to be expected from military success."[34] This is a very clear statement of fact and it exposed the real intentions of the French government. It

[29] F. O., Turkey, 78/189. Gordon to Aberdeen, March 2, 1830. Gordon enclosed in this despatch Guilleminot's letter containing the promise to appoint a commissioner.
[30] A. E. C. P., Turquie 260. Polignac to Guilleminot, February 9, 1830.
[31] *Ibid.*, March 5, 1830.
[32] *Ibid.*, Guilleminot to Polignac, March 7, 1830.
[33] F. O., France 27/408. Stuart to Aberdeen, March 26, 1830.
[34] *Ibid.*, March 27, 1830.

also destroyed what hopes the British had for a compromise of any sort.

Guilleminot, after some hesitation, gave Tahir Pacha a passport for Algiers. There is no evidence in the official documents that Polignac instructed the French agent to do this, but the former was convinced that it was too late for Tahir Pacha to do any harm to the French plans.[35] Tahir Pacha set out on a fruitless and hazardous expedition. He was taken captive by the French before he even arrived at Algiers and was sent in chains to Toulon. He appealed to Polignac but without success.[36] Stuart protested; feeling against France ran high in London, but Polignac refused to free Tahir Pacha.[37] There was no question now but that the French intended to send a fleet to Algiers. Diplomacy had failed and Great Britain did not see fit to declare war in order to save the Dey.

The French, meanwhile, continued to prepare for the expedition. The extensive proportions of the plans caused Aberdeen to complain. "It appears to indicate," he declared, "an intention of entire destruction of the Regency rather than the infliction of chastisement."[38] Polignac answered all the complaints in vague and general terms which did not satisfy the British. He wrote of the idealism which prompted the French to act, but carefully avoided any statement as to what they intended to do with the territory after the conquest.[39] All that he would say was that in due time all would be satisfactorily explained.[40]

Stuart gradually came to the conclusion that the French were determined to chastise not only the Dey but also to annex his territory. This conviction came as a result of nu-

[35] A. E. C. P., Turquie 260. Guilleminot to Polignac, March 30, 1830.
[36] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Algérie V. Tahir Pacha to Polignac, May 27, and July 1, 1830.
[37] F. O., France 27/408. Stuart to Aberdeen, May 31, 1830. A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Stuart to Polignac.
[38] F. O., France 27/405. Aberdeen to Stuart, March 5, 1830.
[39] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Polignac to Laval, March 3, 1830.
[40] F. O., France 27/408. Stuart to Aberdeen, April 9, 1830.

merous developments. *Le Moniteur* on April 20, contained an article which outlined a plan for the administration of Algiers when once the city was taken. This occurred before the expedition left Toulon. Stuart asked Polignac what the article meant but received no direct answer. Polignac in turn made a counter appeal in which he requested that he should not be forced to make statements which would be open to criticism in the Chambers.[41] He also complained to Aberdeen that Stuart was entirely too personal in his attacks and was overstepping the limits of his position in order to embarrass the French government.[42]

Polignac's attitude towards the British government concerning the Algerian question can be explained in part by his conviction that Wellington was in no position to be assertive. Laval assured him, and to a degree truthfully, that Wellington was only playing politics and that in the end would offer no great resistance.[43] Indeed Wellington was fighting a losing battle with his political opponents, but Polignac failed to take into account the fact that there were certain things in British policy more fundamental than political issues. Among these was a general opposition to French territorial expansion, especially in the Mediterranean countries, and also the desire to maintain the integrity of Turkish territory.

The fleet, after elaborate preparations was ready to set sail for Algiers. The French had seldom, even in the days of their greatest glory, seen such an expedition leave their shores.[44] Well might a bystander wonder why a fleet of such proportions should be sent against a place as weak as Algiers.

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[41] *Ibid.*, 27/409. April 30, 1830.
[42] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 630. Polignac to Laval, May 8, 1830.
[43] *Ibid.*, Laval to Polignac, May 17, 1830.
[44] F. O., France 27/409. Stuart to Aberdeen, May 21, 1830. *Annual Register*, "History of Europe," 1830, 174. There were sixty-eight ships of war, 277 transports and seven steam vessels. The military force amounted to 30,852 infantry, 534 cavalry, 2,327 artillerymen, 1,330 engineers, besides officers, medical staff, and interpreters of the Moorish and Turkish languages.

Anglo-French negotiations were somewhat altered with the actual sailing of the fleet. The British had tried to prevent the expedition, and having failed, they attempted to limit the extent and influence of the military operations. Stuart started negotiations along these lines before the fleet had reached its destination.[45] Charles X and Polignac were much relieved when once the expedition was under way. They felt that foreign intervention would not come, at least until after victory was assured. Accordingly they busied themselves with making ready to take advantage of the expected victory.

"The arms of the King have triumphed,—the fate of Algiers was decided yesterday. The King's flag waves over the forts and the palaces of the Dey."[46] Such was the headline printed in *Le Moniteur* on July 12, 1830. Charles X, after days of expectancy, was able to point with pride to the first important victory accredited to French arms since the humiliations of 1815. In his estimation, the first move towards his intended *coup d'état* had been successfully executed.

The French, experiencing little opposition, occupied Algiers.[47] The poorly equipped and undisciplined troops of the Dey proved no match for the well-planned attack. Marshal Bourmont, after the guns of the forts had been silenced, forced the Dey to abdicate and sign over all the fortified cities under his control. The French soldiers occupied the city garrisons and public buildings, and the whole Province was put under military rule.[48]

Charles X and Polignac anxiously awaited the effect that the occupation would have on both France and the foreign

[45] F. O., France 27/405. Aberdeen to Stuart, June, 1830.

[46] *Le Moniteur*, July 12, 1830.

[47] U. S. Navy Department Archives, 1830. Biddle to Secretary of Navy, July 13, 1830. F. O., Algiers, Consular Reports 3/32. St. John to Colonial Office, July 13, 1830.

[48] De Clercq, *op. cit.*, III, 577. Plantet, *Correspondance des Deys d'Alger avec la Cour de France*, III, 569.

countries. The enthusiastic reception of the news of the victory in France seemed to indicate that even their greatest expectations in that quarter had been realized.[49] The attitude of the foreign courts was also far from discouraging. With the exception of Great Britain and Turkey, the nations seemed to be either enthusiastic or passively indifferent. The Czar of Russia sent his congratulations.[50] Officials in Holland and several of the Italian States openly expressed their thankfulness that the troublesome pirates' nest had at last been destroyed.[51] In the United States, France was acclaimed for having rendered so great a service to humanity.[52] Austria, although not so enthusiastic, was not critical. Metternich passed over the whole affair as a matter of no great importance. He concluded that "the expedition was the result of an accident more than the outcome of a premeditated design."[53]

Great Britain and Turkey were openly opposed to the French occupation of Algiers. The Sultan regarded the attack as an infringement on the territorial integrity of his state. He was in no position to offer military resistance himself but it is evident that he expected Great Britain to champion his cause. The American Ambassador at Constantinople predicated that the British would surely take advantage of this opportunity to regain some of the influence with the Porte which they had lost in recent times.[54] Great Britain was in reality the only great power that looked upon the conquest as an actual violation of the sovereignty of Turkey. The other powers apparently felt that the Dey was practically independent and did not consider Algiers as a part of Turkey.[55]

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[49] Comtesse de Boigne, *Mémoires*, III, 251.
[50] De Broglie, *Souvenirs*, IV, 26.
[51] Blanc, *A History of Ten Years*, I, 76.
[52] *Niles Register*, XXXIX, 18. September 4, 1830.
[53] *Wellington Despatches*, VII, 97-8.
[54] U. S. Department of State, Turkey I. Navoni to Secretary of State, August 10, 1830.
[55] *Wellington Despatches*, VII, 20-5.

When Stuart received news of the French victory at Algiers, he congratulated Polignac but reminded him that "the expedition was undertaken for the sole purpose of vindicating the national honor of France, and not with a view of acquisition or conquest."[56] He tried to get Polignac to call a general conference of the powers to decide the future status of Algiers, but Polignac refused to commit himself, much to the annoyance of Stuart.[57]

Polignac was at a loss as to what to do with Algiers. The French government had planned no further ahead than the occupation. Charles X was more interested in the effects which the conquest would have than in the uncertain value of a colony. He was busy, for the time being, with his plans for the reörganization of his government. Polignac, in whose hands the Algerian problem rested, was either without instructions or lacked the courage to carry out the will of his sovereign.[58] He considered withdrawing from Algiers and wrote to the French Ambassador at Constantinople to sound out the Porte on the matter.[59] No one seemed to know just what should be done. Even the consuls in Algeria were uninstructed as to the plans which their government expected to follow.[60] Polignac, in spite of all his indecision, did guard against committing himself to the British.[61]

The general feeling in England was averse to allowing the French to stay in Algiers after the Dey had been duly chastised. The press reflected concern, lamenting in particular that the French had taken such a valuable colony. The *London Chronicle* commented on the healthy climate, the

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[56] F. O., France 27/411. Stuart to Aberdeen, July 16, 1830.

[57] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1830.

[58] Blanc, *op. cit.*, I, 85. Marchand, *L'Europe et la Conquete d'Alger*, chapter 11. Darcy, *op. cit.*, 139.

[59] A. E. C. P., Turquie 261. Polignac to Guilleminot, July 17, 1830. U. S. Department of State, Turkey I. Navoni to Secretary of State, September 11, 1830.

[60] *Ibid.*, Consular Reports, Algiers XII. July 5, 1830.

[61] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Polignac to Laval, July 16, 1830.

productivity of the soil, the fact that there were over two million people within the confines of the territory.[62] These things appealed to the colonizing instincts of the English. They especially resented the fact that France, of all nations, had acquired such a lucrative territorial possession. Many of them remembered France as their old rival in colonization. The long wars of the eighteenth century culminating in the struggle with Napoleon were still grim realities. The occupation of Algiers might, in their estimation, be the beginning of another struggle.[63] Various plans were suggested in the press for the curtailment of French activities in North Africa. The one most generally agreed upon was to establish a government in Algiers controlled jointly by Great Britain, Russia, France, and Austria.[64] All this was unofficial, but it gives an idea of how the English people felt about the matter.

The Marquis of Lansdowne expressed in the British Parliament the feeling of uneasiness which was generally prevalent in official circles. "An important change, materially affecting the interests of the country has recently taken place in the French successes in Algiers. He [Lansdowne] could not regard with dissatisfaction that additional triumph of civilization over barbarism, but new conditions must exercise great influence in the settlement of Eastern affairs. He hoped that the final agreement would prove as satisfactory to the powers as it was glorious to French arms."[65]

St. John, British Consul at Algiers, enthusiastically sponsored the cause of his country. He was active in his endeavor to minimize the possibilities of French success both during

[62] *London Chronicle*, July 12, 1830.
[63] *Courier*, July 14, 1830. *London Times*, July 23, 1830.
[64] *London Chronicle*, July 23, 1830.
[65] *Hansard* (new series) XXV, 1219.

the conquest and in the attempted administration of the territory by the victors. He sympathized with the natives; gave them advice and in some instances material aid. He courted the friendship of the native chieftains and won their confidence by intimating that his country would come to their rescue. He urged Aberdeen to intervene in their behalf, and suggested that only a very small force would be needed to drive out the invaders[66] Aberdeen did not take kindly to these suggestions. Although opposed to French occupation of Algiers, he was not willing to resort to war to drive out the French. He rebuked St. John for his unauthorized aggressiveness and pointed out that no feeling of hostility existed between France and Great Britain.[67] There is no evidence in the Record Office to prove that Aberdeen ever encouraged St. John to give support to the natives against the French.[68]

The enthusiasm in France over the victory at Algiers was short-lived. The immediate outbursts were due to what remained of the Napoleonic legend. The French populace reacted as they had done over Napoleon's triumphs at Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram. Charles X, however, compared very unfavorably with Napoleon, and the occupation of Algiers lacked the romance commonly associated with Austerlitz. A little time for reflection produced upon the French people an attitude of indifference on the part of some and of unsuppressed disgust on the part of others.[69] Several prominent French citizens had never approved of Charles X's scheme. Broglie proposed that a petition be presented to the King against any such undertaking.[70] Vice-

[66] F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/32. St. John to Colonial Office, July 25, August 25, and September 2, 1830.

[67] This statement was written across St. John's report of September 2. F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/32.

[68] Darcy, *op. cit.*, takes a different point of view.

[69] F. O., France 27/411. Stuart to Aberdeen, July 12, 1830.

[70] *Archives Parlementaires*, LXI, 554.

Admiral Verhuell recommended that all preparations for the conquest be stopped even before the fleet set sail.[71] And Talleyrand warned that "if this enterprise is an expedient with the view to facilitate some home matters, *they will find themselves greatly mistaken.*"[72] The enthusiasm that was originally expressed in the press soon died down, and the more liberal journals become openly critical. *Le Journal des Debats* regretted that "French blood must be spilled in such a conquest."[73] Rumblings of a revolt could be heard from every direction, but Charles X obstinately marched towards the abyss which was nearer than even his bitterest enemies realized.

When the French Chambers convened in March 1830, they were greeted with a discourse from the King which foretold what was to follow. A number of the members felt that not only had the constitution been violated, but also that they had been personally insulted.[74] A protest was voted and sent to the King on March 18. He was obdurate. "Gentlemen," he declared, "I announced my resolutions in my discourse. . . . These resolutions are unalterable."[75] The Chamber was dissolved in May and an election was ordered for July. The election had been timed to take place just after the arrival of the news of the French victory in Algiers. The clamor for constitutional rights dimmed the shouts of victory from the field of battle. The election was disastrous for the King. The opposition elected 270 out of 420 candidates, a clear majority.[76] Even some of the King's most intimate friends and advisers were defeated in the upheaval.[77]

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[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Talleyrand, *Memoirs*, III, 310.
[73] *Journal des Debats*, June 20, 1830.
[74] *Archives Parlementaires*, LXI, 543.
[75] *Ibid.*, 619.
[76] *Annual Register*, "History of Europe," 1830, 178.
[77] D'Haussez, Minister of Marine, was defeated for re-election.

Charles X was still determined to crush the rebellious opposition. On July 26 he issued a royal ordinance which destroyed the freedom of the press, modified the election law, and annulled the election which had just taken place. A revolution was the result. Charles X was forced to abdicate and a new dynasty was established with the coronation of Louis Philippe.

CHAPTER VI

THE ADVENT OF THE ORLEANS MONARCHY

French foreign policy underwent many changes between 1789 and 1848, ranging in scope from modest plans for non-intervention to grandiose schemes for making France a world state, and from expeditions to free suppressed peoples to military campaigns which were purely militaristic. Since the days of Louis XIV France had been looked upon as a disturber of national boundaries; and since 1789, she had acquired the rather odious reputation of being a meddler in the internal affairs of other states.

Charles X, driven into exile by the Revolution of July, took along with him most of the traditions of the Bourbon dynasty. The treaty obligations which the deposed dynasty had incurred since the restoration in 1815, were considered abrogated, states that had been friends and allies were cast aside; and the ministers, in whose hands the destinies of the state rested, were either in exile or in prison. The succeeding government, with new principles and obligations, was to construct a new diplomatic structure. Even though they might agree in principle with some of the ideas of their predecessors, it was impolitic to let this be known. Revolutionists always expect something new and different from the old order of things.

A revolution seldom, if ever, satisfies all parties. There are generally two extremes representing groups with incompatible ideas. There is seldom unanimity of opinion even within the successful party. Lack of organization and leadership often divides a group on matters of administration, even though it has been united while actual fighting was

taking place. As a result, in order to establish a system of administration, a compromise is made. The ruler or system thus established is seldom enthusiastically supported by any group. Louis Philippe, the newly chosen French monarch, found himself in just that position.[1] The policies of the Orleans Monarchy, both foreign and domestic, therefore necessarily vacillated from one side to the other. Security and stability were lacking from the very first.

The powers of Europe were both alarmed and annoyed by the Revolution of July. There were individuals still in power who had witnessed the disorders that followed the French Revolution of 1789; some had set in the Congress of Vienna and had obligated their countries to agreements and alliances to prevent another upheaval. Some still retained their suspicion of the French. What assurance had they that this revolution would not pave the way for another Napoleon?[2] Most of the rulers looked askance at Louis Philippe and with hesitation accepted him as a brother monarch.

Louis Philippe was not unaware of the prevailing conditions. He realized that he must secure some support from the outside without at the same time antagonizing any powerful faction in his state. It was a difficult task to convince the absolute monarchs of his conservative intentions and satisfy liberals at home.[3] He endeavored to do this by appointing conservatives to represent France in foreign courts and by giving the most important places in the Ministry to liberals. Talleyrand, a well-known conservative, was appointed as Ambassador to Great Britain with the hope of winning the support of Wellington.[4] The Whigs clamored for the recognition of the Orleans Monarchy and

[1] Broglie, *Souvenirs*, 287 ff. Guizot, *Mémoires*, II, 29.
[2] U. S. Department of State, England XXVI. McLane to Secretary of State, November 5, 1830.
[3] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Boudraud to Molé, August 23, 1830.
[4] U. S. Department of State, England XXXVII. Report of McLane, December, 1830.

Palmerston spoke of the Revolution of July as "a most triumphant demonstration of the advantages arising from free discussion and freedom of the press."[5] Wellington was accused of having sponsored Charles X's attempt to carry through his *coup d'état*.[6] Pressure from the opposition and the conservatism of Talleyrand finally led to the recognition of Louis Philippe by the British government.[7] The Czar of Russia, whose friendship for Charles X was generally known, was the last of the great monarchs to recognize Louis Philippe. The affiliation of Talleyrand with the new government was a deciding influence in Russian recognition as well as in the British.[8]

The incompatibility of Louis Philippe's domestic and foreign policies was obvious from the start. He could not silence the demands of his people for intervention in behalf of the Italians in their struggle against oppression, for the conquest of the Rhine provinces, or for active intervention in Spain.[9] These demands could not be disregarded, but extreme caution was necessary in order not to antagonize too many of the powers. The attempt to reconcile the various factions that had developed occupied the most of Louis Philippe's time.

Louis Philippe knew that he could not expect support from all the rulers in Europe. The tardy manner in which the most important of the continental powers had recognized his government, together with their opposition to liberalism in any form, seemed to necessitate an understanding with Great Britain. Talleyrand's influence in directing the interests of France towards this end is obvious. It was in conformity with a long cherished idea which he so clearly

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[5] Parker, *Life of Sir Thomas Graham*, I, 144.

[6] *Correspondence of Princess Lieven with Earl Grey.* Grey to Lieven, July 29, 1830. Stockmar, *Memoirs.*

[7] Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique Politique Étrangère*, III, 10.

[8] Stockmar, *Memoirs*, I, 145.

[9] Thureau-Dangin, *Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet*, I, 52.

manifested at the Congress of Vienna. Besides, quite apart from the wishes of Louis Philippe and Talleyrand, an Anglo-French alliance was far from being illogical. The two countries were outside of the Holy Alliance, which theoretically united the states of Europe. They were the only important powers in Europe which recognized democracy even in theory. The French government regarded British support as the *sine qua non* for its security but the British did not feel so keenly the need for French support. Their insular location and their command of the seas made them more independent. Proposals for an Anglo-French alliance were to come naturally from France, not from Great Britain.

Talleyrand's appointment as Ambassador was not applauded by the people in either France or Great Britain. Many of his countrymen regarded him as hopelessly corrupt and as a representative of an order long suppressed. Guizot and Broglie alone supported Louis Philippe's decision without reservation.[10] The Whigs in Great Britain were not enthusiastic. They remembered him as the intriguer of 1792,[11] and frowned upon his hypocrisy in religion and morals. *The Morning Chronicle* referred to him as "this distinguished Prince, with spectacles on his nose and pouch on his side is to leave rue Rivoli for Portland Place, and to imagine himself happy and respected in the British metropolis. . . . Will he betray Louis Philippe? Will he join the party of the Duke of Bordeaux? Will he embroil France with England or England with Europe?"[12]

Although an elderly man, Talleyrand accepted the duties of his new position with enthusiasm. His desire for an Anglo-French alliance urged him, even in his declining years, to leave the solitude of retirement and to renew his political

[10] Broglie, *Souvenirs*, IV, 57. Darcy, *op. cit.*, 10.
[11] *Letters of Princess Lieven*, 258.
[12] *Morning Chronicle*, September 11, 1830.

activities. "England," he said, "is the country with which France should cultivate the most friendly relations, . . . the other powers still believe in the doctrine of divine right of kings; France and England alone no longer subscribe to that doctrine. Both countries have resolved to maintain peace and their voice will not be heard in vain."[13] He was pleased with the reception tendered him by the Tories.[14] They looked upon him not only as a conservative representing the most dependable element in France but also as one who would conform to their ideas in the conduct of foreign affairs.

His task was beset with many difficulties. Before he set foot on British soil, preparatory to taking up his duties in London, revolutions broke out in Belgium and Poland. The powers surmised that French revolutionary doctrines were again threatening the stability of their institutions. Louis Philippe assured them that France would have nothing to do with the revolutionists, but the enthusiasm with which French people acclaimed them contradicted this statement. "Let us march boldly to the Rhine, let us carry the frontier to it, let us continue the national movement with war. . . . At this price, we, the Republicans, promise to the services of the government our persons, our capacities and our energies; and assume responsibility for domestic tranquillity."[15] This declaration, along with others similar in character, was a challenge to both Louis Philippe and the powers of Europe. If the King of France disregarded the appeals for action he would weaken his position at home. If he adhered to them, he would endanger his reputation abroad.

The revolutionary leaders in both Belgium and Poland acclaimed the Revolution of July as a model for their own plans, and they received the approbation of many French-

[13] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Talleyrand to Sébastiani, November 27, 1830.
[14] *Ibid.*, Talleyrand to Molé, November 2, 1830.
[15] *Archives Parlementaires*, LXVI, 605.

men in their endeavor. The various rulers noted this fact in particular. They seemed agreed as to the necessity for action but the underlying motives differed. The British were more concerned, in general, with the maintenance of the *status quo* and, in particular, with keeping France out of Belgium, than they were in supporting conservative political institutions in the various territories in question. Even the unpopular Wellington Ministry had the support of the people in his opposition to a change in the territorial status of the Low Countries. The struggle for freedom against autocracy found general favor among the British but the idea of the acquisition of Belgium by France met with unanimous opposition of all parties. The rulers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria held a different view. Their prime concern was the suppression of liberalism. They held France responsible for the prevailing political upheavals. She had, in their estimation, violated the decisions of the Congress of Vienna.[16] Some believed that they should march an army into France as they had done in 1815, and stamp out the evil at its source. Such action was prevented by Russia's being, for the time, occupied in the suppression of the revolt in Poland.[17] Austria and Prussia did not see fit to undertake the task alone.

Anglo-French relations were fortunately improved by the advent of Casimir Périer as the head of the French Ministry. He was much less radical than his predecessors had been and quite willing to meet the British halfway. He announced his intention to carry out a policy of peace and coöperation with Great Britain, based on the principle of non-intervention in Belgium. "French blood for France alone," he declared.[18]

The revolutions just referred to eclipsed, for the time being, interest in the Mediterranean. Louis Philippe, during

[16] *Letters of Princess Lieven*, 247. Stockmar, *Memoirs*, I, 146.
[17] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Talleyrand to Sébastiani, December 1, 1830.
[18] *Archives Parlementaires*, LXVII, 683.

the early part of his reign, showed little inclination to interfere in the Mediterranean but as time passed he took a different attitude.

The opposition which France met in the Mediterranean when any assertiveness was shown was partly due to her aggressiveness in Belgium. The British would have opposed the occupation of Algiers, but not so readily or so vehemently, if France had not shown signs of aggressiveness in other directions. The impossibility of completely separating any one phase of the foreign policy of a state from the whole is strikingly demonstrated in this illustration.

The powers, even France, seemed for the moment to have forgotten the attack on Algiers. The King who was responsible for the conquest had been deposed. His successor was supported by a party which had frowned upon the expedition as a foolish enterprise. Louis Philippe was endeavoring to secure the friendship and support of Great Britain, the country that had objected most strenuously to the conquest. These conditions seemed to indicate that Algiers would be evacuated. There were, however, other factors which had to be taken into consideration. The French people at heart favored the retention of the territory. Possession of it was looked upon as the first real manifestation of military success since the Congress of Vienna. The Napoleonic tradition was still in evidence. Louis Philippe had been forced to disavow it in Belgium. Could he do the same thing in the Mediterranean?

The French army in Africa was inactive for some months after the July Revolution.[19] The fact that it remained, however, seemed to indicate that Louis Philippe considered the possibility of holding the territory. He also realized the disappointment which withdrawal would mean to many of

[19] U. S. Department of State, Consular Reports, Algiers XII. Brown to Secretary of State, September 3, 1830.

the French people.[20] British opposition was to be expected but that might not be serious if a cautious policy was followed. Talleyrand's instructions during the first few months of his stay in London contain very few references to Algiers. However, he was an expansionist. He confessed to Stuart that he very much desired an alliance with Great Britain[21] but it is hard to believe that he did not also realize the importance of a colony in northern Africa.[22] He endeavored to keep the Algerian question in the background and expressed annoyance at the popular demands in France for expansion. He informed Molé that he "had avoided speaking of it [Algiers], and would be glad if our newspapers observed the same reticence to our occupation, as silence is the best means to attain an end. I believe . . . we shall experience no insurmountable difficulties when we begin to consider it."[23]

Louis Philippe gradually came to the conclusion that there was no real reason why France should give up Algiers. The question was freely discussed in the French Chambers. Some of the members advocated complete and immediate evacuation. "The expedition to Algiers was concluded without the consent of France," declared one speaker, "it was concluded by a Ministry which speculated without doubt, upon the accomplishment of its covetous designs."[24] Molé wondered whether or not Algiers was worth the price of conquest, especially since it involved the loss of friendship of the various nations of Europe.[25] There were others who insisted that the territory should be held. Clauzel, the commander of the expeditionary forces in northern Africa,

[20] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Algérie VI. Memoir of Bois le Comte, August 25, 1830.
[21] F. O., France 27/414. Stuart to Aberdeen, September 27, 1830.
[22] Cans, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, 1890. Mantoux, "Talleyrand en 1830," *Revue Historique*, 1902, 266. De Clercq, *op. cit.*, I, 436.
[23] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Talleyrand to Molé, November 30, 1830.
[24] Dubois et Terrier, *Un Siècle d'Expansion Coloniale*, 203.
[25] *Archives Parlementaires*, LXIV, 88.

urgently pressed for permission to complete the conquest of all of Algeria.[26] Public opinion was gradually manifesting itself and Louis Philippe awaited the result.

The British expected the withdrawal of the French troops from Algiers. They considered it entirely in keeping with the overthrow of Charles X and in accordance with the prevailing desire for an Anglo-French understanding. Stuart watched closely for some indication as to what the French government intended to do. His reports indicate the indecision of the French and the expectancy of the British. On August 9, he wrote that in his opinion the French were making ready to evacuate Algiers.[27] Three days later he expressed fear that they were about to reëstablish their fortifications.[28] On the 16th he reported that the Duke of Orleans had insisted that under the existing circumstances Algiers could not be evacuated.[29] A week later he wrote, "They say that the continued hostility of the natives and the sickness which prevails in the army render it impossible even to retain temporary possession of Algiers."[30] Two weeks later he confessed that he had been too optimistic, for it was evident that the French intended permanently to keep Algiers.[31]

To recapitulate: The Orleans Monarchy was in a precarious position from the very day of its advancement to power. Louis Philippe was confronted with the difficult task of establishing a foreign policy compatible with his domestic policy. The Belgian and Polish difficulties complicated this undertaking. The clamor for intervention on the part of his subjects and the threatening attitude of the powers made the outcome uncertain. The Algerian problem was shoved

[26] Louis Blanc, *op. cit.*, II, 473.
[27] F. O., France 27/412. Stuart to Aberdeen, August 9, 1830.
[28] *Ibid.*, August 11, 1830.
[29] *Ibid.*, August 16, 1830.
[30] *Ibid.*, August 23, 1830.
[31] *Ibid.*, September 17, 1830.

into the background for a time, but as the smoke cleared the French flag still waved over Algiers. At first the British took it for granted that withdrawal was imminent; when this became uncertain they made ready to curtail the operations of the French in northern Africa. To France, possession was nine points of the law and her foothold in Algiers was destined to grow into a vast colonial empire.

CHAPTER VII

ANGLO-FRENCH ATTEMPTS AT COÖPERATION, 1830-1834

TALLEYRAND while Ambassador at the Court of St. James, centered the greater part of his activities on an Anglo-French alliance. His open conviction that the security of the Orleans Monarchy depended upon the friendship of Great Britain added a note of sincerity to his negotiations. This impressed Aberdeen. The conservatism of both the French Minister and the British Cabinet provided common ground for the preliminary negotiations. Talleyrand was scarcely acclimated in his new position when the Tory government fell. Wellington had lost the confidence of even his own party. He failed to keep abreast of the new movements, the strength of which he had underestimated.[1]

The new Ministry led by Earl Grey ushered into British politics several new ideas. The Whigs were freer from the fetters of party tradition than the Tories, a fact due to the length of time that they had been out of office. New blood was introduced into the government which added the energy and enthusiasm the preceding Ministry had lacked. Grey had risen to power with political reform as an issue. He was more interested in the reform of Parliament than in the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy. He accordingly pledged himself to a reform policy at home and to a policy of peace and non-intervention abroad.[2] Palmerston was chosen as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was a man forty-six years of age, had served in the War Office, but was

[1] *Life of Brougham by Himself*, III, 46. *Annual Register*, 1830, "History of Europe," 143.

[2] U. S. Department of State, England XXXVII. McLane to Martin van Bruen, November 22, 1830.

without any particular claim to distinction at the time of his appointment. For a time his foreign policies seemed to indicate that he was groping, a little uncertain as to just what plan to follow. Canning's influence and training were evident from the first. As time passed, Palmerston became more and more a disciple of his illustrious predecessor. He did manifest a will of his own on many occasions. He looked at France with suspicion and regarded Louis Philippe as a man "in whom no solid trust can be reposed."[3] Palmerston and Talleyrand never got along well together. There was always a feeling of mutual distrust which from the first created a barrier that became quite formidable as time passed.[4] This had an unfortunate result on the prospects for an alliance, but Talleyrand did not give up hope. He was very much concerned at first, but reported that he was convinced that the Whigs would not be unfavorable to France.[5]

Talleyrand and Palmerston had many difficulties to settle. Belgium proved to be the most difficult of all[6] but Spain and Poland added problems as well. All these things, although they were far removed from the Mediterranean question, had a pronounced effect on the policies of both countries in that area.

Palmerston's Mediterranean policy, for a time, lacked precision. He agreed with the traditional policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire from the ravages of greedy powers, but he was slow in realizing that there was any immediate danger. Stratford Canning pleaded with Palmerston to follow a more assertive policy, lest Turkey should fall an unfortunate victim to Russia, France, or Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. Palmerston was not concerned over the success of Mehemet Ali against the Sultan which Can-

[3] Greville, *Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Victoria*, I, 302.
[4] *Memoirs of Duchess of Dino*, I, 154. *Talleyrand Memoirs*, III, 281.
[5] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Talleyrand to Maison, November 18, 1830.
[6] Hall, *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, chapters 3 and 4.

ning so graphically described. He believed matters should take their own course so that when the Sultan and Mehemet Ali mutually were deprived of their surplus strength they would be willing to settle down and live at peace.[7] Palmerston persisted in this nonchalant attitude in spite of all that Canning could do.

British influence with the Porte had waned steadily since the battle of Navarino. Palmerston apparently did not realize the extent to which this was true. He was not easily convinced that both France and Russia furthered their interests, Russia with the Sultan and France with Mehemet Ali, at the expense of the British. The French even talked of the possibilities of making the Mediterranean a French lake, and also a Franco-Russian alliance for the conquest of India was intimated. Several in Great Britain realized what was threatening. *The Oriental Herald* urged Palmerston to occupy Egypt. "It will be well, if Egypt is to be possessed by a European power, that England should be the first to plant her standards on the banks of the Nile. . . . Of all the acquisitions that England could make, whether in a military, political, commercial, or colonial point of view, Egypt is the most important. Not only is she the key to India, and the immediate connecting point between that country and England, but no territory offers more resources for the augmentation of our wealth."[8] The idea of using the Mediterranean as a trade route to India was also being discussed. As early as 1830, English surveyors and scientists were retracing the trail blazed by Napoleon and his followers over a quarter of a century earlier, endeavoring to determine the possibilities of an all-water route to India through Egypt. The reports of these investigations were printed by

[7] F. O., Turkey 78/211. Canning to Palmerston, December 19, 1832. A long memorandum covered with marginal notes in Palmerston's own handwriting. It shows clearly his opinions on the Near East at that time.

[8] *Oriental Herald*, XIX, 256. Quoted in Hoskins, *op. cit.*, 142.

order of Parliament[9] and they attracted a great deal of attention.

The Whigs were criticized in Parliament for not attempting to curb the French.[10] Palmerston answered that the intentions of France were good and that in the end everything would be settled peaceably.[11] Sir Robert Peel pointed out that the English were daily losing influence in the Mediterranean and that unless something were done, France and Russia would completely supersede them there.[12] These fears were substantiated in part by reports that came from the various Mediterranean countries. St. John reported from Algiers that the English were losing the opportunity to supersede the French. He suggested that only a few English troops could drive out the French, if they were sent immediately.[13] These reports did not impress Palmerston. Pencil notes on the margins of St. John's letters to him show how he was annoyed by them.[14] The British were also met by the French in Tripoli where the consuls of the two countries strove to promote the interests of their respective nations.[15] The reserve which Palmerston displayed in opposing the French can probably be traced to Talleyrand's assurances that France was in no way contemplating an extension of her conquest.[16]

Developments in the French Chambers prior to 1833 seemed to justify Palmerston's belief that the French were not contemplating the colonization of Algeria. No definite policy had been decided upon even for the city of Algiers.[17] A change in the French attitude towards colonization in

[9] *Parliamentary Papers* (1834), 478.
[10] *Hansard* (third series) IX, 841 ff.
[11] *Ibid.*, X, 1231.
[12] *Ibid.*, 1229.
[13] F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/33. St. John to Foreign Office, January 14, and June 15, 1831. *Ibid.*, St. John to Goderich, April 7, 1832.
[14] See also C. O., Mediterranean 324/84. Hay to St. John, June 26, 1832.
[15] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Tripoli. Despatch of Schwebel, October 12, 1832.
[16] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 630. Talleyrand to Périer, January 25, 1832.
[17] Dubois et Terrier, *op. cit.*, 203. *Archives Parlementaires*, LXIV, 88; LXXXVI, 597.

North Africa is noticeable in 1833.[18] In that year a special commission was appointed to make an investigation of the conditions in Algiers with a view to further colonization. The commission, after a thorough investigation, recommended the retention of Algiers and the occupation of the garrison towns.[19] This was the first important official act of the French government which indicated a determination to retain its newly acquired territory.

Revolts in Modena and the Papal States in February, 1831, attracted the attention of both Great Britain and France. As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, France had for some time been interested in Italy and now the revolt of the Italians against their autocratic governments made an added appeal. Austria without any hesitation came to the rescue of the threatened governments. This was no more than she had done on previous occasions, but in this particular instance France felt powerful enough to resist by force what she had from necessity disregarded on previous occasions. The French government approached both the Holy See and Great Britain in an attempt to prevent the actual intervention of the Austrians.[20] Palmerston was sympathetic and ordered the British Ambassador at Florence to proceed to Rome to aid in the prevention of hostilities,[21] but before anything could be done, Austrian troops occupied Bologna. The revolt was soon crushed but unrest lingered on and outbreaks continued. Finally, after continued disorder, Austria saw fit to occupy Bologna a second time in February, 1832. Périer, when this news arrived, declared, "France, a Catholic country, has need of the independence of the Holy See: and what will become of this independence if the Pope is guarded by the bayonet of a

[18] *Ibid.*, 590, 592, 594, and 599.
[19] *Ibid.*, LXXXVIII, 669.
[20] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 630. Sébastiani to Talleyrand, March 1, 1831.
[21] F. O., France 27/427. Granville to Palmerston, March 7, 1831.

foreigner?"[22] French troops were sent to occupy Ancona. This move brought a protest from Palmerston who had been willing to coöperate with Périer in a diplomatic way to oppose the Austrians, but military intervention was unwarranted in his estimation, and dangerous to the peace of Europe.[23] He informed Talleyrand that the French occupation of Ancona endangered the prospects for an Anglo-French understanding. This struck a responsive chord in Talleyrand's mind. He urged Périer to withdraw the troops from Italy in order to obtain the settlement of more important matters with Great Britain.[24] In this he was not successful as both the French and the Austrians remained in Italy. Palmerston interpreted this act as proof of French insincerity in her dealings with Great Britain.

Early in 1833, the Turkish problem became the center of attraction for both Great Britain and France. Friendship for Mehemet Ali continued to increase in France. He was regarded as a French protégé and his success or failure was linked closely with their own. One member of the French Chamber voiced a popular opinion when he suggested that France should support Mehemet Ali in his attempt to occupy Constantinople.[25] The continuation of war between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan brought to the front problems of such importance that neither France nor Great Britain any longer could conceal from each other their real intentions.

Mehemet Ali, a great admirer of Napoleon, tried to imitate the "Little Corsican." He gradually established his independence in Egypt, partly through his ability as a soldier and partly by making a bid for the support of the Mohammedans by promising to deliver the Holy Places

[22] Lucas-Dubreton, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 210.
[23] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 636. Talleyrand to Périer, March 9, 1832.
[24] *Ibid.*, March 22, 1832.
[25] *Archives Parlementaires*, LXXXIV, 92.

from the clutches of non-believers. Egypt, however, was by no means the limit of his ambitions. Since Syria lay directly in his path to glory, he planned for the conquest of that territory. In 1831, a force of 10,000 Egyptians entered Syria and laid siege to Acre, a city which had been strong enough to withstand an attack generaled by Napoleon. The Sultan declared Mehemet Ali an outlaw. Mehemet Ali, although insisting that he had no designs against the Sultan, was really glad of the opportunity to make a clean sweep of Asia Minor. Acre, Damascus, and Aleppo fell before his devastating offensive. Even the army of the Sultan could not withstand the onslaught. The people of Syria, Moslems and Christians alike, attracted by the ability, moderation, and personality of Mehemet Ali, flocked to his banner. The Sultan, buoyant and aggressive in the hour of victory but meek and submissive when threatened with defeat, appealed to Great Britain for aid. He implored Stratford Canning, British Ambassador at Constantinople, to urge his government to come to the rescue.[26] Palmerston was not anxious to be dragged into the war, nor was he convinced that the interests of his country were threatened. At this particular moment he was much more concerned over the settlement of the Belgian question than over the affairs of the Mediterranean. He did, however, thank the Sultan for his special mark of friendship and sent a mild rebuke to Mehemet Ali for his unwarranted disturbances.[27] These words were of no material aid to the Sultan in the struggle with his rebellious subject, for Mehemet Ali was not influenced by verbal chastisements.

Mehemet's victories brought him closer and closer to the gates of Constantinople. The Sultan's position was very precarious. Having failed in his attempt to interest Palmer-

[26] F. O., Turkey 78/212. Canning to Palmerston, August 9, 1832.
[27] *Ibid.*, 213. Palmerston to Mandeville, December 5, 1832.

ston, he turned to a more willing listener. The Czar of Russia had been waiting for such an opportunity. The Sultan did not have to plead for aid; aid came unsolicited and in generous allowances.

At this time Broglie approached Palmerston with the suggestion that their countries act jointly to settle the difficulties in Turkey.[28] Palmerston gave a polite yet definite refusal. He lived to see the day when he regretted this decision, but at the time it was made he thought France, not Russia, was the real intruder in the Near East. Since the conquest of Algiers in 1830, he suspected the French with having secret designs on the whole of North Africa.[29]

Palmerston and Broglie pursued separate policies towards Turkey. Palmerston sent Colonel Campbell to Alexandria and Lord Ponsonby to Constantinople with instructions to patch up the difficulties as best they could.[30] Broglie despatched Admiral Roussin to Constantinople to restore order and prevent the encroachment of Russia in Turkey. Roussin approached both the Sultan and Mehemet Ali with a plan to settle their difficulties, but both men spurned the offer with equal indignation.[31] Roussin then informed Mehemet Ali that the French, although sympathetic with his cause, could not support him in his plans to conquer the Sultan.[32] He then went to the Sultan and advised him to offer Adana to Mehemet Ali if he would withdraw his troops. The Sultan agreed and Mehemet Ali promised to withdraw.[33]

The Czar of Russia had been informed as to what was taking place. He was determined not to let this opportunity for intervention slip through his fingers. He despatched

[28] F. O., France 27/463. Granville to Palmerston, February 7, 1833. *Hansard*, XXII, 322.
[29] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 640. Talleyrand to Broglie, March 14, 1833.
[30] F. O., Turkey 78/227. Palmerston to Campbell, February 4, 1833.
[31] *Ibid.* 78/222. Mandeville to Palmerston, February 25, 1833.
[32] *Journal des Debats*, April 19, 1833.
[33] Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russia*, 24.

another agent, Count Orloff, to win the confidence of the Sultan and convince him that his salvation depended upon the support of Russia. Orloff was successful from the very start.[34] His influence over the Sultan was immediate and conclusive. The presence of the Russian fleet in the Dardanelles and a detachment of Russian soldiers in Constantinople helped to clinch the victory. The Egyptians withdrew and shortly afterwards the Russian troops disembarked, but not before the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had been signed. Russia obtained by this treaty, in principle if not in word, the free use of the Dardanelles and a predominant position in Constantinople.[35]

Palmerston obviously had misjudged the situation in Turkey. While he was either inactive or watching France lest she become too powerful in the Near East, Russia had stepped in and done the very thing that he had hoped to prevent. The success of the Russians was as much a blow to Great Britain as the success of France would have been. Broglie had no particular designs in Turkey in 1833. Although sympathetic with Mehemet Ali, he was by no means favorable to the destruction of the Turkish state. Coöperation between Palmerston and Broglie might very well have prevented the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and at the same time kept the *status quo* in the Near East.

Although Palmerston was shocked when he heard of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, he did not resort to any radical measures to overcome it. He negotiated with both Austria and France but signed no agreement that would interfere with his own plans. In a letter to Ponsonby, the new Ambassador to Turkey, Palmerston outlined his proposed line of action.[36] He suggested that the Sultan should be approached

[34] Goriainov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, 33-35.

[35] Hertslett, *op. cit.*, II, 925. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, 235.

[36] F. O., Turkey 78/220. Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 6, 1833. Baker, "Palmerston and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi," *English Historical Review*, January, 1928.

on the ground that Great Britain would be a truer friend to him than Russia, because Russia was aiming at territorial aggression while the British were not. He also counted on the support of France in case it was needed.[37]

Talleyrand left no stone unturned in his efforts to complete an Anglo-French alliance.[38] He urged Broglie to push the matter and meet Palmerston even more than halfway. The time did seem opportune, as the Czar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia were in conference at Munchengrätz. Broglie and Palmerston looked upon this meeting as one to plot direct action against their respective countries. The Czar of Russia was the moving force of the trio which met at Munchengrätz. He was a little uneasy because of the strong opposition which Great Britain and France had shown to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and sought security by courting the monarchs of Austria and Prussia. Nesselrode and Metternich, representing Russia and Austria, signed an agreement to use their influence to preserve the Ottoman Empire, to curb the ambitions of Mehemet Ali, and as a last resort, if a partition of Turkey should take place, to support each other in the attainment of their mutual interests. A further agreement, signed also by the King of Prussia, established the right of any sovereign to seek the support of a brother monarch in case aid was needed.[39] Palmerston adopted a waiting policy but kept a vigilant watch over Turkey to prevent the occurrence of anything that would offer Russia an excuse for intervention.[40] Talleyrand with his alliance proposals was thus kept at arm's length, but close enough to lean on in case of immediate danger. Palmerston's actions prevented

[37] *Hansard*, XXII, 327.

[38] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 641. Talleyrand to Broglie, August 2, 1833.

[39] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XXIV, 1290. Goriainov, *op. cit.*, 51. Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 33.

[40] F. O., Turkey 78/221. Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 6, 1833.

Europe at this time from being definitely divided into two armed camps.

The Czar of Russia was much concerned over this apparent Anglo-French coöperation. His answers to their protests were evasive but at the same time indicative of the fact that he was not willing to run the risk of war. His policy began to show evidence of a change. He sought the friendship of Great Britain in order to isolate France. Talleyrand reported evidence of this development as early as January, 1834.[41]

There is a phase of Anglo-French relations which should be mentioned here, not that it had any direct relationship to the Mediterranean policies of the two countries, but because it throws light on the reasons for some of Palmerston's decisions. There was a similarity in his policies whether they referred to Turkey, Belgium, or Spain. The situation in Belgium was beyond doubt the most outstanding Anglo-French problem between 1830 and 1840. With Great Britain it was a question of national security, augmented by a suspicion of French designs. With France it was a continuation of Richelieu's idea of "natural frontier" bolstered up by the revolutionary doctrine of freeing suppressed peoples. Talleyrand was quite willing to sacrifice what was to him the odious revolutionary principles of his country for an Anglo-French alliance.[42] He yielded in making Luxemburg a part of Holland;[43] he withdrew his suggestion for the partition of the Low Countries,[44] and agreed to the withdrawal of French troops from Belgium without being so instructed by his government.[45] There was little real coöperation in the settlement of the Belgian problem. Talleyrand finally realized this and blamed Russian interfer-

[41] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 642. Talleyrand to Broglie, January 3, 1834.
[42] Guyot, "Talleyrand et l'Independance de la Belgique," *Révue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, II, 586.
[43] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 631. Talleyrand to Sébastiani, January 21, 1831.
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] *Ibid.*, 634. Louis Philippe to Talleyrand, August 27, 1831.

ence for his failure.[46] This is still further evidence of a change in Russian tactics in order to win the friendship of Great Britain.

The Revolutions of 1833, in Spain and Portugal still further complicated Anglo-French relations. Spain, situated as it was at the head of the Mediterranean, attracted the particular interest of the French. The idea of helping suppressed peoples, as in the case of Belgium, had also a popular appeal. The British were interested in the protection of their Mediterranean interests, which the revolutions might affect, but their first interest was the general maintenance of the *status quo* in Europe. The two governments were, in the main, agreed in outward expression as to the best policy to be followed towards the revolutions in Spain and Portugal. Palmerston, however, was afraid that France might give in to the enthusiasm of the masses and annex some territory in Spain. This made him very cautious. Talleyrand was quite willing to sacrifice French interests in Spain for a British understanding. Broglie did not object to Palmerston's taking the lead in the settlement of the troubles, but he wanted to make sure that the French would be allowed to participate.[47] Talleyrand, after numerous disappointments and prolonged negotiations,[48] became a party to an agreement signed on April 22, 1834, for the settlement of the difficulties in the Iberian peninsula.

The so-called Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal was, in substance, what Talleyrand had been struggling to obtain since his appointment as Ambassador to Great Britain in 1830. The Treaty in reality fell far short of what he had hoped to obtain; it possessed but few qualities which could in any way be called a real alliance. The indications are that Palmerston only allowed

[46] *Ibid.*, 643. Talleyrand to Rigny, April 28, 1834.
[47] F. O., France 27/415. Granville to Palmerston, December 16, 1833.
[48] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 643. Rigny to Talleyrand, April 17, 1834.

Talleyrand to sign the Treaty to keep France from acting independently in Spain. By this time the friction between Talleyrand and Palmerston was very evident. Princess Lieven noted that Palmerston did not invite Talleyrand to Windsor along with the Spanish and Portuguese Envoys to celebrate the signing of the Treaty.[49]

Talleyrand himself was soon convinced of the impossibility of an understanding with Great Britain. This was a great disappointment to the old diplomat who had long cherished such an agreement. He was no longer convinced that an alliance with Great Britain was either necessary or practicable. He recommended that Austria be sought as a possible substitute for Great Britain.[50] His dislike for revolutions and democracy probably influenced him in this choice. "England has altered greatly," wrote Talleyrand in his letter of resignation as Ambassador, "and I do not think that she can pause in the course she has taken. I do not feel myself called upon to follow her. . . . Palmerston and I no longer agree nor do we satisfy each other."[51]

The Treaty did not receive the enthusiastic support of any faction in France. Even Louis Philippe had somewhat changed his views since 1830. His growing conservative ideas led him to look towards Austria instead of Great Britain as a possibly ally.[52] The French press was critical of the Treaty. *Le National,* a paper of the extreme left, deplored the fact that France's position in Europe should depend on a British alliance.[53] *Le Temps* insisted that the two countries were drawing apart and that a break was inevitable sooner or later.[54] The Belgium and Spanish problems, two of the most outstanding questions of the time, were looked upon by the French as having been settled not

[49] *Letters of Princess Lieven,* 373. Lieven to Alexander, April 23, 1834.
[50] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 644. Talleyrand to Rigny, June 16, 1834.
[51] *Ibid.,* November 13, 1834. *Ibid.,* November 22, 1834.
[52] Hall, *op. cit.,* 198.
[53] *Le National,* June 1, 1834.
[54] *Le Temps,* November 20, 1834.

only without their active participation but even to their detriment.

The Treaty with France was not favorably received by the British. Even the supporters of the agreement accepted it merely as a temporary expedient. Palmerston regarded it as a "capital hit," not that he needed the support of France in the settlement of the Iberian troubles, but it gave him more confidence in dealing with the Turco-Russian question which was rapidly coming to a crisis. He was using France as a tool but he refused to degrade her completely. Russia had not yet convinced the British Minister of her friendly intentions.[55] Disraeli, at that time a novice in politics, criticized the Whigs for their French policy. "I have endeavored," he wrote, "to show that the English Minister, in sacrificing all the ancient principles of our policy to ally himself with our hereditary foe, has not been successful in the object for which he impudently and previously paid the dearest price; and that we have, in fact, deserted Portugal and outraged Holland, not for friendship of the French nation but for a mere transient connection with two individuals—the French King and the French Minister, one of whom the nation despises and the other whom the nation detests."[56]

In spite of the alliance which theoretically existed, France and Great Britain were steadily growing farther and farther apart. There was no desire in Great Britain to be any more friendly with France than with any other European power. In fact, there is some evidence, even this early, of British aloofness from continental alliances which ripened into what Disraeli later called "Splendid Isolation." In France the belief that the security of the Orleans Monarchy depended upon an alliance with Great Britain was gradually

[55] *English Historical Review*, October, 1930.
[56] Moneypenny, *Disraeli*, I, 206.

disappearing. As Louis Philippe felt himself more and more securely seated upon his throne, and as liberalism became more and more taboo in official circles, he pushed the idea of an alliance with Great Britain into the background. Russian change of policy from independent penetration in the Near East to a willingness to coöperate with Great Britain furnished a partial explanation for the divergence in Anglo-French cordiality. In the eyes of the British, France became the intruder in the Near East while they believed Russia was willing to aid in the prevention of this new threat against the *status quo*.

CHAPTER VIII

PARTING OF WAYS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The British Near Eastern policy prior to 1834 was very largely defensive. Palmerston had not been convinced that Turkey presented a major diplomatic problem. In his estimation it was decidedly secondary to the Belgian question and inferior to several other major issues. Both France and Russia made gains in the Near East because of British inactivity. The former pushed her influence into the provinces bordering Algeria, while the latter threatened to gain complete control of the Straits. The British route to India was threatened.

Palmerston's inactivity was not indicative of inattention to what was going on in the Mediterranean. Steam navigation through the Mediterranean connecting Great Britain and the Far East had long been a topic of general discussion, but no serious effort had ever been made to make it a reality. In 1834, however, the matter was discussed at length in Parliament, and on June 3, a committee was appointed to "inquire into the best means of promoting the communication with India by steam."[1] The ensuing report was favorable to immediate action; furthermore, it recommended that the government should bear the expense involved.[2] There was a great deal of simultaneous agitation in both Great Britain and France in favor of the construction of a canal across the Suez.[3] Palmerston, always atten-

[1] *Hansard*, XXIV, 142.

[2] *Ibid.*, 932.

[3] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1834, XIV. *Archives Parlementaires*, LXXXII, 277. Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 40. Hoskins, *op. cit.*, 148.

tive to progressive ideas that might further the interests of his country, sponsored the move and instituted a more aggressive Mediterranean policy.

Palmerston had been convinced of the necessity for keeping Turkey intact. He was, however, a little uncertain as to how to do so. His first plan was for indirect action rather than direct intervention. He decided that his country would benefit most and with least expense by attempting to rejuvenate the government of Turkey, thereby enabling it to fight its own battles at home and abroad.[4] This was a difficult task, but once convinced of its feasibility, Palmerston set to work. He announced to Mehemet Ali that complete independence was out of the question;[5] he advised instead a complete reorganization of the Turkish army. The Sultan was safe neither from internal nor external foes without an efficient military organization; and this very necessary element of his government had degenerated into an almost worthless structure. Modern equipment and trained leaders were lacking to such a degree that an attack from almost any source would mean certain disaster. Realizing this, Palmerston offered to send military experts to train the soldiers and modern equipment for their use. Chrzanowski, a Polish officer in British service, was sent to Constantinople with the suggestion that he be made a Quartermaster General on the Sultan's staff. Palmerston expected to use him as a medium through which the British government could be kept informed of the developments of special interest.[6] This project was not so successful. Chrzanowski was not received with much enthusiasm. Von Moltke was sent to Turkey by the Prussian government for the same purpose and made more headway than Chrzanowski. Yet Palmerston did not

[4] Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," *Journal of Modern History*, December, 1929.

[5] F. O., Turkey 78/244. Palmerston to Campbell, October 26, 1834.

[6] *Ibid.*, 271. Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 7, and 29, 1836.

give up hope.[7] There were still other means by which the "sick man" could be kept alive. The Turkish fleet was in even a more deplorable condition than the army. Palmerston offered to help reörganize it.[8] The Porte agreed but when the British naval officers arrived, they were received with marked indifference.[9] Ponsonby was convinced of the ineffectiveness of Palmerston's plan and sought to bring about a closer relationship between Great Britain and Turkey by aiding British capitalists in the negotiation of a loan for £3,000,000. This he believed would materially obligate the Sultan to Great Britain and thereby establish British prestige. Palmerston did not object to the loan but refused to grant a guarantee without which the capitalists were unwilling to risk their money in Turkey.[10]

Other states, particularly Russia, looked upon British intervention in Turkey with consternation. The Czar was very much annoyed. He would not receive Stratford Canning, Ambassador-elect to St. Petersburg, and he recalled Prince Lieven, Russian Ambassador to London.[11] This led to momentary improvements in Anglo-French relations, but the fall of the Whig government and the return of Wellington prevented what seemed to be a definite break with Russia. When Palmerston returned to office early in 1835, he decided to follow out Wellington's policy of conciliation towards Russia. Lord Durham was sent to St. Petersburg where he was very favorably received by the Czar. Durham assured Palmerston in 1836, that "the peace of Europe is not likely to be disturbed by any ambitious or hostile enterprise on the part of Russia, for which she has neither the inclination nor the means."[12] This was the first concrete

[7] *Ibid.*, 300. August 4, 1837.
[8] Quoted in Rodkey, *Journal of Modern History*, December, 1929.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, June, 1930.
[11] Hall, *op. cit.*, 221.
[12] Reid, *Life and letters of Lord Durham*, II, 28 ff.

evidence which the British government had of Russia's willingness to coöperate and possibly relinquish some of the provisions of the detested Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

The improvement in Anglo-Russian relations was accompanied by increased friction between Great Britain and France. While Broglie was Minister, he took pains to be discreet and showed an inclination for a rapprochement with Great Britain, but Broglie was unpopular in Paris. He was succeeded by Thiers in February, 1836. Thiers, in contrast to Broglie, stood for action at almost any price. He was aggressively patriotic and was himself the embodiment of that spirit of the Napoleonic legend which Great Britain and the other powers dreaded and detested. He believed himself delegated to lift France from her state of humiliation and regain for her some of the glory which years of misfortune had dimmed. Great Britain he regarded as the natural enemy of France, and he believed Palmerston was using France as a tool for the furtherance of his own designs.[13] The first manifestations of his policy were in North Africa. Thiers proposed an expedition against Constantine; he sent a fleet to Tunis; he opened negotiations with the Porte; and offered to serve as mediator in the struggle between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. And in order not to be completely isolated without a continental ally, he proposed a marriage alliance between the ruling houses of France and Austria. This was an ambitious program and it met with opposition at home and abroad. The Doctrinaires opposed what they termed an aggressive war in Algeria,[14] but Thiers passed this over as an insult to French arms and national glory.[15] He referred to the conquest of Algeria as belonging to the true spirit of the Napoleonic legend. "Austerlitz and

[13] Bibliothèque Nationale, Thiers MSS., 20,607, 16.
[14] *Archives Parlementaires*, CV, 209.
[15] *Ibid.*, 211.

Wagram cost lives," he declared, "but at the mention of those names all French hearts beat high."[16]

These statements were not idle threats. An expedition was sent to Tunis, much to the annoyance of the British,[17] to oppose with force the entrance of the Turkish fleet into that harbor. Thiers boldly declared that the western part of the Mediterranean was the field for French activity. "Russia and England are supreme in the East but the West invites French colonization," he declared.[18] He urged openly an Austrian marriage for a French Prince and made plans for intervention in Spain. The failure of the former led to increased assertiveness in the latter. He announced that a French army would march into Spain and capture Don Carlos,[19] but all this was cut short by his dismissal in August, 1836. The animosity and suspicion of Great Britain, however, had already been incurred.

Thiers was succeeded by Molé, who was more moderate than his predecessor but quite as determined in his opposition to the liberals.[20] He was generally looked upon as a master in *la grande intrigue politique* and his rise to power did little to relieve the tension that had developed between Great Britain and France. Palmerston spoke of the new Minister as one who "always spoke to you with the greatest frankness about the weather . . . but whenever you bring the conversation to those European questions in which England and France had a common interest . . . Molé shut himself up in cold reserve."[21]

Meanwhile the French policy towards Algiers had become much more assertive. Prior to 1834 the question as to whether the territory was to be kept or discarded hung in

[16] *Ibid.*, 225.
[17] F. O., France 27/523. Aston to Palmerston, July 29, 1836.
[18] Bibliothèque Nationale, Thiers MSS., 20,607. 291. F. O., Turkey 78/284. Campbell to Palmerston, October 30, 1836.
[19] Bibliothèque Nationale, Thiers MSS., 20,607. 291.
[20] *Souvenirs de Barante*, V, 457.
[21] Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 244. *Letters of Queen Victoria*, I, 123.

the balance. The government seemed hesitant about facing the strong opposition in the Chambers with a policy of expansion but this hesitancy had gradually subsided until in 1835 it had ceased to be of first-rate importance.[22] Steps had been taken for the administration of the territory,[23] a move which indicated a determination for permanent occupation. This was a disappointment to the British, as they had hoped that this step would never be taken.[24]

The attempt to govern Algeria brought the French into conflict with the natives, who bitterly resented French control. Abd-el-Kader united several of the tribes of Algeria and the neighboring provinces and launched a bitter attack against the French. A treaty had been signed between the native chieftain and the French in 1832, which gave the former special privileges in Oran, Mostaganem, and Arzen, while the French were promised Algiers.[25] This agreement lasted but three years, after which hostilities were renewed on a much larger scale. The French complained that encouragement, if not munitions, was furnished to Abd-el-Kader from England.[26] The Sultan did receive assurances from Thomas Reade, British Consul at Tunis,[27] and the Sultan of Turkey promised him the Beylick of Algiers if he would drive out the French.[28] Encouraged by these friendly manifestations Abd-el-Kader pushed ahead and defeated the French at Macta on June 26, 1835. This was but the beginning of a long-drawn-out struggle. Clauzel, the French commander, retaliated by defeating the natives at Mascara, Hebra and several other less important places. The Treaty of Tafna, signed on May 30, 1837, brought a temporary lull in the almost constant struggle. This Treaty provided

[22] *Archives Parlementaires*, LXXXI, 404.
[23] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XXII, 351. Schefer, *L'Algérie et l'evolution de la Colonization Française*, 167 ff.
[24] F. O., France 27/497. Report to Granville, February 27, 1835.
[25] De Card, *op. cit.*, 89.
[26] A. E. Mém. et Doc., Tunis. Report of Duval, October 28, 1833.
[27] F. O., Tunis. Report of Reade, January 18, 1834.
[28] Serres, *op. cit.*, 213.

for the partition of the disputed territory. Commerce and navigation were to be free, persons and property were to be protected, and Abd-el-Kader promised never to cede any territory to a third power.[29] This Treaty proved to be no more permanent than any of the others had been, for hostilities were renewed within a few months after it was signed. The Duc de Nemours accompanied General Dauremont to the scene of action with instructions to defeat and if possible, capture Abd-el-Kader. Constantine, one of the most important strongholds in North Africa, fell into the hands of the French in October, 1837.

The capture of Constantine was acclaimed by the French as the greatest military victory of the Orleans Monarchy. *Le Moniteur* proclaimed the victory as something that "will show Europe that what we want we can take, that Africa is ours and that we do not intend to accord any one of them the right to contest our ascendancy."[30] The victory at Constantine was not only important as a step towards the complete control of Algeria, but it also helped to strengthen the position of the Ministry. Opposition to the further conquest and permanent occupation of the territory in North Africa succumbed to the wave of enthusiasm which greeted the news of the French victory.[31]

The victories of the French over the natives in Algeria aroused British animosity, which had been dormant for some time. The inactivity of the French troops in Algeria and the opposition to further conquest which a strong faction in the Chambers had manifested, had led the British to hope that the French had reached the limit of their activity. Palmerston continued to consider the French occupation of Algiers as an infringement on the integrity of Turkey. "If Algiers is to be considered a province of Tur-

[29] De Card, *op. cit.*, 92. *British and Foreign State Papers*, XXVI, 1095. Yver, *Correspondance relatif au Traité de la Tafna, passim.*
[30] *Le Moniteur*, October 26, 1837.
[31] *Archives Parlementaires*, CXI, 608 ff.

key," he wrote, "occupied for the moment by French force, then it is clear that British subjects ought not, by the temporary occupation, be deprived of the privileges which in a Turkish province they are entitled to enjoy by the capitulations between Great Britain and the Porte."[32] He also kept the French informed that they were to limit their activities to Algeria and not make any attack upon Tunis. "The English government had intentionally abstained from saying anything to that of France with regard to Algiers, because we know how delicate the position of the French government is upon that subject, with respect to the popular feeling and public opinion in France, but that any attack of France upon Tunis would give rise to a new and different question. . . . It would be impossible for England to see with indifference the occupation of Tunis by France."[33]

The fall of Constantine increased Palmerston's fear that the French intended to push on into Tunis. He wrote Granville to express to the French government "the hope that they did not contemplate any arrangement with respect to Constantine which would in any way interfere with or alter the present dependence of the Bey of Tunis upon the Porte."[34] At this opportune time the Sultan protested to the French government against intrusions against Tunis. Sébastiani, at that time French Ambassador to London, wrote Molé when he heard about the protest, that he believed the British government was back of the Sultan's actions.[35] Palmerston's uneasiness about Tunis was soon justified. In February, 1838, a dispute arose between the French and the Bey of Tunis over some territory which had been claimed by the Dey of Algiers before the French conquest in 1830. Palmerston was indignant. "France has not even acquired

[32] F. O., France 27/516. Palmerston to Granville, April 29, 1836.
[33] *Ibid.*, 517. November 1, 1836.
[34] *Ibid.*, 537. November 17, 1837.
[35] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 650. Sébastiani to Molé, November 30, 1837.

any right of sovereignty over Algiers as yet," he declared.[36] Molé replied that France had no designs on Tunis, Tripoli, or any other possession of the Sultan of Turkey, but he reminded Palmerston that French rights to Algiers had already been settled and that he did not care to open the question again.[37] Palmerston, in spite of these promises, kept on complaining that the French were assuming too much control in Tunis.[38]

St. John added fuel to the fire by reporting that the French were contemplating an extensive campaign into the interior of Algeria and even into Morocco against Abd-el-Kader.[39] This report proved to be premature but it helped to keep alive Palmerston's dread of French expansion.

Meanwhile the Near Eastern policies of both France and Great Britain were somewhat altered. Palmerston was convinced at last that his policy of passive interest had not been effective. His plans for the rejuvenation of the Turkish government had failed; furthermore, the paramount importance of British interests in the maintenance of the unity of the Turkish state had become a decided reality.[40] British prestige with the Porte gained steadily under the skilful direction of Lord Ponsonby. In this respect he was able to outstrip both France and Russia, as was convincingly demonstrated by a joint maneuver of the Turkish fleet with the British Mediterranean squadron.[41] French prestige, on the contrary, had been gradually but certainly on the wane in Constantinople. This was due partly to Ponsonby's intervention, but perhaps more to the support which the French government gave Mehemet Ali in his struggle against the

[36] *Ibid.*, February 9, 1838. F. O., France 27/555. Palmerston to Granville, February 9, 1838.
[37] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 650. Molé to Sébastiani, February 22, 1838.
[38] F. O., France 27/556. Palmerston to Granville, May 22 and 31, 1838.
[39] F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/41. St. John to Palmerston, February 3, 1838.
[40] Baker, "Palmerston and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi," *English Historical Review*, XLIII, January, 1928. Palmerston is quoted as having written Granville on June 5, 1838, that his mind had long been made up that the Sultan ought to be supported vigorously.
[41] F. O., Turkey 78/333. Ponsonby to Palmerston, November 10, 1838.

Sultan. This alignment of Anglo-French interests, one on the side of the Sultan, the other on the side of Mehemet Ali, produced a crisis in the Near East. There was a clear-cut vital issue which separated the two powers. Sultan and Pasha, each convinced that a European power would come to his rescue in case of war, were anxious to measure swords.

Palmerston's change of policy towards Turkey can be explained somewhat by the growing interests of the British people in the Mediterranean. By 1837 travel and trade through this channel had become an item of no mean consequence.[42] The commercial importance of a Mediterranean route to the Far East was becoming more apparent. The British, however, were not the only people interested; the French were active in pursuing the same end. Competition was strong in both official and unofficial circles. The *London Times* on September 11, 1838, deplored the fact that so little was being done by the government to aid in the struggle against the French. "Let the merchants of Great Britain look around them. Let them turn their eyes to Senegal, Oran, Algiers, Constantine, Tunis, Greece, Naples, La Plata, the Amazons, the Gulf of Mexico, the Gulf of California, and they will perceive in each of these regions France established as the avowed enemy of British commerce." Members of Parliament were also aroused at the obvious intrusion which the French were making.[43] This competition, although incidental to the rivalry between the two countries in the Mediterranean, did help to intensify and further it. The protection of trade interests was the keynote to British interests in the Mediterranean.

In the meantime Mehemet Ali decided to break away from the control of the Sultan.[44] He was convinced that he could defeat the Turks without difficulty, and also that he

[42] Hoskins, *op. cit.*, 222.
[43] *Hansard*, XLVII, 721.
[44] Hall, *op. cit.*, 233.

could depend upon France to offset the danger of any foreign intervention. The attitudes of Great Britain and France in this matter were quite clearly defined. Palmerston, although he warned the Sultan that an offensive war would not receive the sanction of his government,[45] was at the same time determined to prevent the intrusion of Mehemet Ali into Turkish territory. He announced his intentions of supporting the Sultan "with France if she will act with us; without her if she should decline."[46] The French were willing to coöperate in the protection of the Sultan only to the point wherein it involved the coercion of Mehemet Ali, but there they drew the line.[47]

Anglo-French relations were altered frequently by changes in ministries in both countries, especially in France. Soult succeeded Molé as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the midst of the negotiations referred to in the previous paragraph. The new Minister was willing to go further than his predecessor in the direction of the fulfillment of the desires of the British, and for a time it seemed that they were about to reach an agreement.[48] The disastrous defeat of the Turks by Mehemet Ali in June, 1839, brought this prospect to an abrupt close. The old Sultan died before news of the disaster arrived and in the period of confusion which followed, the Turkish fleet was surrendered to the Pasha. This opened the way for the complete destruction of the Turkish State unless something could be done at once. Palmerston demanded the return of the fleet to Turkey.[49] Metternich also took an active interest in what had just happened. He suggested that a collective note be sent to the young Sultan urging him not to fall prostrate at the feet of the Pasha.[50] Soult was hesitant. The news of Mehemet's victory had

[45] *Ibid.*, 240.
[46] Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, 266. Palmerston to Granville, June 5, 1838.
[47] *Archives Parlementaires*, CXXIII, 416 ff.
[48] Hall, *op. cit.*, 241.
[49] Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 111.
[50] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XXVIII, 408.

been received with great rejoicing in France. The prevailing feeling was sympathy with the victor, and Soult dared not, for political if not for private reasons, disregard it completely. He believed that Russia would prevent British intervention and in the end possibly bring Palmerston over to a French alliance.[51] Soult unfortunately had not taken cognizance of the gradual change in the Russian policy towards the Porte[52] and the subsequent effect which it had on Anglo-Russian relations.[53]

The Czar of Russia changed his policy towards Turkey from a plan for independent penetration to one which offered coöperation with Great Britain. He took this stand because of a growing distrust of France and because he realized that he could not dictate alone the policies of the Porte. Baron Brunow was sent as a special Minister to London to confer with Palmerston and to assure him that Russia was in a position to back Great Britain in the coercion of Mehemet Ali, with or without the aid of France.[54] This greatly strengthened Palmerston's position because he could have a free hand in checking the French without the constant fear of Russian intervention.[55]

Soult was surprised when he found himself in an isolated position. He realized the dangerous position in which Mehemet Ali was placed and urged him to promise to evacuate Adana with the assurance that Crete and Egypt might be held for life.[56] In spite of all Soult could do Palmerston insisted that Mehemet Ali should not have any extension of territory. Palmerston was quite frank with Soult and informed the French Ambassador in London that

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[51] Goriainov, *op. cit.*, 58.

[52] *Ibid.*, 25.

[53] F. O., France 27/586. Bulwer to Palmerston, September 16, 1839. Hall, *op. cit.*, 248.

[54] Goriainov, *op. cit.*, 67.

[55] Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, 305.

[56] Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 124.

he hoped "the coöperation of France would not be refused."[57]

The French were not willing to give in without a struggle. Soult and his Cabinet were too observant of popular feeling in their country not to realize that Mehemet Ali's cause was very dear to the French people. Guizot was sent to replace Sébastiani as Ambassador at London in a last effort to keep from breaking with Great Britain. He was instructed to retain for France a place in the Concert of Europe and preserve British friendship, but at the same time he was to insist that Syria should belong to Mehemet Ali.[58] Guizot found difficulty in carrying out his instructions.[59] He reported rather despairingly that in his estimation England would like "to retain our friendship . . . but I am disposed to think that she has no intention of allowing the present opportunity of attaining her ends in the East escape."[60]

In the meantime Thiers had succeeded Soult. Unlike his predecessor, Thiers was not convinced that the four powers could agree on any question. He hoped that ultimately they would disagree on a Near Eastern policy and drop the whole thing. The numerous delays in the arrival of the accredited agent from the Porte, the death of Frederick William III of Prussia, and the evident dissension in Palmerston's own Cabinet naturally encouraged him in this belief. The French Minister took advantage of these delays and undertook to settle the dispute between the Sultan and Pasha single handed.[61] His efforts were futile, as the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed on July 15, in the absence of Guizot "a convention for the pacification of the Levant." This agreement pro-

[57] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 654. Sébastiani to Soult, January 5, 1840.
[58] Guizot, *Mémoires*, V, 416.
[59] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 654. Guizot to Thiers, March 12, 1840.
[60] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1840.
[61] Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 158 ff.

vided that the Pasha should have the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the control of Acre for life. He was given ten days in which to concede to the provisions of the convention. Failure to do so would entail the loss of Acre, and if twenty days elapsed, he was to lose Egypt and submit to any decision to which the powers might agree.[62]

Guizot was soon informed of what had taken place and sent the news on to Paris.[63] Thiers, although calm, showed disappointment at being so completely neglected in a matter of such vital importance to his government and the French people. His determination to vindicate the stand he had taken and to retrieve the prestige which France had lost, led him to register an immediate protest to the British government. He made it clear that France would pursue a policy in accordance with her own interests no matter how great the risk. "I cannot understand an alliance on small questions and a difference on great ones. . . . I regret it deeply; but I cannot but see in the state of affairs, as now announced to me, eventualities which may disturb the peace of Europe."[64] Fortifications for the city of Paris, long delayed, were now begun in earnest and evidence of military activity was noticeable throughout France. Guizot was asked to inform Palmerston of the extent to which the convention of July 15, had affected France and to show resentment by treating him "as he treated you . . . question him boldly . . . place him in the position of having to confess that he acted in a foolhardy fashion."[65]

Thiers did not exaggerate when he said that the French people were greatly perturbed over the four-power agreement. Stocks fell in Paris to a surprisingly low level.[66] There was frequent talk of war in the French Chambers and belli-

[62] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XXVIII, 345.
[63] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 655. Guizot to Thiers, July 17, 1840.
[64] F. O., France 27/604. Report of Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840.
[65] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 655. Thiers to Guizot, undated.
[66] See appendix A, in Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 233.

cose statements were issued from the press.[67] Public feeling had to be taken into account by the government. Louis Philippe knew the dangers that constantly threatened his throne. The attempts of Louis Napoleon to start a revolution and the effect of the return of the body of the great Napoleon had demonstrated the general state of the public mind. He could not afford to run too great a risk.

Thiers was too much a diplomat to jump headlong into war except as a last resort. He staked a great deal on the belief that the powers could not agree and still more on the strength of Mehemet Ali. He despatched special agents to the Sultan and the Pasha to negotiate peace, should the opportunity arise.[68] Guizot was instructed to make counter proposals in London to offset the four-power agreement. Thiers offered to make himself responsible for holding Mehemet Ali in check, if the powers would agree to the then existing territorial status; and if this proposal did not meet with favor, Guizot was to offer to mediate between Mehemet Ali and the powers.[69] Louis Philippe also tried his hand in the negotiations. He appealed to his son-in-law, Leopold, King of the Belgians, to impress on Queen Victoria the dangers of the policy which Palmerston was following.[70] Palmerston, however, went serenely on his way. He paid no attention to the warlike threats in France, not even calling for an explanation or asking for any additional vote of credit from Parliament, but proceeded to carry out the provisions of the Four-Power Treaty.[71] Mehemet Ali, having failed to conform to the agreement of the powers, was attacked on September 11, by an allied fleet. The Sultan, exuberant over Mehemet Ali's defeat but without the consent of the powers, deposed his rebellious subject.

[67] *Constitutionnel*, July 27, 1840. *National*, July 27, 1840.
[68] Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 168.
[69] Guizot, *Mémoires*, V, 270 ff.
[70] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 655. Louis Philippe to Leopold, August 13, 1840. This letter was enclosed in Guizot's instructions of the same date.
[71] *Ibid.*, Guizot to Thiers, August 21, 1840.

This prolonged the final settlement for some time, because even Palmerston could not sanction this move.

Thiers gradually lost ground both at home and abroad. The possibility of a military victory over the powers was out of the question after the disastrous defeats of his only possible ally, Mehemet Ali. In October, 1840, he made plans to seize one of the Balearic Islands in order to strengthen his position in the Chambers,[72] and at the same time he proposed to interfere in the troublesome affairs of Spain.[73] Such procedure would have exposed the government to greater risks than Louis Philippe was willing to incur. The French Monarch had always inclined towards peace, and when forced to take a stand cast his lot in favor of the principle which was very dear to him.[74] The French people were far from unanimous in their desire for war. The commercial class, whose influence was beginning to be felt in French politics, objected to the enormous expenses that a war would entail. Thiers was asked to resign and a new Ministry under the direction of Marshal Soult, with Guizot in possession of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, was appointed.

Guizot, the real head of the new Ministry, was much less bellicose than Thiers and much more respected in Great Britain. He hoped that Palmerston would be willing to concede a few points in order to allow the Ministry, which was decidedly more favorable to Great Britain, a chance to entrench itself at home. In this he was disappointed, as Palmerston's first note was just as emphatic as if it had been written to Thiers.[75] Within a few days the powers agreed upon a plan for the settlement of the Egyptian crisis. The Sultan was to reëstablish Mehemet Ali as hereditary Pasha of Egypt, provided that he, on his part, should first offer his

[72] F. O., France 27/606. Granville to Palmerston, October 12, 1840.
[73] Hall, *op. cit.*, 306.
[74] Malmesbury, *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, I, 122.
[75] F. O., France 27/606. Palmerston to Granville, November 2, 1840.

submission to the Sultan.[76] This had a consoling influence in France, for the people were now assured that their friend would not entirely lose his control of Egypt. Guizot was anxious for France to have some say in the final settlement. "Far from desiring to persist in our isolation, we have always in view the reëstablishment of the Concert of Europe, and we know by what openings, great and small, we are able to return to it. We know also that many desire us to return, and we believe that they are right. Our isolation does nothing for anyone. . . . When a door conveniently opens before us for an escape from this situation, we shall not stubbornly insist on remaining outside."[77] The moderation of Guizot's policy found favor in the courts of Austria and Prussia and influenced Palmerston to follow a more conciliatory attitude towards France. France was invited to become a party to the agreement regarding the Turco-Egyptian settlement.[78]

The invitation to France to become a party to the four-power agreement was a disappointment to the Czar of Russia. He had changed his policy as expressed in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, in order to further the growing breach in the friendship between Great Britain and France. Clanricarde, the British Ambassador to Russia, was approached by the Czar in December, 1840, for an alliance which would "serve as a security against any efforts that France might make to awaken revolutionary feelings in Europe, or against, perhaps, a revolutionary war."[79] In January of the following year the Russian Ambassador was instructed to approach Palmerston formally on the same subject. Obviously the Czar wanted an agreement that

[76] Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, 198.

[77] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VI, 55 ff.

[78] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 657. Bourqueney to Guizot, January 7, 1841.

[79] F. O., Russia 65/262. Clanricarde to Palmerston, December 22, 1840. Quoted in Rodkey, "Anglo-Russian Negotiations, 1840-1841," *American Historical Review*, January, 1931.

would be more far-reaching than a mere understanding over the existing Oriental question.[80]

Palmerston's stand on the Russian proposal explains in part his desire to have France a member of the Four-Power Treaty. He was no more anxious to see Russia established in Turkey than France, and this was his opportunity to limit the activities of both by making them parties to the same agreement. He thanked the Czar for his friendship and support; but he was firm in his refusal to enter any agreement that had as its purpose the control of French policies in general. "One of the general principles which we wish to observe as a guide for our conduct in dealing with the relations between England and the other states is, that changes which foreign nations may choose to make in their internal constitutions and forms of government are to be looked upon as matters with which England has no business to interfere by force of arms for the purpose of imposing upon such nations a form of government which they do not wish to have, or for the purpose of preventing such nations from having institutions which they desire. These things are considered in England to be matters of domestic concern which every nation ought to be allowed to settle as it likes."[81]

Encouraged by the willingness of the powers to allow France to take a part in the negotiations, Guizot sent to his Ambassador in London a definite plan composed of five points which he believed were fundamental. The two Straits were to be closed, the *status quo* of the Ottoman Empire was to be assured, the Christian subjects of the Porte were to be protected, Jerusalem was to have special favors, and the commercial routes were to be kept open.[82] These were not all adopted but they were considered and France became an active participant in the negotiations. On July 10, 1841,

[80] *Ibid.*, F. O. Russia 65/277. Nesselrode to Brunnow, January 5, 1841.
[81] *Ibid.*, Palmerston to Clanricarde, January 11, 1841. F. O., Russia 65/269.
[82] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VII, 73.

the Straits Convention was signed which settled the Turco-Egyptian question and reconciled France with the Concert of Europe.[83]

Guizot was indeed relieved when the settlement had been reached. He declared that he was determined "never to subject the foreign policy of France to the whims and mistaken ideas of the day."[84] Guizot's opinion on this matter was not representative of that of the French taken as a whole for there were but few who realized how narrowly their country had escaped isolation. It was fortunate for the peace of Europe that Guizot was in power in 1841.

Palmerston emerged from the Near East crisis victorious. For a time his hesitation to act threatened British prestige in Turkey but in the end his policy of independent action proved successful. Constantinople was saved from Russia and Alexandria remained independent from the French. The settlement of the Mehemet Ali affair did not end Anglo-French rivalry in the Mediterranean. The British and French continued contesting each other's rights in Tunis, Morocco and Egypt for over another half century.

[83] *British and Foreign State Papers*, XXIX, 703.
[84] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VI, 129.

CHAPTER IX

SHAPING OF MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES

The prestige of France in the Near East suffered as a result of the support which she gave Mehemet Ali in the crisis of 1840 and 1841. Mehemet was defeated and forced to accept but a small portion of what he set out to acquire; the Sultan looked upon France as being largely responsible for the difficulties which he had just encountered; and France, although a member of the Concert by virtue of having signed the Straits Convention of 1841, was obviously humiliated. Great Britain was triumphant. Of all the powers affected by the Near Eastern crisis she came the nearest to the realization of her aims. The Sultan looked to her as his most trusted protector, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had been scrapped, and the territorial integrity of Turkey, for the time being at least, was assured.

France, however, was in no way ready to give up the idea of extending her influence in the Mediterranean because of the setback which she had just experienced. She had by no means neglected her interests in other places in Africa for the sake of Egypt. The latter was but one of her many centers of activity. Tunis, in particular, attracted a great deal of attention.

The British watched with consternation French intrusion into Tunis. The territory nominally belonged to the Sultan but he had great difficulty in governing it. There was constant friction between the Dey and the Sultan. Without any hesitation France supported the Dey; but the British hoped to prevent any further dismemberment of Turkey, and especially objected to the establishment of French prestige

in Tunis. Palmerston wanted to keep the good will of the Dey in order that the British merchants might profit by the trade, but he had to remember that his country had assumed the rôle of the protector of the Turkish state. To lend support to the Dey would, in the end, be a violation of this responsibility. One thing was certain; he was not going to stand idly by and watch the French gain complete control of the territory without a struggle. This necessitated some clever diplomacy, but Palmerston was equal to the task. Early in 1838, he assured the ruler of Tunis that he was willing to protect him from both the Turks and the French.[1] He instructed Ponsonby at Constantinople to try to convince the Sultan that a policy of moderation was the best way to deal with his obstinate subject.[2] It is evident that Palmerston hoped to prevent actual hostilities.

The native tribes of the various provinces of North Africa often sought and frequently received aid in various forms from European powers. Arms and ammunition of European manufacture were at the disposal of the warring tribes. It seemed that they were furnished, if not by officials, certainly by individual adventurers, from both Great Britain and France.[3] Abd-el-Kader made a direct appeal to Palmerston for aid in his struggle against the French. He offered the British the permanent use of any harbor which he controlled and added in his appeal to the British Consul, "If you wish to establish between us and yourselves a commercial intercourse you may apprise your court of it and decide upon everything with the bearer, for we know you are people of faith and honor while the French, as you are well aware, are faithless and without honor."[4] Palmerston declined the offer with thanks. On October 6 he directed the Colonial Office

[1] F. O., Consular Reports, Tunis. Instructions of Palmerston to British Consul at Tunis, January 26, 1838.
[2] F. O., Turkey 78/333. Palmerston to Ponsonby, February 6, 1838.
[3] F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/42. St. John to Palmerston, December 9, 1839.
[4] *Ibid.*, 3/43. Enclosure in letter from St. John, April 12, 1840.

to inform Abd-el-Kader that "the British government does not wish to acquire any territorial possession on the Mediterranean coast of Africa."[5] Although Palmerston did not desire the territory, he was determined that France should not have it. He outlined his policy in a long letter to Granville late in 1839: "The desire of possessing Algiers and Egypt is not a recent ambition on the part of the French, for not to go further back than forty years, Bonaparte, having at one time made a great effort to conquer Egypt and having intended if he could have returned to Egypt, to have added Syria and Mesopotamia to the French Empire. It is also certain that when war broke out in 1803, he contemplated an attack on Algiers, with the government of which, he was, for that purpose endeavoring to pick an unjust quarrel. Algiers is now in possession of the French, and the French government is laboring to establish an independent state consisting of Syria, Egypt and Arabia to be placed under the protection and to be subject to the influence of France; to be in short to France what the cabinet of St. Petersburgh wishes Turkey to be to Russia.

"If these claims were accomplished, it is easy to see that Tunis and Tripoli would soon be observed in the same political system, and France would be practically mistress of the Mediterranean, . . . undoubtedly the full execution of such a vast plan would be attended with difficulties hardly to be surmounted, and when once its nature and extent came to be generally seen and understood in England, any British government would be compelled by public opinion to resist the further progress of such a scheme by war if remonstrances should prove ineffectual. But in matters of this kind prevention is easier than remedy and is the most effectual and therefore it is that Her Majesty's government

[5] F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/43. Colonial Office to St. John, October 6, 1840.

deemed it expedient to lose no time in noticing this apparent uncalled-for augmentation of the French fleet."[6]

Palmerston defined his attitude on the Tunis question quite clearly in the above letter. He was determined to oppose French expansion by diplomatic protest if possible, but he would resort to war if necessary. He reminded the French of the fact that Tunis was a part of the territory of the Sultan and that their intervention was a violation of the territorial integrity of Turkey. The French seldom if ever connected the two whether from indifference or as a matter of principle it is hard to determine. Palmerston did not hesitate to declare that he considered the whole northern coast of Africa, excluding Morocco, as Turkish territory.

Thiers was very anxious to push the interests of his country in Africa. "Let us go to Algeria," he declared; "let France get herself talked about, earn some reputation, produce some soldiers. Europe has been at peace for twenty-five years; and the blood is hot in our veins."[7] Similar displays of militarism were further evidenced in the spring of 1840 all over France. Palmerston feared that this would be followed with further conquests in northern Africa. He wrote Granville, "to remind the government of France that it has distinctly and more than once engaged itself towards the government of Great Britain, that France will . . . not seek to take possession of any portion of the territory of the Regency of Tunis or the Empire of Morocco."[8] He expressed his determination even more vehemently in a letter to Melbourne on August 18, 1840. "If the French attempt to bully and intimidate us as they have done, the one way of meeting their menaces is by quietly telling them that we are not afraid and by showing them first, that they have more

[6] F. O., France 27/598. Palmerston to Granville, December 16, 1840.
[7] Bourgeois, *Modern France*, I, 215.
[8] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 654. Palmerston to Granville, March 16, 1840.

vulnerable points than we have."[9] He expressed the same ideas in various public speeches. At Tiverton he charged the French with following a high-handed policy in Algeria and showed by contrast the effects of their own colonial policy. "They profess to colonize Algeria but they are only encamped in military posts. . . . In Africa every native is opposed to the French and every heart burns for vengeance."[10] He even complained against France's constructing a chapel at Carthage in memory of Saint Louis as being merely an excuse for military intervention.[11]

The English press supported Palmerston's opposition to the French expansion in North Africa. The *London Times* was bitter in its criticism. "Whenever the French have remained long enough in close communication with the barbarous people,—such as the North American Indians or the Moorish peoples of Africa—they have thrown aside with strange rapidity the restraints of Christianity and civilization."[12] *Blackwood's Edinburgh Review* joined in with the chorus of protests. "The invasion of Algerian territory by the French is one of the most remarkable evidences that nations are taught their common justices or common sense by suffering. We see France after twenty-five years of misery taking the first opportunity to rob and shed the blood of her neighbors. She had no more cause for war against the Algerians than against the Antediluvians; but it occurred to her imbecile government that she wanted glory, and to her insane people that glory was to be found in cutting throats of Turks and Moors, unfortunate enough to live in territory where she expected to find land cheap, dollars at sword point, and triumph for nothing."[13] Another contributor expressed in verse his opinion of the barbaric Gaul:[14]

[9] *Melbourne Papers*, 462. Palmerston to Melbourne, August 18, 1840.
[10] *Morning Chronicle*, June 30, 1841.
[11] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 656. Palmerston to Guizot, September 15, 1840.
[12] *London Times*, June 6, 1840.
[13] *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, February, 1840.
[14] *Ibid.*

Woe, woe to the Gaul
Ambition's worst slave;
Must he grasp, till the world
Is a dungeon or a grave?
Must he envy the Arab
His swamp and his sand?
Must his crown be a curse
And his sceptre a brand?
But wrath will not sleep;
As he sows, he shall reap;
The robber shall pay
Gore for gore, clay for clay.

Meanwhile Abd-el-Kader continued his guerilla warfare against the French forces in Algeria. His operations were so swift and his hiding places so inaccessible that he completely baffled the French commander. When hard pressed, it was easy for him to cross over either into Tunis or Morocco where the natives, if not the governments, were friendly to his cause.[15] This gave France an excuse for intervention which was further augmented by a rather general feeling on the part of the French people in favor of expansion in Morocco and Tunis. "Morocco should be added to Algeria," argued a contributor to *Le Revue des Deux Mondes,* "as they are virtually the same and cannot be separated."[16] The French government for some time had been negotiating with the Emperor of Morocco. A military officer was appointed in 1838, to reside at the Court,[17] but by 1840, the French had decided to take drastic measures in order to prevent support being given to Abd-el-Kader.

Beyond a doubt Palmerston did sympathize with Abd-el-Kader, probably because the chieftain offered the most effective means of opposing the French. Palmerston wrote Granville, "It cannot be forgotten that in the quarrel with

[15] A foreign correspondent for the *Niles Register* on April 25, 1840, reported that he was convinced that Abd-el-Kader was receiving arms and ammunition from Morocco.
[16] *Revue des Deux Mondes,* 1840, III, 17. Rey, "Le Morac et la Question d'Alger."
[17] F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/41. St. John to Palmerston, August 27, 1838.

Abd-el-Kader, the French were the aggressors, because the unnecessary march of the French troops from Algiers to Constantine seems to have been an unprovoked violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Tafna."[18]

The activities of Abd-el-Kader brought Morocco into the North African controversy. Palmerston was determined to keep the French out of this territory. He instructed Hay, the Consul stationed there, to keep reminding the Emperor not to give the French any excuse for declaring war.[19] He especially implored Hay to steer clear of any negotiations with Abd-el-Kader, in order not to give the French the slightest cause for suspicion.[20] Hay proved to be a worthy Consul. He was less aggressive than most of the British Consuls in North Africa and much more willing to stick to his instructions. He agreed with Palmerston that the maintenance of the *status quo* was the means through which their hopes could best be realized.[21]

Anglo-French relations took a turn for the better in September, 1841, with the resignation of Palmerston and the succession of Aberdeen. Palmerston, although careful to present an outward friendship towards France, had found this task more and more difficult. The resignation of Thiers in October of the previous year also removed another personality which was largely responsible for the growing estrangement between the two countries. Guizot, the successor of Thiers, was sometimes referred to as an Anglophile, as he had a thorough knowledge of English history and a great respect for the English people. The personal friendship that existed between Guizot and Aberdeen was

[18] F. O., France 27/598. Palmerston to Granville, December 13, 1839.

[19] F. O., Consular Reports, Morocco 99/5. Palmerston to Hay, April 2, 1840.

[20] *Ibid.*, April 21, 1840.

[21] *Ibid.*, Hay to Palmerston, March 17 and 18, 1840. I have had the privilege of reading Professor Flournoy's excellent article on "British Policy towards Morocco, 1830-1841" in the manuscript. He traces the origin and development of the British policy in Morocco during this period. The article will be published soon in the *Political Science Quarterly*.

of even greater consequence and was an asset in the furtherance of a good feeling, artificial as it was, between the two countries. Aberdeen, although trained in the school of Pitt during the Napoleonic Wars, followed in principle the Mediterranean policy of his predecessor, though with less antagonism and with more diplomacy.[22] Queen Victoria, during the early part of her reign, also did what she could to gain a closer understanding with Louis Philippe. King Leopold of Belgium, who had a great deal of influence over the young Queen, was responsible to a degree for Victoria's actions. He spoke to her of the foolishness of Palmerston's attitude towards France. "I cannot understand what has rendered Palmerston so extremely hostile to the King and Government of France. . . . Palmerston likes to put his foot on their necks! now no statesman must triumph over an enemy that is not quite dead. People forget a real loss, a real misfortune, but they won't forget an insult."[23] The Queen of England showed a much greater inclination to befriend her brother monarch in France after Palmerston was out of office. "My one ardent desire is for peace; I attach a high, nay, extreme importance to our coming to some conciliatory agreement with our neighbors."[24]

The cordiality with which the monarchs and ministers of both Great Britain and France spoke was largely on the surface. It did, beyond a doubt, temporarily lessen the antagonism which, had it continued unabated, might have led to an open break. Even with this change the governments failed to carry their friendship over into matters of state. The old issues were still bitterly contested, and when a test case came up, regarding expansion in the Mediterranean countries, the officials in the two governments generally allowed their animosity to outdo their friendship. Sir Henry

[22] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VII, 72 ff.
[23] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, I, 233. Leopold to Victoria, October 2, 1840.
[24] Bourgeois, *Modern France*, I, 231.

Bulwer summarized the problem: "I am therefore firmly of the opinion that peace will be the great object with the present government, to which all will be subordinate, but at the same time it is not to be imagined that it is the only object.

"No Ministry in France will ever exist without perpetually struggling to increase the influence of France in foreign countries. The difference will be in the manner of so doing." He called attention to the influence tradition played in the French foreign policy: "I say that this traditional policy is more powerful in this nation than elsewhere, and I say so for this reason, there have, at different periods, been men of great ambition and ability, the absolute rulers of this country, and ruling it according to its passion after glory, who have conceived great plans for its aggrandizement, some of which have been successfully executed." The interests and ambitions of the present and past ministers of France the writer summarized as "the extension of French influence over Belgium and towards the Rhine—the predominance of France in the Mediterranean and along the African coast, in Egypt, in Syria, the submission of Spain to her influence and authority,—such are the objects to which no minister, that I know of, from the year 1815 up to 1841 (and of course I might go even further back), has ever been insensible; nor, indeed could have been so." Bulwer further stated that the French government "attempts to extend its influence over Tunis, sends money to Syria, has agents traveling in Greece, has been imposing, by the presence of its fleet near the Balearic Islands, on Spain and keeps up intrigue in favor of the party over which it has most influence in that country. . . ."[25]

The lack of a definite understanding between the two countries is very well shown by the way in which Aberdeen

[25] F. O., France 27/241. Bulwer to Aberdeen, September 10, 1841.

resented an article which appeared in *Le Moniteur* on January 20, 1842, which quoted him as having said, "I therefore look upon your position in Africa as a *fait accompli,* against which I have no further objection to make." Aberdeen answered: "I never said that I had no objections to make to the establishment of the French in Algiers; but that it was my intention to be silent. . . . It does follow, however, that objections, although not expressed, may be entertained."[26]

Late in 1841, the situation in Tunis stirred up a rivalry between Great Britain and France which had not been equaled since the Mehemet Ali affair. The Sultan of Turkey, encouraged by offers of kindness and support from both Great Britain and France, decided to chastise the Dey of Tunis for his failure to pay tribute. He equipped a fleet and ordered the commander to be in readiness to set sail. In accordance with their general policy the British did not want to see a disturbance in the *status quo,* and France with an attitude equally traditional did not look with favor on the renewal of the Sultan's power over the North African countries. Concerted action to prevent the expedition was possible, but each nation was prompted to act from very different motives. Aberdeen offered to join with Guizot in sending a joint protest to the Sultan.[27] Guizot agreed and suggested that he was willing to send a detachment of the French Mediterranean squadron to make the protest more effective.[28] Aberdeen objected because he was afraid that the French might easily find an excuse to occupy the territory if their fleet was sent.[29] Moreover, he reminded Guizot that promises had been made not to extend their influence any further in North Africa and also that Tunis was a part

[26] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 659. Aberdeen to Cowley, January 22, 1842.
[27] *Ibid.*, 658. Sainte-Aulaire to Guizot, no date.
[28] *Ibid.*, Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, December 3, 1841.
[29] *Ibid.*, Sainte-Aulaire to Guizot, December 7, 1841.

of the Turkish Empire whose integrity had been guaranteed.[30] Difficulty was removed when the Sultan decided not to send his fleet to Tunis and when Guizot promised again not to extend French control into Tunis.[31] Aberdeen sought to seal his bargain by requesting the Sultan to stay clear of any connections whatsoever with Abd-el-Kader. The purpose behind this request was not to give the French any further chance for intervention in the North African countries.[32]

The French did not remain inactive even in the Near East after their failures connected with Mehemet Ali. The loss of prestige seemed to be an impetus for renewed activity. M. de Bourquency, who had for some time been connected with the French Embassy in London, was appointed *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople. He was instructed to use his influence to gain the confidence of the Sultan and build up French prestige.[33] The success that crowned his work even under adverse conditions is suggestive of what can be done in the field of diplomacy by a skilful diplomat.

The settlement of one problem seemed only to give rise to another. There was almost constant friction at one point or another in North Africa. This, in itself, is an indication of the importance that both Great Britain and France put on these territories. There were at times individuals acting in no official capacity who sought honor and wealth by furthering the cause of their country in the coveted provinces. Two Englishmen, Scott and Richardson, posed as representatives of their government and opened negotiations with Abd-el-Kader. Scott went so far as to send to Bugeaud, the Governor of Algeria, the supposed official warning that unless he

[30] *Ibid.*, December 20, 1841.
[31] *Ibid.*, Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, February 7, 1842.
[32] *Ibid.*, 659. Sainte-Aulaire to Guizot, June 23, 1842.
[33] A. E. C. P., Turquie 268. Guizot to Bourquency, November 15, 1841. A. E., Mém. et Doc., Fonds France 1900. Desages to Bourquency, November 27, 1841.

stopped fighting with Abd-el-Kader the English would be forced to intervene.[34] He also complained directly to Aberdeen against the inactivity of St. John and urged his removal from office.[35] The French were very much annoyed with the actions of these individuals in spite of the fact that Aberdeen had already disavowed them.[36]

Meanwhile the relations between France and Morocco became more strained. Natives under the leadership of Abd-el-Kader harassed the French, using Morocco as a base for operations.[37] Guizot at length decided that the only way to remedy this ever-increasing evil was to chastise the Moroccan government for its violation of neutrality. He knew full well that the British government would be opposed to any such action, but something had to be done. Guizot informed the British government of the proposed attack and assured them that the French had no designs towards the permanent occupation of any territory.[38] Aberdeen seemed willing to take the promise which Guizot had made, but the enthusiasm shown by the French people led him to believe that the Chambers might not adhere to it.[39] Guizot minimized the importance of rash statements made by irresponsible persons, and added that neither he nor Louis Philippe had any intentions of annexing any of the territory that belonged to the Emperor of Morocco.[40] After almost two years of preparation and negotiations, word was at last sent to London that the fleet was ready to set sail for Morocco.[41] General Bugeaud was in command of the land

[34] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 659. Sainte-Aulaire to Guizot, February 24, 1842. F. O., Consular Reports, Algiers 3/45. St. John to Foreign Office, July 28, 1842.

[35] *Ibid.*, Scott to Aberdeen, September 18, 1842.

[36] F. O., France 27/646. Aberdeen to Cowley, August 9, 1842.

[37] Lamartinière et Lacroix, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de N. O. Afrique*, I, 1 ff., 522 ff., and II, 1 ff.

[38] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 659. Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, April 1, 1842.

[39] *Ibid.*, Sainte-Aulaire to Guizot, April 6, 1842.

[40] *Ibid.*, Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, May 6, 1842.

[41] *Ibid.*, F. O., France 27/697. Cowley to Aberdeen, June 3, 1844. A. E. C. P., Angleterre 663. Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, June 6, 1844.

forces and the Prince of Joinville led a squadron of the French navy.[42]

Aberdeen was not willing to stand idly by even with the assurances he had received from Guizot. No sooner had the news of the French declaration of war arrived in London than Hay was informed, "So long as Abd-el-Kader shall be permitted to take refuge in Morocco and there to recruit and organize his forces, the Emperor must not be surprised if he finds French troops are collected on the frontier and should the Emir use the Emperor's territory, as grounds from which to attack the French, Her Majesty's government is not prepared to say that the latter would not be justified in pursuing their enemy beyond the boundary of Morocco."[43] Aberdeen clearly hoped to remove the excuse for the French expedition and thereby prevent all complications which might result. He recognized the legality of Guizot's claims against the Emperor, but he had to face a militant opposition in Parliament which watched closely for flaws in his foreign policy.

British public opinion was especially critical towards the Moroccan expedition because of the prevailing dispute with France over the island of Tahiti. France was condemned for the imprisonment of the English Consul at Tahiti. The French *chargé d'affaires* in London wrote Guizot that "war now is generally regarded as inevitable."[44] Aberdeen favored an attempt at compromise in spite of a bitter protest in Parliament.[45] Guizot stated: "The greater the excitement, the more necessary it becomes to allow it time to cool down. For the moment we must abstain from all discussions of the subject."[46] Guizot was criticized in the Chambers for his leniency towards Great Britain and demands for war were

[42] *Ibid.*, June 13, 1844.
[43] F. O., Consular Reports, Morocco 99/13. Foreign Office to Hay, June 15, 1844.
[44] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 664. Jarnac to Guizot, August 22, 1844.
[45] F. O., France 27/691. Aberdeen to Cowley, August 23, 1844.
[46] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 664. Guizot to Jarnac, August 8, 1844.

heard from all directions.[47] Louis Philippe was not willing to go to the extreme of war over either Tahiti or Morocco.[48] He met the most stringent of the British objections in both cases. A monetary indemnity was offered to settle the Tahiti dispute[49] and the French troops were ordered to evacuate Morocco as soon as the Emperor agreed to expel Abd-el-Kader.[50] A treaty of peace was signed with the Court at Fez on September 10, 1844, which included all the demands made by the French.

The crisis just ended was much more serious than commonly believed. The determination of both nations to carry out their plans was prompted by convictions that were well defined. By virtue of personal convictions and for political reasons, Guizot saw the necessity of bringing pressure to bear against the government of Morocco in order to overcome Abd-el-Kader.[51] At the same time he harbored some resentment against Great Britain for supporting the Chieftain.[52] Aberdeen considered French intervention as very serious and sent three battleships to the scene of action to keep watch over French activity.[53] Even the signing of the treaty of peace between France and Morocco did not remove all the suspicion from the mind of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. "The authority of the Emperor is shaken severely," wrote Aberdeen, "and any fresh shock may expose even his throne itself, to our great hazard. Our paramount object must be to exert ourselves to our utmost in assisting to uphold that authority, and to avert every incident which might threaten it with fresh danger."[54] The British Consul in Morocco was asked to keep a "vigilant eye on all attempts of the French, whether professedly

[47] F. O., France 27/699. Cowley to Aberdeen, August 5, 1844.
[48] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 664. Guizot to Jarnac, August 29, 1844.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] De Card, *Les Traités entre la France et la Morac*, 52 ff.
[51] A. E. C. P., Angleterre 663. Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, June 6, 1844.
[52] *Ibid.*, June 27, 1844. *Ibid.*, 664. October 20, 1844.
[53] *Ibid.*, Jarnac to Guizot, July 9, 1844.
[54] F. O., Consular Reports, Morocco 99/24. Foreign Office to Hay, May 26, 1845.

private or public, to open independent communication with territories claimed by or contiguous to Morocco."[55] Uneasiness existed in the British government for some time. In 1846, Addington, undersecretary in the Foreign Office wrote Hay: "You understand in the meantime in confidence, that we have no objection to clogging their [the French] wheels by all legitimate means."[56]

While the Anglo-French controversy over Morocco was at its highest pitch Aberdeen listened once again to Russian entreaties for an alliance against France.[57] The Czar visited London in June, 1844,[58] and there is some indication that a preliminary verbal agreement was reached.[59] But in the end the British followed their old policy of steering a middle course.

The Moroccan crisis came at a time when there was supposedly a "cordial understanding" between Great Britain and France. This shows in reality how artificial the understanding was and to what extent the rivalry between the two countries was fundamental. Aberdeen and Guizot tried, within certain limitations, to make this supposed understanding an actuality rather than a myth. The monarchs of the two countries gave their support. They exchanged visits, which was quite unusual, and went to great lengths to be courteous to each other. While in England Louis Philippe was initiated into the Order of the Garter with medieval splendor. Queen Victoria afterwards referred to her visit at Eu as one of her most pleasant experiences. These manifestations of friendship, however, proved to be mere gestures as far as any fundamental effect on the policies of the two countries was concerned. Numerous instances of friction were constant reminders of the fact that they were not

[55] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1845.
[56] *Ibid.*, 99/30. Addington to Hay, October 16, 1846.
[57] Goriainov, "Secret Agreement of 1844 between Russia and England," *Russian Review* (Liverpool) I, 1912. *Hansard*, CXXXII, 157-190. 287-300.
[58] Stockmar, *Memoirs*, II, 110-115.
[59] F. O., Russia 65/300. Bloomfield to Aberdeen, September 21, 1844.

allies but rivals. Misunderstandings over Mediterranean affairs were not solely responsible for the estrangement but they played a conspicuous part. Besides the Tahiti incident there was the ever-recurring problem of Spain and Portugal. This was of course very closely associated with, if not a part of, the Mediterranean policies of both countries. It is doubtful if Louis Philippe or Guizot ever very closely associated the two but Bulwer truthfully pointed out that "in order to carry out successfully her [France's] plan of aggrandizement in Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, and Egypt she must exercise a paramount influence at Madrid."[60]

There was no complete understanding between Great Britain and France over the policies they were to follow in regard to the disorders in Spain and Portugal. France took no particular interest in the affairs of Portugal but she was much interested in Spain. The King of France, according to the provisions of the Quadruple Alliance signed in 1834, was only to do "whatever might be settled by common consent between himself and his three august Allies." The faithfulness of the French government in carrying out the provisions of the Alliance is questionable. An offer from Great Britain in 1836, for united action was refused, probably because of Metternich's influence.[61] The unsuccessful termination of the marriage negotiations between France and Austria, and Isabella's approach to a marriageable age brought the Spanish question to the attention of the French. Louis Philippe desired the young Spanish Queen to marry a member of his family and thus continue the close family connection that had existed between France and Spain for almost a century and a half. The British government favored the choice of a Coburg Prince. Queen Isabella had a sister Louisa, also of marriageable age. In case Isabella's

[60] Hall, *op. cit.*, 389.

[61] Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, 77.

marriage should be childless, then Louisa's children would succeed to the throne. Guizot was willing to allow the Queen to marry a Coburg Prince provided Louisa be permitted to marry a French Prince.[62]

Palmerston returned to office on June 26, 1846. He was very unpopular in France and his return to office broke down what good feeling did exist between the two countries. Guizot's militant opposition to Palmerston was augmented by his recent victory in the French Chambers.[63] He was quite willing to take up the gauntlet: "I am expecting his hostility and I shall behave accordingly. It shall not be I who will give up Spain to Lord Palmerston."[64]

Guizot, aided by Bresson, the French Minister at Madrid, made good his threats. On October 8, 1846, Queen Isabella married the Duke of Cadiz and the Infanta married the Duke of Montpensier, son of Louis Philippe.[65] The whole British nation was indignant. Queen Victoria, urged on by Palmerston,[66] wrote a haughty note to the Queen of France deriding her and the French policy in no uncertain terms.[67] She even confided to Leopold of Belgium that a declaration of war against France might be advisable.[68] War was not declared and the marriages were allowed to stand; but what respect Palmerston had for France, especially the government of Louis Philippe, was gone. The death knell of the long-dying "cordial understanding" had been sounded.[69]

Palmerston's return to office in 1846 marked the beginning of a much more aggressive British policy in the Mediterranean. Italy, Spain, Greece, and Egypt were centers of great activity.[70] Palmerston had as his aides in this under-

[62] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VIII, 226 ff.
[63] *Ibid.*, 279.
[64] Bourgeois, *Modern France*, I, 271.
[65] Lavisse, *op. cit.*, V, 310 ff.
[66] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II, 97.
[67] *Ibid.*, 101.
[68] *Ibid.*
[69] Hall, *op. cit.*, 400 ff.
[70] Thureau-Dangin, *op. cit.*, VI, 193.

taking such men as Stratford Canning, Bulwer, Lyons, and Normandy, each a man with outstanding diplomatic ability and all faithful in endeavoring to carry out the duties assigned them. These men were directed to outdo France in particular.

There was Anglo-French competition at every turn. Palmerston was annoyed by the pomp and display with which the *école française d'Athenes* was established in 1846. There was bitter competition between the agents of both countries in Greece, but in the long run the British seemed to gain a slight advantage.[71] Palmerston also actively intervened in Italy. He sent Lord Minto into that country ostensibly to promote peace, but actually to further the interests of Great Britain. Lord Minto encouraged Charles Albert of Savoy to resist the tyrannical government of Naples. At Rome he protested against the Austrian outrages at Ferrara, and he spread the doctrine of liberty and unity wherever he went.[72] Guizot in turn sent Count Rossi into Italy to offset British influence. Count Rossi's instructions, in contrast to those of Lord Minto, were to encourage "enlightened conservatism." Neither of the two agents was momentarily successful. Their work was not only illustrative of Anglo-French rivalry but indicated some future developments.[73]

Egypt, like most of the North African countries, continued to be the scene of Anglo-French competition. By the middle of the nineteenth century the British government had come to realize the significance of a line of communication to the Red Sea by way of the Mediterranean. In 1847 over 3,000 passengers were transported across the Isthmus. It took 2,563 camels, 440 horses and sixty-four vans to transport the passengers and commodities across the Isthmus. New steamships were built to carry mail from India to

[71] Bourgeois, *Modern France*, I, 277. Bulwer, *Palmerston*, III, 199.
[72] Hall, *op. cit.*, 417.
[73] Guizot, *Mémoires*, VIII, 342-356. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, December 25, 1848.

Europe twice each month.[74] The practicability of the Mediterranean route was being adequately demonstrated. There had been for some time agitation in Great Britain for a more effective line of communication through the Suez. The East India Company preferred a canal and urged Palmerston in February, 1841, to encourage it.[75] The French had never given up the idea of a canal since Napoleon made his survey. In 1845 there was unusual activity on the part of the French. Palmerston was informed in 1847 that the French had a definite plan for a canal which they were about to execute.[76] Mehemet Ali welcomed the adventurers from both countries. He saw the possibility of advancing his own interests and was prepared to accept the highest bid for the right to construct a line of communication connecting the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. The British could not be too aggressive on account of the Sultan, and their hesitations allowed the French to push ahead since Mehemet Ali was already more favorable to France than to Great Britain.

Palmerston was hesitant about backing the proposed canal across the Suez. He was afraid of the international effects of a water passage across Turkish territory. "A ship canal from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, if such a work were practicable, would be a different thing; and it is needless to point out how such a work, changing as it would the relative position of some of the maritime powers of Europe towards each other, would involve the possibility of political consequences of great import and might seriously affect the foreign relations of the Turkish Empire."[77] A canal in such a strategic position might present to the British the same difficulty as a second Bosphorus. And one, in Palmerston's estimation, was enough. Palmerston was much more in

[74] *Parliamentary Papers* (1851) no. 605.
[75] F. O., Egypt 97/411. Anderson to Palmerston, February 20, 1841.
[76] *Ibid.*, 408. Murray to Palmerston, May 3, 1847.
[77] F. O., Turkey 78/411. Palmerston to Stratford Canning, July 24, 1851.

favor of a railroad than a canal. He urged his agent to point out to the Pasha "the costliness, if not the impracticability, of such a project; and you should point out that the persons who press upon the Pasha such a chimerical scheme, do so evidently for the purpose of diverting him from the railway which would be perfectly feasible and comparatively cheap."[78] The Revolution of 1848 in France called a halt to her progress in the Near East. This undoubtedly prevented at the time a crisis similar to the Fashoda incident which occurred half a century later.

Palmerston's attitude towards France since the episode of the Spanish marriages was far from friendly. He ridiculed Guizot's foreign policy by sponsoring liberalism in Switzerland and Italy,[79] while Guizot followed the more unpopular cause of conservatism. Thiers led the opposition to Guizot and there is some indication that he coöperated with Palmerston against Louis Philippe's government.[80] Whether Palmerston's aid in breaking down the Orleans Monarchy was premeditated or not cannot be definitely determined, but the effect, intentional or otherwise, was none the less evident.

Palmerston stands as the master diplomat of his period. His policies were nearly all carried through not only in spite of the opposition from abroad but also in defiance of a strong faction at home. The *status quo* policy was successful except in the case of Algiers. There the French occupation occurred before he came into office. He held in check not only the French but the Russians and Mehemet Ali as well. Turkey was kept alive when death seemed very probable. At other times he held the Sultan in check when, intoxicated with the results of minor successes, that potentate was de-

[78] F. O., Egypt 97/411. Foreign Office to Murray, February 8, 1847.

[79] Hall, *op. cit.*, 438. Stockmar, *Memoirs*, II, 203 ff.

[80] Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique Politique Étrangère*, III, 263. Thureau-Dangin, *op. cit.*, VI, 284 ff. Guyot, *La Première Entente Cordiale*, 296 ff.

termined to undertake adventures which would have been suicidal. The success of the British policy in the Mediterranean, however, cannot be entirely attributed to one man but perhaps more to the fact that, in spite of changes in ministries, there was unity in their policies. Just the opposite can be said of France. The great variations which were characteristic of the numerous ministers and even of the King himself, were not conducive to progress. There was a great difference between the policies of Périer and Guizot, and a vast change in the ideas of Louis Philippe between 1830 and 1848.

The French were able to retain Algeria after a long struggle with both internal and external foes. The surrender of Abd-el-Kader in 1847 broke the backbone of native resistance. Algeria was by no means the limit of French ambitions. Napoleon III intimated to Bismarck that he would like to make the Mediterranean a French lake.[81] The work of Napoleon III and the succeeding governments of France is but a continuation of what we have attempted to trace in the earlier period, and it continued with even greater intensity down to the very eve of the *Entente Cordiale* in 1904. Palmerston's prediction made on October 7, 1859, that "France will never consider herself secure in Algeria until she had added Morocco to Algeria,"[82] was almost prophetical.

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[81] *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, IV, no. 1207.

[82] Gooch, *Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840-1878*, II, 242. Palmerston to Russell, October 7, 1859.

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